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JPRS-UMA-84-019

8 March 1984

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# USSR Report

## MILITARY AFFAIRS

## MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No. 12, December 1983

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MILITARY AFFAIRS**

**MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL**

No 12, December 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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## WORLD WAR II: FIRST SOVIET OFFENSIVE AT ROSTOV DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 12-17

[Article by Maj Gen (Res) N. Kirichenko\*: "In the Battles for Rostov-na-Donu (October-December 1941)"]

[Text] The Nazi Command viewed Rostov-na-Donu as the "gates" to the Caucasus or as the "key" to them. The troops of the German Army Group South was given the mission, after the capturing of the Donets Basin, of attacking Rostov and without a halt to capture it and develop the offensive further toward the Caucasus.

For taking the Rostov Industrial Area, the command of the Army Group South assigned the 1st Tank Army of Gen E. Kleist which included the XIV and III Motorized Corps, the XLIX Mountain Rifle Corps and an Italian mobile corps.

Reinforced with a significant number of personnel and combat equipment, the army numbered over 300 tanks and 100 armored vehicles. In addition, enemy aviation constantly maintained air superiority.<sup>1</sup>

The offensive by the 1st Tank Army on the Rostov axis was parried by the 9th Army (commander, Maj Gen F. N. Kharitonov). To the right the troops of the 18th Army were on the defensive. The strength of these field forces was limited and there was a shortage of artillery and particularly aviation and tanks. The rifle divisions were significantly under strength while the personnel was fatigued by the extended defensive battles.

At the end of September 1941, the Army Group South broke through the defenses of the Southern Front and, in developing the offensive, the enemy during the first days of December reached the distant approaches to Rostov. Difficult conditions confronted our troops. It was essential to stop the enemy and prevent it from taking Rostov. By a decision of the command of the Southern Front on 11 October 1941, the Taganrog Operational Group was organized (it was

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\* During this period the author was the senior instructor and later the assistant chief for Komsomol work in the political section of the 56th Separate Army.

headed by the commander of the SKVO [Northern Caucasus Military District], Lt Gen F. N. Remezov) consisting of three rifle divisions (31st, 339th and 150th), the 26th Motorcycle Regiment, the 38th NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] Rifle Division, the Rostov Infantry School and the Novocherkassk Cavalry School. On 15 October, the group included also the 35th, 56th and 66th Cavalry Divisions.<sup>2</sup>

Fierce defensive battles ensued. Units from the Taganrog Operational Group and formations from the 9th Army not only defended themselves stubbornly but also made a strong counterattack from the line of the Mius River against the enemy which had broken through.

In later recalling these critical days, the former commander of the SKVO, Gen F. N. Remezov, wrote that in 7 days the Taganrog Operational Group grew into an army grouping which successfully carried out the important mission of eliminating the deep operational breakthrough by the Nazi tank and mechanized units in the southern sector.<sup>3</sup>

At this time Hq SHC [Headquarters, Supreme High Command], from the headquarters of the SKVO and the assigned rifle, cavalry divisions and reinforcements on 17 October 1941, completed the organization of the 56th Separate Army (commander, Lt Gen F. N. Remezov) for the immediate defense of Rostov. The army consisted of five rifle divisions (31st, 317th, 343d, 347th and 353d) and four cavalry divisions (62d, 64th, 68th and 70th), one tank brigade (the 6th) and the Rostov School. It was reinforced by three artillery regiments (the 515th Heavy Artillery Regiment, the 526th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the SVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve] and the 476th Field Artillery Regiment) possessing 56 guns as well as the 8th Guards Mortar [Rocket] Regiment. The 6th Tank Brigade which was part of the army had 105 predominantly light tanks and 16 armored vehicles.<sup>4</sup> The units and formations of the 56th Army drove off all the Nazi attacks. Then the enemy shifted the main thrust to the zone of the 9th Army.

From 22 October through 9 November 1941, the troops of the 9th Army in heavy defensive battles thwarted the plans of the Nazi Command. Having lost 146 tanks, 10 armored vehicles, 54 guns and mortars and around 9,000 killed and wounded, the troops of the 1st Tank Army were able to advance only 38 km but were halted on the rear defensive line.

Having failed in taking Rostov by enveloping strikes through Shakhty and Novocherkassk, the Nazi Command began to create a grouping for attacking Rostov by the shortest route, that is, against the 56th Army.

On 11 November, in the sector of the 56th Army the enemy commenced active operations by reconnaissance groups and air reconnaissance in the area of Rostov and Novocherkassk and intensified the air strikes against the railroad stations to the south and north of Rostov. On 17 November, after heavy artillery and air softening up, the enemy went over to an offensive, making the main thrust on the axis of Generalskoye and Bolshiye Saly.

In this sector, in a narrow section of the front, three tank divisions and one motorized one were concentrated with strong artillery and air support. Fierce,

bloody battles began. The first tank attacks were driven off. However, the Nazis committed constantly new forces. Some tanks rolled back while others in a new wave continued to assault the defensive positions of the 56th Army.

On 19 November, at a price of high losses, the enemy succeeded in breaking through into the northern edge of the city. On the following day the Nazis attempted to capture the crossing over the Don in the area of Aksayskaya but, encountering heavy fire from the troops on the defensive here, were unsuccessful. Then the enemy attacked the center of Rostov. Street battles ensued. During the night of 20 November and the entire following day, the units of the 56th Separate Army unstintingly defended the city. On 21 November, the enemy had captured Rostov. Our units had retreated beyond the Don.<sup>6</sup> The retreat and crossing of the Don by the troops of the 56th Army were covered by the 33d Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 230th NKVD Regiment and the Rostov People's Militia Regiment which continued to fight fierce battles in the city streets and were the last to retreat across the Don.

Having captured the city, the Nazi Command stated boastfully to the entire world that the defenses on the Don had been broken and the 56th Army defeated and that now the way was open to the Caucasus.


In conducting defensive battles against the troops of the 1st Tank Army, the command of the Southern Front was preparing a counteroffensive in the aim of routing it and halting the offensive by the Nazi troops to the south. On 9 November 1941, the divisions being turned over to the Southern Front from the RVGK began to be shifted and the troops were regrouped within the front. The main attack force of the front was the 37th Army (commander, Maj Gen A. I. Lopatin), and this included six rifle divisions, seven artillery regiments, three tank brigades, two mortar battalions and three armored trains. In addition, the counteroffensive involved a portion of the forces from the 18th and 9th Armies and a separate cavalry corps (two cavalry divisions). The assembly area (Kamensk, Krasnodon, Tatsyn) was chosen in such a manner that the attack grouping hung over the left flank and rear of the 1st Tank Army.

In the morning of 17 November, after a 30-minute artillery softening up, the assault group of the Southern Front went over to a counteroffensive. The Rostov Offensive Operation had started and in the course of this the outcome of the fight for Rostov was determined. The troops of the 37th Army, having broken through the enemy defenses, during the very first day advanced 15-18 km. The 9th Army also advanced successfully. The enemy, feeling itself threatened, committed its reserves and resisted desperately. During the subsequent 3 days the 37th Army in the sector of the main thrust succeeded in advancing 15-20 km. The basic reasons for the slow development of the offensive were the weak maneuvering of the resources and the poor organizing of cooperation between the infantry and the tanks and artillery. Moreover, during the first 5 days aviation was unable to operate because of bad weather.

On 20 November, a change was noted. The weather improved and the Southern Front Air Forces went into operation, providing substantial aid to the advancing troops. The 1st and 4th Mountain Rifle Divisions, the 16th Tank Division and the Motorized SS Division "Viking" of the Kleist Army suffered significant losses. The advance by the Soviet assault grouping created a real threat to

the flank and rear of the 1st Tank Army. The Nazi troops in Rostov were threatened by encirclement from the northwest. For this reason Kleist immediately began to shift the tank divisions to the north and was forced to abandon a further offensive to the south.

Against the 56th Separate Army, the Nazi Command left the reinforced motorized divisions, including the SS Division "Adolf Hitler." The Nazis hurriedly began to build their defenses, to create strongpoints in stone structures and mine the banks of the Don.



The Course of Combat at Rostov-na-Donu (27-29 November 1941)

**Key:** 1--Plan for defeating the Kleist Army by the Southern Front of 26 November 1941; 2--Position of sides by morning of 27 November; 3--Position of Southern Front troops by morning of 29 November; 4--Position of Southern Front troops by end of 29 November.

On 24 November 1941, Hq SHC set the immediate mission for the troops, namely, the liberation of Rostov. The field forces of the Southern Front by concentric strikes were to defeat the Kleist Army (see the diagram). The Southern Front with the forces of the 9th and 37th Armies were to attack Rostov from the north, the 56th Separate Army from the south and southeast. The first echelon troops from the 56th Army were put into two groups, eastern and western. The eastern group (commander, Maj Gen A. A. Grechkin) consisting of the 353d Rifle

and 64th Cavalry Divisions and a battalion from the military-political school had the mission of capturing the eastern edge of the city on the morning of 27 November by attacking toward Bolshoy Log, Ordzhonikidze.

The western group (commander, Maj Gen P. M. Kozlov) consisting of the 31st Rifle Division, the 13th and 78th Rifle Brigades, the 62d and 70th Cavalry Divisions from the morning of 27 November were to attack on the axis of Chaltyr and Kamenolomni and take the western edge of Rostov.

Moreover, the 343d Rifle Division, the Rostov People's Militia Regiment and the 347th Rifle Division with the 230th NKVD Regiment were to advance at the center, directly toward Rostov.

The offensive of the 56th Army started in a very difficult situation. Rostov stood on a steep bank and was elevated over the plain of the opposite bank. The battle formations of our troops could be seen by the enemy to their entire depth.

The ice on the Don was still thin and this excluded the possibility of moving not only the tanks but also motor vehicles and artillery across it. The entire burden of the attack rested on the infantry. Under these conditions the role of the individual subunits and assault groups increased and the initiative and boldness of each soldier, sergeant and commander assumed particular importance. In preparing for the offensive, party and Komsomol meetings were held and here they discussed the tasks and the order of action during the offensive.

The divisional staffs clarified the reconnaissance data on the enemy. As was assumed, the Nazis had organized a rather solid fire plan. On individual elevations and natural features dug-in tanks had been positioned. Carefully camouflaged firing positions were located in houses and other stone buildings.

The troops were moved up to the jump-off position for the offensive covertly, observing all blackout measures. Regardless of the frost, the lighting of bonfires was prohibited.

...Early in the morning of 27 November, our artillery made heavy strikes against the enemy defenses. The formations of the 56th Army began to assault the enemy positions.<sup>7</sup>

The 31st Rifle Division fought to take Nizhne-Gnilovskiy and Semernikovo. The men crossed a reed-covered floodplain and then a completely exposed area of terrain. When the units went out on the weak river ice, the Nazis unleashed an avalanche of fire against them using all the infantry weapons and the dug-in tanks. The ice was stained with the blood of the wounded but many of them continued to fight the enemy and advance--so great was the desire to liberate the city.

Regardless of the heroic efforts by the personnel of the regiments, the commanders and the political workers, on 27 November the 31st Rifle Division had not succeeded in breaking into the city. Only during the night of 29 November did its units reach the western outskirts, in the area of Krasnyy Gorod-Sad, they cut the Rostov--Taganrog Highway and forced the Nazis to flee, fearing encirclement.

...There were the first houses. Automatic and machine gun bursts exploded the frozen ground, raising a snowy dust. The men pressed themselves in the openings of houses and the road ditches. But a fierce, ardent hate led them forward. They advanced from house to house, from street to street.

The men of the 347th and 343d Rifle Divisions also fought heroically. The sub-units of the 230th NKVD Regiment and the Rostov People's Militia Rifle Regiment attached to the 343d Rifle Division fought with particular energy and daring. Their active operations contributed much to the successful carrying out of the operation.

The Rostov People's Militia Rifle Regiment, in fighting in the first echelon, during the night of 28 November, in a strength of two battalions under the personal leadership of the regiment's commander, Capt M. A. Varfolomeyev, secretly crossed to the right bank of the Don and captured a bridgehead in the area of the cement and slate plant and then, on 28 and 29 November, in conducting fierce battles for each house, broadened the bridgehead. The regiment supported the crossing of the basic forces of the 343d Rifle Division and on 29 November reached the area of Krasnyy Gorod-Sad where it linked up with the 31st Rifle Division.

On 29 November, the units of the 9th Army broke into Rostov from the north and northeast. On this day Rostov was finally cleared of Nazi invaders. The enemy had fled, abandoning tanks, weapons and ammunition. The attempts to cover the retreat by groups of motorized infantry and individual tanks had not been successful. By the end of the day the units of the Western Group had occupied Khopry and Chaltyr.

The faces of people shown with the happiness of the first great victory. The city's population, paying no attention to the frost, came out on the streets. Many of them rushed to the soldiers, they embraced, kissed and shook their hands, thanking them for liberating.

In retreating, the Nazi butchers in bestial anger destroyed everything alive. By the building of the railroad depot lay several killed railway workers with their weapons in frozen hands. This showed that along with our soldiers they had been driving the enemy away from their Rostov railroad junction. By the wall of a large grey building at No 5 Engels Street, lay the bodies of old people, women and children. There were particularly many executed persons in the center of the city and on Theater Square. One very young girl lay on the ground, her head tilted awkwardly, her eyes were open and in them were the frozen terror and the question: "Why?"

After the liberation of Rostov the troops of the Southern Front began to pursue the enemy. On 30 November, a mobile group was formed in the 56th Army consisting of the 64th and 70th Cavalry Divisions and the 54th Tank Brigade. In the morning of 1 December, the mobile group began pursuit in the direction of Suyetin-Saly, Veselyy and Morskoy Chulek. However, the Nazis had succeeded in organizing their defenses on a previously prepared line beyond the Satbek River. Repeated attempts by the formations of the 56th Army to break through were unsuccessful, as the artillery had not participated in the course of the pursuit having remained at the crossings over the Don. By 5 December, the front of the 56th Army had stabilized on the line of the Miuss River.

Aviation took an active part in the operation. Night and day the bombers attacked the enemy concentrations. The fighters covered the troops and major installations of the rear.

Effective party political work contributed to the high morale of the Soviet troops in the battles at Rostov. All the activities of the military councils, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations were aimed at ensuring the fulfillment of the set missions.

A majority of the workers from the political sections of the armies and divisions as well as the political workers from the regiments was directly in the first echelon advancing companies. The main slogan under which party political work was carried out was: "Forward Against the Enemy, Rostov Should Be Soviet, the Nazi Occupiers Should Be Defeated." Great importance was paid to the personal example of the communists and Komsomol members in offensive combat.

Interesting figures show the high moral and political upswing of the personnel and the party's authority during this difficult period of the war. In the course of the offensive battles at the end of November and the beginning of December, 101 persons were admitted to the ranks of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)], 444 became candidate members and 380 persons joined the Komsomol.<sup>9</sup> After these successful battles in December-February, in the army 4,012 persons were admitted to the party, including 913 full members of the VKP(b) and 3,099 persons as candidate members,<sup>10</sup> while the Komsomol admitted 2,930 persons.<sup>11</sup>

The defeat of the Nazi troops at Rostov was of great military and political significance.

The Rostov Operation has gone down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as the first offensive operation which created favorable conditions for the Soviet Army to go over to the decisive counteroffensive at Moscow. In the course of this operation, the German occupiers suffered a major defeat. The crack tank grouping under the command of Gen Kleist suffered high losses: around 30,000 men, 80 airplanes, 275 tanks and over 350 guns. As a result, the plan of the Nazi Command to break through to the Caucasus was thwarted. The situation of our troops on the left wing of the Soviet-German Front was strengthened. The offensive by the Southern Front tied down the forces of the Army Group South and deprived the enemy of an opportunity to use this to strengthen the Army Group Center advancing toward Moscow.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> A. K. Oreshkin, "Oboronitel'naya operatsiya 9-y armii (oktyabr'--noyabr' 1941 g.)" [The Defensive Operation of the 9th Army (October-November 1941)], Voenizdat, 1960, p 8.

<sup>2</sup> TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 412, inv. 10282, file 2, sheets 5, 6.

<sup>3</sup> "Rozhdennaya v boyakh" [Born in Battle], Rostov, Rostovskoye khizhnoye izd-vo, 1977, p 16.

<sup>4</sup> TsAMO SSSR, folio 412, inv. 10282, file 10, sheets 6, 7, 23.

<sup>5</sup> [Not in text.]

<sup>6</sup> "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynы 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Vol 2, Voyenizdat, 1961, p 223.

<sup>7</sup> TsAMO SSSR, folio 412, inv. 10282, file 10, sheet 17.

<sup>8</sup> [Not in text.]

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., inv. 10295, file 15, sheet 17.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., file 39, sheets 9, 39.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., file 41, sheets 31-32.

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CSO: 1801/149

## WORLD WAR II: FIGHTER TACTICS AGAINST GROUND TARGETS EXAMINED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 18-23

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col N. Zavgorodniy:  
"From the Experience of the Combat Employment of Fighter Aviation Against  
Ground Targets During the Years of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] Some experience in employing fighters against ground targets was gained even during the period of World War I and the Civil War as well as in the local wars in the 1930's in Spain, China and the Far East.<sup>1</sup>

According to the 1940 field manual, the use of fighter aviation for attacking enemy ground targets was envisaged only in special cases.<sup>4</sup>

However, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet fighter aviation destroyed and neutralized ground targets both independently as well as along with carrying out other missions.

What factors determined the use of fighters against ground targets? During the first period of the war, they were employed for carrying out this mission due to the acute need for supporting the ground forces from the air. The Soviet Air Forces did not have a sufficient number of special attack planes while the frontal [tactical] bomber aviation had suffered high losses (in June 1941, the proportional amount of the Il-2 in the attack aviation was just 0.2 percent).<sup>5</sup>

The report on the combat results of the Western Front Air Forces over the 4 months of the war pointed out that as a consequence of the insufficient amount of bombers and attack planes, fighter aviation, in addition to carrying out the basic missions related to conducting air combat, were significantly employed for strafing attacks on the ground troops. The fighters of the National Air Defense Troops were also employed in operations against ground targets. Thus, in the defensive period of the Battle of Moscow, the VI Fighter Air Corps of National Air Defense made 27,226 combat sorties in the interests of the ground forces.<sup>6</sup>

Because of the shortage of airplanes as well as due to the fact that during the first months of the war the Soviet fighters were employed with insufficient effectiveness against the enemy ground targets, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense on 18 June 1942 issued an order on the employment of fighters as

daytime bombers. The order pointed out that "our fighters on the battlefield and in the close organic rear to a depth of 20-30 km behind the forward edge can successfully carry out the missions of daylight bombers. After dropping their bombs the fighters carry out their basic mission of destroying the air enemy and covering our troops...."<sup>7</sup> It was ordered that the bombload for the fighters be varied depending upon the nature of the targets, using for this purpose the FAB-100 [high-explosive bomb], FAB-50, ZAB-100 [incendiary bomb], ZAB-50 and AO-25 [fragmentation bomb]. The order demanded that the pilots be trained in daylight bombing in all the fighter air regiments in the front and in the rear.<sup>8</sup>

In the second and third periods of the war, fighters began to be employed even more for destroying ground targets and this was aided by the winning of air supremacy by the Soviet Air Forces. By this time the effectiveness of enemy troop air defenses had markedly increased and they put up strong resistance to our attack and bomber aviation. The higher speed and maneuvering qualities of the fighter in comparison with the attack planes made it possible for them to more successfully overcome the resistance of enemy antiaircraft weapons and to make surprise, effective strikes against them, providing favorable conditions for successful bomber and attack operations. One of the directives from the command of the Soviet Army Air Forces in September 1944 stated that the winning of unchallenged air supremacy had created all conditions for the widest use of fighters for hitting ground troops using bombs and machine gun and cannon fire.<sup>9</sup> For example, in the course of the Belorussian Offensive Operation of 1944, the II Fighter Corps from 23 June through 29 August 1944, out of the total 6,127 aircraft sorties, made 360 sorties to attack troops and make strikes against enemy airfields.<sup>10</sup> The units and formations of the III Fighter Corps during this same operation in June-August, out of the 6,289 aircraft sorties, made 340 aircraft sorties for operating against enemy ground installations.<sup>11</sup> Particularly effective were the fighter strafing attacks against retreating enemy columns under the conditions of wooded swampy terrain with a limited number of roads.

During the period of the East Prussian Operation of 1945, 200 airplanes from the XI Fighter Corps were prepared for bombing strikes against point targets.<sup>12</sup> During the single day of 16 January 1945, the fighter pilots in Yak-9 destroyed 186 motor vehicles, 5 tanks and 5 tank trucks.<sup>13</sup>

Motor vehicle columns and individual vehicles, antiaircraft weapons, trains and station facilities, airplanes at airfields, and enemy artillery were the most important ground objects against which the fighters were employed during the war years. At times the fighters were also used against tanks.

The weapons of the Soviet fighters were continuously improved and this made it possible for them to more effectively hit the ground targets. Thus, from mid-1942 the Yaks and Lavrochkins began carrying rockets (RS). The Yak-9T fighter armed with 37-mm or 45-mm cannons was also successfully employed against ground targets.<sup>14</sup>

From 1944, for destroying ground targets the Yak-9B plane began to be used with inside bomb suspension for up to 400 kg.<sup>15</sup> The 130th Fighter Division (commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Col F. I. Shinkarenko) was organized as part

of the 1st Air Army, and this division was equipped with these planes. The division was successfully employed for carrying out the most diverse missions, including: thwarting operational movements, attacks against reserves, air-fields, artillery and mortar batteries and other ground targets.

The experience of employing fighters to destroy ground targets led to the development of multi-purpose planes capable of destroying both air and ground targets. The Yak-9B can be considered the prototype of such planes and the 130th Fighter Division which flew these planes can be considered the first representative of a new branch of combat aviation--fighter-bomber.

The fighter tactical procedures and methods of operations against ground targets were marked by certain particular features. First of all, these depended upon whether or not the fighters were operating against ground targets along with carrying out other missions or had specially sortied for hitting the targets planned for them. In the course of carrying out the tasks of covering the troops, before beginning patrolling, the fighters made bomb strikes against the enemy, and having completed their patrolling, fired on its ground installations with machine gun and cannon fire, leaving an untouched reserve of ammunition for countering enemy airplanes in returning to their airfields. In supporting the combat operations of the other branches of aviation, the fighters, if the situation permitted, neutralized (destroyed) enemy air defenses first of all in the combat area of the covered planes.

During the third period of the war, the Soviet fighters were employed particularly widely for countering enemy antiaircraft artillery covering the air-fields, troops, crossings and other important installations. As a rule, the fighters attacked the antiaircraft artillery along with supporting the combat operations of the other branches of aviation as well as with independent operations against Nazi airfields. Here the fighter formations included special groups to neutralize the antiaircraft artillery. The positions of the weapons to be neutralized by the fighters as well as the approaches to them were carefully studied from maps and the photomosaics and the routes for approaching the targets were chosen considering the weather conditions, the antiaircraft artillery cover around the objects of the attack and the possibilities of an antiflak maneuver.

The size of the neutralization group, the methods of its combat operations and the bombload depended upon the composition and nature of the enemy air defense operations. An attack on its antiaircraft artillery batteries, as a rule, was made by the diving of individual planes, pairs or flights, in firing on the targets with machine gun and cannon fire from altitudes of 400-600 m. For carrying out the combat mission, the neutralization group assumed a position in the fighter cover formation, providing the attack aviation against possible enemy fighter attacks.

In the course of the air support for ground troops, when the enemy air defenses had been sufficiently neutralized, our fighters operated together with the supported aviation predominantly at areal targets such as a concentration of personnel and equipment, airfields, railroad stations, motor vehicle columns and so forth.

The particular features of fighter tactics in operations against ground targets in escorting attack aviation were that ordinarily the fighters participated with a portion of their forces in the last attack plane assault.

In escorting and covering frontal bombers, the fighters were employed sporadically against ground targets. This was determined by their lack of sights for effectively hitting small-sized mobile objects from altitudes at which the bombers operated (3,000-7,000 m).

In supporting bomber operations against airfields, the fighters, if the situation permitted, attacked airplanes on alert, antiaircraft weapons, control posts and dumps. However, their basic mission was to cover the bombers along the route and in the target area. For this reason, as soon as a threat arose of an enemy fighter attack, our fighters immediately halted the carrying out of other missions and concentrated their efforts solely on covering the bombers.

As experience showed, for hitting ground targets the most effective was echeloned [wave] operations which during the war years were continuously improved. While the first period of the war was characterized by sporadic attacks in small groups, in the third the composition of the groups was gradually increased. More and more often squadrons made the attacks. Fighters rarely made concentrated attacks in the war years, and these were basically against troop groups and other important objects. Fighter formations consisted of attack and cover groups which were able by turn to replace each other and carry out one or another mission.

In attacking enemy movements, accumulations of troops and equipment by crossings, the Soviet fighters employed "free hunting." The essence of this method of combat was a flight over enemy territory by small groups of planes for seeking out and destroying targets. This method was employed most effectively in searching for enemy motor vehicle columns. Fighters, flying, as a rule, away from the road or crossing it in a "snake" formation, detected and attacked motor vehicle columns most often from a gentle dive at an angle of 25-30°. In opening fire from an altitude of 200-300 m and at a range of 400 m and in halting fire at an altitude of 100 m, a pilot in a Yak-9 was able to get off 2 or 3 rounds of the 37-mm cannon in an aimed burst and 12-15 rounds from the small-caliber machine guns or 20-mm cannon.

The experience of fighter operations against motor vehicle columns showed that each airplane most often made aimed fire at one vehicle and in the event of a miss ceased fire and aimed at a new target. This was explained by the fact that during the repeat run against the same target, the personnel which was in the previously attacked vehicle had been able to spread out over the terrain and the attack no longer made sense. If the motor vehicle columns had to be attacked at a wide angle relative to the direction of their movement, the fire most often was opened up from an altitude of 100-150 m.

In operating against trains en route, the Yak-9B planes attacked with a dive predominantly from altitudes of 600-1,000 m at an angle of 10-15° relative to the train's axis of movement. The first attack was made against the steam locomotive and subsequent ones against the boxcars and flatcars. Subsequently the planes fired their cannons and machine guns from altitudes of 200-400 m and sometimes also from a low-altitude flight.<sup>16</sup>

During the war years, the Soviet fighters, under the conditions of heavy resistance from the enemy fighters, were specially involved in independent operations against Nazi airfields. For carrying out this mission, the fighters had a number of advantages over attack aviation. They did not need to be escorted to the target and back and it was not necessary to organize cooperation between the mixed air groups. The proximity of the bases to the front line and the higher speeds of the fighters made it possible for them to quickly reach the enemy field, to make a surprise attack on it and to destroy the scrambling and returning planes. In preparing to make an attack on the airfield, the crews and subunits carefully studied the route of flight to the target and back, the position of the air defenses and their capability and the procedure for making the attack. On the eve of the raid, a final reconnaissance of the target was frequently made and the data from other types of reconnaissance were analyzed. The proper measures were taken to detect not only the location of the airfield but also the number and type of airplanes at it, their parking areas and the methods of camouflage, the combat readiness of the air defenses at the airfield and so forth. The airfields were located by the successive visual surveillance and photographing of certain areas or regions of terrain, and verifying from the air the data received from various sources (partisans, covert intelligence, local inhabitants and so forth).

Depending upon the available resources and the existing air situation, a portion of the fighters was assigned to destroy the enemy antiaircraft weapons and another portion for combating enemy aviation in the air and hitting the enemy airplanes scrambling from the airfield. Ordinarily the fighters began the attack on the airfield by dropping bombs and completed it by hitting targets with machine gun and cannon fire. Particular attention was given to destroying the antiaircraft batteries, airplanes on alert, airplanes at parking areas, special motor transport, control posts and fuel and ammunition dumps.

The greatest effectiveness in a fighter strike was achieved by firing all the weapons at one most important object (fighters on alert, an air transport, an antiaircraft weapons crew or control post). In making a surprise attack, the fighters pulled out of the attack with a combat turn toward the sun, clouds or, using natural features, left in a low-altitude flight.

In actual combat operations, average fighter forces were set for hitting typical ground installations. For example, a fighter squadron was capable of causing significant damage, disorganizing and delaying the movement of an infantry battalion for 1 hour, a fighter regiment could do the same for an infantry regiment. One fighter flight was enough to check the movement of an artillery battery consisting of four-six guns and six-eight motor vehicles in a column. An air squadron was assigned to hit a train.<sup>18</sup>

The specific actions of fighter pilots against ground targets (preparation for combat and the carrying out of a mission in a short time, as a rule, along with carrying out other missions, the necessity of equipping the planes with a special unit of fire, reciprocal cooperation in escorting aviation or ground troops) necessitated their particular preparation. Special preparation of the fighters as bombers was organized. Exercises were held in studying bombing methods from a fighter and the operation of bombing weapons. If time allowed,

training flights were conducted with practice bombing in pairs and flights against objects located on terrain similar to the area of forthcoming combat.

The flight personnel mastered the art of flying under instrument conditions and the ability, with the lack of sights on the fighters for bombing ground targets, of making accurate attacks on the first run against small-sized, mobile and active (antiaircraft artillery) enemy targets.

Here a positive role was played by the tactical flight exercises, conferences, demonstration firings and bomb strikes by ace pilots against ground targets,<sup>19</sup> the propagandizing of advanced experience in the press and the issuing of special instructions.<sup>20</sup> A group of party political measures was carried out to indoctrinate high moral, combat and political qualities in the flyers.

Fighter tactics in operations against ground targets was largely similar to attack air tactics, but its development was influenced by a number of particular features, in particular, the lack of early special training for the fighter pilots, the complexity of maneuvering the plane in attacking the target and the necessity of making the attack on the ground target while maintaining constant readiness to conduct air combat; the higher speed and maneuvering qualities of the airplane (than in the attack planes) making it possible to more successfully avoid enemy antiaircraft artillery fire; fighter vulnerability in operating at low altitudes against the fire of small caliber antiaircraft artillery and small arms.

Thus, the experience of destroying ground targets as acquired by the fighter pilots during the years of the Great Patriotic War, remains a precious heritage of the Soviet Air Forces. It is being improved and enriched in the daily practice of combat training for the units. The commanders, staffs, flight personnel and crews of the command posts of the Air Forces fighter aviation are working constantly to seek out the most effective methods for seeking, detecting and destroying important ground objects in the tactical zone and operational depth, relying on the experience acquired by predecessors and on the high combat capabilities of the new aviation equipment, combat control devices and electronic countermeasures.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> See I. B. Shaposhnikov, "Istoriya Vojenno-Vozdushnykh Sil (materialy po pervoy mirovoy i grazhdanskoy voynam)" [The History of the Air Forces (Materials on World War I and the Civil War)], Moscow, Izd. Vojennoy akademii General'nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR, 1976, pp 35, 102; I. P. Popov, "Istrebitel'naya aviatsiya" [Fighter Aviation], Vojenizdat, 1940, pp 31, 38, 98-104; B. Teplinskiy, "Osnovy obshchey taktiki Vojenno-Vozdushnykh Sil" [Principles in General Air Forces Tactics], Vojenizdat, 1940, p 155.

<sup>2</sup> [Not in text.]

<sup>3</sup> [Not in text.]

- <sup>4</sup> "Boyevoy ustav istrebitel'noy aviatsii (BUIA-40)" [Fighter Aviation Field Manual (BUIA-40)], Moscow, 1940, pp 6, 27-29.
- <sup>5</sup> "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [The History of Military Art], a textbook, Monino, Izd. VVA imeni Gagarina, 1978, p 21.
- <sup>6</sup> "Deystviya voysk PVO v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynye 1941-1945 gg." [Air Defense Troop Operations in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Izd. VPA, 1965, p 182.
- <sup>7</sup> VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1976, p 74.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>9</sup> Ye. G. Veraksa, "Razvitiye taktiki rodov aviatsii v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [The Development of the Tactics of Branches of Aviation During the Years of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Izd. VPA, 1965, p 32.
- <sup>10</sup> TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 290, inv. 3284, file 419, sheet 72.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., sheets 39, 66, 76.
- <sup>12</sup> M. N. Kozhevnikov, "Komandovaniye i shtab VVS Sovetskoy Armii v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynye 1941-1945 gg." [Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1977, p 203.
- <sup>13</sup> T. Khryukin, "Soviet Aviation Over East Prussia," VESTNIK VOZDUSHNOGO FLOTA, No 11, 1945, p 10.
- <sup>14</sup> A. S. Yakovlev, "Sovetskiye samolety" [Soviet Airplanes], Moscow, Nauka, 1975, p 74.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>16</sup> STALINSKIY SOKOL, 24 March 1945.
- <sup>17</sup> "Istrebitel'naya aviatsiya v Otechestvennoy voynye" [Fighter Aviation in the Patriotic War], a collection of articles, Voyenizdat, 1946, pp 247-251, 264-280.
- <sup>18</sup> G. V. Zimin, "Taktika v boyevykh primerakh" [Tactics in Combat Examples], Voyenizdat, 1982, pp 25-26.
- <sup>19</sup> See G. U. Dol'nikov, "Letit stal'naya eskadril'ya" [The Steel Squadron in the Air], Voyenizdat, 1983, pp 165-166.
- <sup>20</sup> "Istrebitel'naya aviatsiya v Otechestvennoy...," p 254.

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## WORLD WAR II: PURSUIT OF ENEMY BY DIVISIONAL UNITS EXAMINED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 24-28

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Col R. Portugal'skiy: "Control and Command of Divisional Units in Pursuit of the Enemy During the Years of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] The specific features of combat operations by rifle formations and units in pursuing the enemy during the years of the Great Patriotic War were determined by the missions they were carrying out, by their combat and maneuvering capabilities and by the nature of the enemy's operations in endeavoring using small forces to check the drive of the advancing troops in order to carry out an organized retreat of the main forces. The time factor played an important role in the successful carrying out of the pursuit tasks. Even F. Engels paid attention to this in emphasizing that "the speed of pursuit determines whether or not the retreat will be made in suitable order..."<sup>1</sup> For this reason, in control particular importance was assumed by the immediate adopting of a decision, the prompt giving of combat missions to subordinates, the achieving of the steady handling of situational data and the ensuring of continuous combat operations.

During the first period of the war, pursuit was organized most often only with the start of the enemy's retreat, that is, directly in the course of combat. Such a situation was explained by the limited time of preparations for the offensive (within 3-5 hours) and the lack of combat experience among the command personnel.

In organizing pursuit, the commanders and staffs paid basic attention to determining the effective strength and tasks of the forward detachments and to controlling them in the course of combat. As an example, in organizing the breakthrough of the intermediate defensive line in December 1941, the commander and staff from the 18th Rifle Division of the 16th Army envisaged the assigning of a forward detachment for pursuit consisting of a vehicle-mounted battalion, a tank company and a cavalry squadron. For controlling them an operations group was organized headed by the division's deputy commander. Communication was established over a radio link and duplicated by message sending.<sup>2</sup> Characteristically, from the experience of the counteroffensive at Moscow, a staff officer with a radio was frequently assigned to the detachment. This helped to

achieve stable command in the course of pursuit. At the same time, the units were frequently given shallow tasks. Little attention was paid to organizing reconnaissance, particularly on the flanks. Continuous pursuit was not ensured as nighttime operations, from the experience of more than 20 divisions on the Western Front, in January 1942 did not exceed 6-8 percent of the time. As a result, the average rate of advance was from 2.7 to 8.8 km a day. Moreover, the commanders and staffs did not always skillfully organize firing on the enemy and unsatisfactorily prepared the units and subunits to carry out the pending combat missions.

During the second period of the war, the most important measures in organizing pursuit, as a rule, began to be planned even in the preparations for breaking through the enemy defenses. The plan of the divisional commander more often determined what grouping would have to be defeated and what line reached for the enemy to retreat as well as what were the most probable means of its resistance. The assumed directions of the enemy retreat were also indicated. Here they designated the battle (approach-march and march) formation, the size and tasks of the forward detachments. The staff organized the control of the units considering the nature of the combat operations in the operational depth. For example, this is how the task was carried out in the 347th Division of the Transcaucasian Front in January 1943.<sup>3</sup> Careful preparation of the units and the reinforcing of them by tank subunits created an opportunity to pursue the enemy not only with the forward detachments but also with the remaining forces of the divisions. From the experience of pursuing the enemy in the Donets Basin and the battle for the Dnepr, in addition, one can trace a desire of the divisional commanders to sharply increase the fire, assault and maneuvering capabilities of the forward detachments. This task was carried out by reinforcing them with self-propelled artillery mounts [SAU], by artillery on mechanized traction and by combat engineer subunits. For contact with the main forces, the forward units were given one or two radios (in 5 divisions out of 13 in the 2d Guards, 51st and 5th Assault Armies in August 1943).

From the summer of 1943, the divisional staffs began to pay more and more attention to the organizing of reconnaissance. Its underestimation was one of the main reasons for the not-always-successful actions of the troops. Thus, the battle order of the commander of the 43d Army in the Kalinin Front of 30 September 1943 pointed out that "as a result of poor reconnaissance, the enemy escaped the pursuers and almost unobstructed retreated to intermediate lines."<sup>4</sup> For this reason, mobile reconnaissance bodies began to be included in the forward detachments with 20-30 submachine gunners on two or three motor vehicles (in the 130th and 221st Divisions of the 28th Army in November 1943) or a cavalry squadron reinforced by submachine gunners on motorcycles (in the 248th Division of the same army).<sup>5</sup> For achieving continuous pursuit, the commanders and staffs began to conduct nighttime operations more frequently, including by the division's main forces. In the aim of more effective fire damage to the enemy, light support was provided, forward artillery observation posts were assigned and equipment readied. Guides were appointed as well as officers and sergeants trained to guide the subunits using a compass.

The experience of those years showed that the work of the divisional staff in organizing enemy pursuit basically consisted in promptly detecting the beginning of the retreat by constantly conducting reconnaissance as well as to

quickly give the missions to the units and forward detachment by employing radio signals, coded maps and procedure tables. It was important to organize combat cooperation for all the available men and weapons. The basic questions of cooperation, as follows from the practice of those times, were: the achieving of clear understanding of their missions by the unit commanders, clarifying the area or direction of actions for the pursuing units and indicating by what time they should reach which lines, and coordinating the actions of the forward detachments assigned from the units with the subunits of the mobile group operating in the division's area and with the adjacent units and the aviation.

During the third period of the war the work of the formation commanders and staffs to ready the troops for pursuit was characterized by greater purposefulness and concreteness. The unit commanders up to then had been given information on the possible lines for going over to pursuit and instructions on the procedure of actions for the main forces (the first and second echelon units and the artillery group), the vanguards and the forward detachments. In giving the missions to the forward detachments, they began to designate assembly areas, jump-off lines and routes of advance. The methods of action and support measures were also indicated. The questions of organizing pursuit were worked out at command and staff exercises. Thus, in preparing for the East Prussia Operation (December 1944) in all the divisions of the 11th Guards Army, battle drill exercises were conducted with the forward detachments. The reinforcements were also involved in these. The rifle subunits were trained in rapid deployment into battle formation and closing up into approach-march and march formations; the tanks trained in firing on the move and from brief halts and the artillery troops in taking up firing positions and opening aimed fire.<sup>6</sup> A practice was made of combined party and Komsomol meetings: in the divisions of the 27th Army on the eve of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, in the formations of the 5th Guards Army prior to the start of the Vistula-Oder Operation. All of this had a positive effect upon the achieving of unity of actions in the course of pursuing the enemy.

The task of achieving continuous pursuit was successfully solved and this was aided by the careful preparation of the troops in anticipation of nighttime actions. Characteristic in this regard was the fact that in the period from 4 through 12 April 1945, almost 60 percent of the exercises conducted in 62 divisions of the first Belorussian Front were carried out under conditions of limited visibility. In them the personnel of the rifle units trained in actions as tank-borne forces. Artillery officers were assigned to radio-equipped tanks for artillery fire correction. The staffs gained experience in organizing a commandant service and operating communications equipment considering the particular features of nighttime actions.

An analysis of the experience of the commanders and staffs during the offensive operations of 1944-1945 makes it possible to note that there was ever-closer cooperation of the main forces and forward detachments of the all-arms formations (units) with the forward detachments and basic forces of the mobile groups. This was done primarily by the continuous exchange of operational and tactical information. There was also a broader range of tasks carried out by the vanguards, the enveloping detachments and the traffic support detachments. Moreover, it was envisaged, for example, in the divisions of the 6th Army in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation to have a specially prepared reserve

battalion which, as follows from the battle order of this army on 1 January 1945, "should be sent out to pursue the enemy all night long."<sup>7</sup> The great strength of the forward detachments, their high maneuvering capabilities and dependably organized radio communications made it possible to cross water obstacles without a halt (the Narew River by the divisions of the first echelon of the 48th Army in September 1944), to capture bridges (the bridge over the Pilica River in January 1945 by the forward detachment of the 270th Guards Rifle Regiment from the 89th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Assault Army),<sup>8</sup> and carry out other missions in the interests of achieving continuous pursuit and increasing its effectiveness.

In organizing pursuit, the commanders and staffs from the rifle divisions gave more and more attention to fire damage to the enemy. For this purpose the forward detachments were saturated as much as possible with self-propelled artillery, artillery on mechanized traction and rocket launchers. The operational groups from artillery units were assigned as part of forward detachments with the mission of accelerating the preparation of data for firing at the enemy from covered firing positions. The divisional staffs coordinated in detail the efforts of the troops with the aviation. Here of important significance was also the fact that from the summer of 1944, the air guidance officers were given the right not only to call in aviation but also to retarget it to new objectives.

During the designated period of the war, the question of ensuring dependable operation of the troop control systems was resolved more effectively. While in the autumn of 1942, the practice of sending staff officers with radios to the forward detachments had arisen, in 1944-1945, an auxiliary command post (VPU) headed by the deputy divisional (regimental) commander was often assigned from the command posts of the divisions and even the regiments. Small in size (four or five officers, two or three radios) and relatively maneuverable (two or three vehicles), such a point could better ensure the collection and analysis of situational data and respond promptly to the received information. The presence of an air guidance officer and a representative of the divisional (regimental) artillery group as part of the VPU provided an opportunity to coordinate fire, assault and maneuver of the troops in the course of pursuit.

With the going over to pursuit it became typical to have the positioning of all the command posts in the sector of the planned success. The command post where the chief of staff and the basic personnel of the divisional headquarters were, had to be more often with the main forces while the division's commander with a small group of officers was in the column of the vanguard regiment. Here communication was provided, as a rule, by radio and by using a messenger service. It should be particularly pointed out that the delivery of combat orders executed in the form of an order map (Vistula-Oder, Prague and other operations) became widespread. For stable control over the forward detachments, often a special point was set up for assembling reports and this was headed by a staff officer. A new feature in the organizing of communications with the first echelon units was the use of radio links (in 70-75 percent of the formations of the 27th Army in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation; in 90-93 percent of the divisions of the 8th Guards Army in the Berlin Operation).<sup>9</sup>

One of the areas of improving troop control in the course of pursuing the enemy in 1944-1945 was the fact that the questions of maintaining battleworthiness began to be solved more effectively. For example, the staff of the 372d Rifle Division by 20 March 1945 (in the East Pomeranian Operation) carried out a whole range of measures, including organizing in each unit two composite detachments each of which had two rifle companies and a mortar battery. The rifle regiments received the subunits of an artillery regiment and a tank killing battalion and a significant portion of the personnel from the rear facilities (subunits). This was explained by the great losses in the personnel of the division (80-120 men remained in the battalions), by the significant loss of officers (up to 60 percent) and by difficulties in organizing communications (by the start of the operation only 20 radios out of the 89 available were in working order).<sup>10</sup> The work carried out by the formation (unit) commanders and also by the staffs in the other operations of the last years of the war helped to achieve continuous pursuit. Its average pace in 1944-1945 rose up to 30-40 km a day. Here of major importance was the improving of party political work. Such forms of work as talks, the putting out of combat leaflets, express leaflets, appeal slogans, the passing on of advanced experience and congratulatory letters to the men and their families held an important place in indoctrinating a high offensive zeal in the troops, initiative, boldness and courage. Thus, the experience of the control of a division's units in pursuit during the years of the Great Patriotic War makes it possible to draw a number of conclusions.

In the first place, the basic content in the work of the commanders and staffs was the questions of organizing reconnaissance, fire damage to the enemy, night-time troop operations, the broad use of forward and enveloping detachments, and the coordinating of their efforts in carrying out the combat missions with the main forces as well as with adjacent units and the army (front) mobile groups operating in the zone of the division. An important role was assigned to protecting the boundaries and flanks and to achieving constant troop control.

Secondly, in the course of the war there was a process of improving command and control in the interests of ensuring continuous pursuit of the enemy. This was achieved by organizing careful preparation of the troops and the staffs for carrying out the combat missions, by echeloning the control posts by keeping commanders of the assigned and supporting units at them and by the integrated use of communications. In addition, the effectiveness of pursuit was ensured by the purposeful activities of the staffs in maintaining coordination of the resources involved in carrying out the missions as well as in ensuring constant combat capability and readiness of the troops.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> F. Engels, "Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Military Works], Voenizdat, 1956, p 300.

<sup>2</sup> TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 793, inv. 3012, file 1, sheet 11.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., folio 5871, inv. 7151, file 1, sheet 16.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., folio 398, inv. 19845, file 2, sheet 298.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., folio 244, inv. 20510, file 2, sheet 287.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., folio 405, inv. 4227, file 34, sheets 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., folio 236, inv. 125960, file 1, sheet 10.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., folio 476, inv. 15140, file 1, sheet 49.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., folio 233, inv. 2372, file 32, sheet 11; folio 236, inv. 2706, file 258, sheet 196.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., folio 1693, inv. 1, file 46, sheets 31-33.

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CSO: 1801/149

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF CIVIL WAR MILITARY PERSONNEL GIVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 29-33

[Bibliographic information compiled by Candidate of Historical Sciences O. Poletayev: "Heroes of the Civil War\*"]

[Text] ALEKSEYEV, Sergey Alekseyevich (1896-1951). He was born in Fergana in a noble family. He was a participant in World War I as a lieutenant. Joined the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] in August 1919. During the years of the Civil War, he was an assistant commander, company commander, assistant commander of the reserve battalion of the 1st Turkestan Communist Regiment, the company commander of the 1st Tashkent Patrol Battalion, the assistant chief and chief of the Ablyk Combat Detachment. From May 1921, commander of a company and battalion of the 5th Turkestan Rifle Regiment, battalion commander and assistant commander of the 9th Turkestan Rifle Regiment, assistant commander and commander of the 8th Turkestan Rifle Regiment, senior assistant chief of staff of the 3d Turkestan Rifle Division for operations, assistant chief of the line and manning section of the headquarters of the Turkestan Front, the chief of the paramilitary training section of the Territorial Directorate of the Uzbek SSR, battalion commander of the 10th and 1st Turkestan Rifle Regiments and then in command positions in the USSR convoy guard. Retired from July 1933. From April 1941, again in the ranks of the RKKA and served in the Yaroslavl Oblast Military Commissariat. Discharged in August 1943 due to illness. Major.

1) "The award of the Order of the Red Banner is confirmed.... By the Revolutionary Military Council [RVS] of the Bukhara Troop Group: to the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Turkestan Rifle Regiment S. A. Alekseyev for merit in battles in 1922 against the Enver Pasha bands" (Order of the USSR RVS No 83 of 28 March 1927).

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\* Continuation. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nos 2, 5, 8, 1969; Nos 2, 7, 10, 1970; Nos 2, 5, 7, 9, 1971; Nos 2, 6, 8, 10, 1972; Nos 1, 3, 6, 10, 12, 1973; Nos 2, 5, 7, 1974; Nos 2, 9, 11, 1975; Nos 2, 8, 10, 12, 1976; Nos 2, 4, 6, 8, 1977; Nos 2, 5, 12, 1978, Nos 2, 5, 7, 1979; Nos 7, 11, 1980; Nos 2, 5, 8, 1981; Nos 2, 5, 8, 1982; Nos 2, 5, 8, 1983.

During the night of 15 June 1922, S. A. Alekseyev directed the actions of the battalion under heavy Basmack fire. The subunit held the prevailing height to the south to the village of Baysun and facilitated the advance of a column of Soviet troops which had dealt a defeat to the main forces of the Basmack leader in Eastern Bukhara, Enver Pasha, and seized his headquarters in the village of Kafryun and significant captured equipment.<sup>1</sup>

2) S. A. Alekseyev has been awarded the Order of the Red Star Second Degree of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic for a number of other combat feats in battles against the Enver Pasha Basmack in 1922 (Order of the USSR RVS, No 223 of 2 April 1925).<sup>2</sup>

GAFAROV, Shamsitdin Shaykhedtinovich (1896-1937). He was born in the village of Kulchurovo in Ufa Province in a family of Bashkir peasantry. He was a participant in World War I as a sergeant major. Joined the RKKA in August 1919 as the commander of a platoon and squadron of the 1st, 5th and 27th Cavalry Regiments of the Separate Bashkir Cavalry Brigade, the chief of the administrative team and platoon commander of the 2d Regiment in the same brigade, a squadron commander in the 45th Cavalry Regiment, a commander in the Kirghiz Separate Cavalry Squadron, and military commissar of Temyasov Canton. In 1925, discharged into the reserves because of sickness. Worked at the Tubin Mine and then on the control and auditing commission of the town of Baymak. From 1933, a commander in the police cavalry battalion of Ufa.

1) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR [Revolutionary-Military Council of the Republic] of 1919 Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the 12th Army of the Order of the Red Banner...to the commander of the 4th Squadron of the 27th Bashkir Cavalry Regiment, Comrade Shamendin Gafarov<sup>3</sup> for having, on 6 June 1920, set off with the squadron to support the 28th Cavalry Regiment and advancing on the village of Pinyayevo, he made a cavalry attack on the enemy, he forced it to retreat and captured enemy weapons..." (Order of the RVSR No 57 of 17 February 1921).

2) "Confirmation is given to the awarding, on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the Western Front of the Order of the Red Banner to the below-named persons for outstanding steadfastness and bravery shown by them during the period of the former offensive battles toward Warsaw and in the subsequent rear guard battles, namely...for the former 12th Army...to the squadron commander of the 27th Bashkir Cavalry Regiment, Comrade Shamendin Gafarov..." (Order of the RVSR, No 353 of 31 December 1921).

KIREYEV, Gavriil Yakovlevich (1891-1961). He was born in the village of Ardy in Kozmodemyanskiy District of Kazan Province in a peasant family. He was a participant in World War I as a sergeant major. He joined the RKKA in October 1918 as the commander of an artillery platoon, the assistant commander and commander of a battery in the 1st Light Artillery Battalion of the 11th Petrograd Rifle Division. After demobilization in 1921, he held administrative jobs in the forestry industry and was later a pensioner.

1) "Confirmation is given to the awarding, on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the Western Front of the Order of the Red Banner to the below-named persons for outstanding steadfastness and

valor shown by them during the period of the former offensive battles for Warsaw and the then following rear guard battles, namely...for the former 15th Army...to the commander of the 1st Battery, Comrade Kireyev..." (Order of the RVSR No 353 of 31 December 1931).<sup>4</sup>

2) "Confirmation is given to the awarding, on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 of the RVS of the former 15th Army of the Order of the Red Banner...to the commander of the 1st Battery of the 1st Light Artillery Battalion of the 11th Rifle Division, Comrade Gavriil Yakovlevich Kireyev for merit in combat on 10 July 1920 near the village of Obodovtsy..." (Order of the RVSR No 66 of 7 March 1922).

During the retreat of one of the rifle regiments from the village of Obodovtsy, G. Ya. Kireyev rolled the gun ahead of the extended line and, disregarding the heavy enemy fire, personally began firing at the enemy which facilitated the cavalry attack of the arriving cavalry regiment. As a result, the enemy retreated, having abandoned 3 guns and 250 men being captured.<sup>5</sup>

KOLOKOLOV, Mikhail Alekseyevich (1906). He was born in the town of Grodno in a peasant family. Joined the CPSU in 1940. He was a worker in Leningrad. He was in the RKKA from April 1926 as an officer candidate of the Military Theoretical School of the Air Forces and the Second Military Pilots School. In 1928-1940, he was a senior pilot from the 40th Separate Air Detachment of the SAVO [Central Asian Military District], the commander of a flight and a detachment from the 37th Air Squadron and a commander of a squadron in the 4th Light Bomber Regiment. In 1940-1941, he was a student in the RKKA Air Forces Academy. He participated in the Great Patriotic War and was the commander of the 646th Combined Regiment, the 118th Fire Correction Regiment and the 621st Air Attack Regiment. After the war, he held command positions. In the reserves from 1954. A colonel.

1) "By the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of 7 February 1933, No 58, the Order of the Red Banner is awarded to the following comrades...Kolokolov, Mikhail Alekseyevich, senior pilot of the 40th Air Detachment..." (Order of the USSR RVS No 0375 of 25 March 1933).<sup>6</sup>

In May 1931, M. A. Kolokolov, along with a spotter pilot detected from the air in the region of Mirshade-Karlyuk a cavalry platoon fighting surrounded against unequal odds against the Khusain Bek band numbering up to 300 cavalry. In coming to their comrades' aid, the pilots from a low altitude repeatedly attacked the Basmachi and with accurate machine gun fire caused them great losses. The enemy retreated in panic pursued by a cavalry squadron which hurried up in being guided from the air. In another battle against the Basmachi which had crossed the Yakh River, M. A. Kolokolov's plane sustained machine gun punctures but remained in the air until the ground units had completed routed the Basmachi band.<sup>7</sup>

2) "By the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of 17 November 1934, the Order of the Red Banner is awarded for combat merit in protecting the USSR state frontiers...to Comrade Mikhail Aleksandrovich Kolokolov<sup>8</sup> the former flight commander..." (Order of the USSR NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense], No 1337 of 26 April 1935).

M. A. Kolokolov received the second order for excellence in defeating a large Basmachi grouping which had crossed the frontier into Kazakhstan.<sup>9</sup>

KURENKOV, Il'ya Matveyevich (1895-1967). Born in the village of Torbeyevka in Kirsanovskiy District of Tambov Province in a peasant family. He was a participant in World War I as a junior under-officer. He joined the RKKA in October 1918 as a Red Armyman of the 7th Tambov Rifle Regiment, a squad commander, assistant platoon commander, platoon commander, assistant company commander and company commander of the 93d Rifle Regiment of the 11th Petrograd Rifle Division. At the end of 1920 he was demobilized because of wounds. He was engaged in private agriculture, he worked at a plant in Tambov, and later as a stableman at the Lavrov Stud Farm, a stableman and brigadier horse raiser at the Omsk Stud Farm No 40. In 1942-1945, he was a Red Armyman, a Pfc in the 2d Separate Battalion of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] Troops for railroad security. After demobilization he again worked at the Stud Farm No 40. Retired from 1959 on pension. Private First Class.

1) "Confirmation is given to the awarding, on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the Western Front of the Order of the Red Banner to the below mentioned persons for outstanding steadfastness and valor shown by them during the period of the former offensive battles for Warsaw and the subsequent rear guard battles, namely...for the former 15th Army...the 93d Rifle Regiment...the company commander Comrade Il'ya Kurenkov..." (Order of the RVSR, No 353 of 31 December 1921).

In battle at the hamlet of Dolginovo on 31 May 1920, the company received an order to make a counterattack. Advancing ahead of the subunit, I. M. Kurenkov shouted: "Comrades, forward! After me!" leading the men and firing on the way. Inspired by the heroic example of their commander, the Red Armymen with a bayonet attack overwhelmed the superior-strength enemy which in panic retreated and suffered great losses in killed and wounded. As a result of the counter-attack, Dolginovo was liberated.<sup>10</sup>

2) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 of the Order of the Red Banner by the RVS of the 15th Army...to the assistant commander of the 2d Company Comrade Il'ya Matveyevich Kurenkov...for merit shown in battle on 4 July 1920 in the region of the village of Borovtsy" (Order of the RVSR, No 66 of 7 March 1922).

The company conducted an offensive against Borovtsy during the night. The enemy, having dug in on the edge of a forest in front of the village, resisted stubbornly. I. M. Kurenkov with two comrades, under heavy machine gun and rifle fire, was the first to rush ahead, leading the soldiers after him. Unable to hold out against the bold attack, the enemy began to flee, abandoning the wounded and killed and leaving their weapons. In continuing to pursue it, I. M. Kurenkov at the head of the company broke into the estate of Yustinovo and captured it.<sup>11</sup>

MAKEYEV, Diomid Nikolayevich (1899-1931). He was born in the village of Shipakovo in Yalutorovskiy District of Tobolsk Province in a peasant family. Joined the Bolshevik party in 1918. In 1918-1919, he was a soldier in a Red Partisan detachment. He joined the RKKA in February 1920 as a Red Armyman of

the 3d Turkestan Rifle Regiment, an instructor-organizer of an agitation instructor train and on the political section of the Bukhara Troop Group, military commissar of a machine gun crew of the 5th Turkestan Rifle Regiment the engineer sections in the towns of Chardzhuy and Termez, a student at the Higher Party Courses in Samarkand, a military instructor of the 10th and 62d Cavalry Regiments, an instructor-organizer for the political section of the 8th Cavalry Division and the RVS of the XIII Rifle Corps, military commissar of the 44th and 81st Cavalry Regiments, and the instructor-organizer at the Political Directorate of the XIII Rifle Corps. From 1926, a student in the Central Asian Courses for Oriental Studies, the deputy commander for political affairs of a cavalry division and deputy chief of the political section of the Uzbek Separate Mixed Brigade. Killed in combat against the Basmachi.

1) "The award is confirmed on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 and 1920, No 1144, of the Order of the Red Banner...by the RVS of the Turkestan Front for excellence in combat against the Basmachi in 1923...to the cavalry regiment of the 10th Rifle Division: to the regiment's military commissar Deomid<sup>12</sup> Nikolayevich Makeyev, from 14 September through 18 October in Baldzhuanskiy Lokay (Order of the USSR RVS, No 43 of 18 February 1924).

During the military operation against the Basmachi bands of Barat, Tugay-Sary and Abdu-Kadyr in September-October 1923, D. N. Makeyev showed unbending will "in constant pressure on the enemy, injecting energy into the regiment's ranks by his words and deeds and personally participating on equal footing with the regimental commander in combat operations" thereby contributing to the defeat of the bands and the capturing of the Basmachi leader Barat.<sup>13</sup>

2) "By the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] of 7 and 17 September 1932, Nos 47 and 48, the Red Armymen and leadership who showed particular dedication to the cause of the proletarian revolution and outstanding bravery in the battles against the enemies of the socialist fatherland, are awarded...the Order of the Red Banner...Deomid Nesterovich Makeyev,<sup>14</sup> the former deputy chief of the political section of the Uzbek Cavalry Brigade..." (Order of the USSR RVS, No 0722 of 28 December 1932).

Having set off with a combat detachment of cavalry troops to the area of the village of Belesrub in Kangurskiy Rayon of Tajikistan for conducting political work among the population, D. N. Makeyev fell behind his comrades and was surrounded by 40 Basmachi. Accepting the unequal combat and having used up all his cartridges, the Basmachi captured him and tortured him.<sup>15</sup>

TRUNIN, Nikolay Ivanovich (1896-1938). He was born in St. Petersburg in a peasant family. Became a member of the Bolshevik party in 1918. A participant in World War I as a junior officer. In the RKKA from November 1918. During the years of the Civil War he was a military commissar in Krestetskiy District of Novgorod Province, a deputy regimental commissar and commander of a battalion in the Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 7th Army, a battalion commissar in the 17th Rifle Regiment, the commissar of the 169th Rifle Regiment, assistant commissar and commissar of the 2d Brigade of the 6th Rifle Division, and commissar of the Krasnoselskiy Combat Section, the 168th Brigade of the 56th Rifle Division and the 5th and 6th Brigades of the 2d Rifle Division. After

the war he was a staff commissar of the 16th Rifle Division, the deputy commissar and commissar of the same division. From December 1921, held responsible soviet and party jobs.

- 1) "The Order of the Red Banner is awarded...to the commissar...of a brigade of the 6th Rifle Division, Comrade Nikolay Ivanovich Trunin. During the retreat of our units from the village of Vysotskoye, Comrade Trunin himself with a machine gun on a truck went...to instill order in the retreating units and, being wounded in the head, remained in combat" (Order of the RVSR, No 308 of 13 November 1919).
- 2) "A second Order of the Red Banner is awarded to the below-mentioned persons for outstanding steadfastness and valor shown by them during the period of the former offensive battles for Warsaw and the subsequent rear guard battles...for the former 15th Army...the military commissar of the 6th Brigade, Comrade Trunin" (Order of the RVSR, No 353 of 31 December 1921).

The commissar of the 6th Brigade of the 2d Rifle Division N. I. Trunin was awarded a second decoration for skillful command and personal bravery shown in the battles at Brest-Litovsk and at Volomin Station in August 1920.<sup>16</sup>

FALIN, Mikhail Nikolayevich (1897-1941). He was born in Penza in a lower middle-class family. He was a participant in World War I as a warrant officer. He joined the RKKA in July 1918. During the years of the Civil War, he was the commander of a platoon, a company and a battalion, the assistant commander and commander of the 98th Rifle Regiment of the 11th Petrograd Rifle Division. In February 1923, he was demobilized. He was involved in administrative and management work, he completed the Leningrad Electrical Engineering Institute and was later an engineer at the Electric Plant in Leningrad. From July 1941, again in the ranks of the Soviet Army as the chief of the engineer service of the 3d People's Militia Rifle Regiment of the Leningrad Front. Missing in action in September 1941. Military Engineer Second Rank.

- 1) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the 15th Army of the Order of the Red Banner...to the deputy commander of the 98th Rifle Regiment, Comrade Mikhail Nikolayevich Falin. In July 1920, when the enemy with large forces and the support of heavy and light artillery went over to an offensive along the line of the village of Tupichany-Zomastyany in the aim of throwing us back beyond the Neman River and had achieved certain success, Comrade Falin, seeing the critical moment, with disregard for his own personal safety and the shout "Hurrah, comrades, follow me, for the revolution!" was the first to rush the enemy, leading the riflemen who after a fierce clash with the enemy sent it into a panic flight, having captured machine guns and many prisoners" (Order of the RVSR, No 182 of 29 May 1921).
- 2) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the Western Front of the Order of the Red Banner to the below-named persons for outstanding tenacity and valor shown by them during the period of the former offensive battles for Warsaw and the subsequent rear guard battles, namely...for the former 16th Army: to the

assistant commander of the 98th Regiment, Comrade Mikhail Nikolayevich Fomin<sup>17</sup>..." (Order of the RVSR, No 353 of 31 December 1921).

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 110, inv. 4, file 180, sheet 16.

<sup>2</sup> Decree of the Presidium of the All-Bukhara TsIK [Central Executive Committee] of 21 May 1923 (TsGA Uz. SSR [Central State Archives of the Uzbek SSR], folio 47, inv. 1, file 347, sheets 2, 14, 16). A more detailed description of the feats of S. A. Alekseyev was not discovered in the archives.

<sup>3</sup> In both orders the name of Sh. Sh. Gafarov was misspelled. A more detailed description of his last feat was not discovered in the archives.

<sup>4</sup> The name "First Light Artillery Battalion of the 11th Petrograd Rifle Division" was established from the presentation list of the staff of the 11th Rifle Division of 8 September 1920 (TsGASA, folio 200, inv. 3, file 1177, sheet 621). From the archival materials on the artillery units of the same division for 1920-1921, it was established that during those years there was no other commander with a similar name except G. Ya. Kireyev.

<sup>5</sup> TsGASA, folio 200, inv. 3, file 1176, sheet 930.

<sup>6</sup> According to the conditions used for publications on persons receiving the Red Banner twice (VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1966, p 4), consideration is given to the decorations both for feats during the years of the Civil War as well as for excellence in the course of combat operations to eliminate its last centers.

<sup>7</sup> TsGASA, folio 37837, inv. 3, file 84, sheet 212.

<sup>8</sup> In the order, the patronymic of M. A. Kolokolov has been misspelled.

<sup>9</sup> A more detailed description of the feat was not discovered in the archives.

<sup>10</sup> TsGASA, folio 3284, inv. 1, file 111, sheet 52.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., sheet 239.

<sup>12</sup> As such in the order.

<sup>13</sup> TsGASA, folio 110, inv. 4, file 214, sheet 767 verso.

<sup>14</sup> The name and patronymic of D. N. Makeyev are incorrect in the order. The correct patronymic of Nikolayevich was established from the decoration application of the USSR RVS to the Presidium of the USSR TsIK of 5 March 1932 (TsGASA, folio 37837, inv. 3, file 84, sheet 329).

<sup>15</sup> TsGASA, folio 37837, inv. 3, file 84, sheet 332.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., folio 200, inv. 3, file 1175, sheet 586. A more detailed description of the feat was not discovered.

<sup>17</sup> The last name of M. N. Falin was misspelled in the order. In March 1923, the staff of the Western Front forwarded the corresponding petition to the RKKA Staff to rectify the name of M. N. Falin in the order and this was done (TsGASA, folio 104, inv. 5, file 296, sheet 115 verso; file 1175, sheets 622, 695).

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CSO: 1801/149

## DEVELOPMENT OF AIR TACTICS IN LOCAL WARS TRACED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 34-43

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col Gen Avn G. Dol'nikov: "The Development of Air Tactics in Local Wars\*"]

[Text] Air tactics in local wars has undergone definite development. The improvement in aviation equipment, weapons, controls and the means of combat support as well as enriching with combat experience have inevitably led to the further development of tactical principles, the methods of conducting combat, combat formations and the organization of cooperation.

During the Korean War (1950-1953) the development of air tactics was basically influenced by the experience of World War II and the appearance of the first combat jets. After the war, the tendency for increased speed became firmly established. In jet fighters it (like the rate of climb) was almost twice as high as in their predecessors, the piston-driven airplanes, and reached the transonic level (a M number = 0.9). This speed ensured the best energetic maneuverability, that is, a maximum rate of turn and climb in a minimal time. In this context the pace of air combat increased as each stage occurred significantly faster.

The conducting of combat at high transonic speeds was reflected in virtually all the elements of tactics. As a consequence of the increasing scope of the combat maneuver, the combat formation was broken up; with the increased intervals and distances between the planes, control over the led crews by the commander became more complicated and the maintaining of fire and tactical cooperation in the group became more difficult. Visual contacts in the aircraft flight were maintained only before the start and in the first stages of combat, and then only the pair, the leader ("sword") and the wingman ("shield") remained inseparable.

The increase in the service ceiling and the rate of climb of the fighters influenced the vertical opening up of the formation with the attack and cover

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\* The article written from materials in the foreign press examines the questions of the development of tactics for fighter, fighter-bomber and attack aviation.

groups as well as the reserve (the free maneuvering group) echeloned in a range from low to high altitudes. In the process of combat, particularly in the attempts to break away from the pursuing enemy after the disrupting of the formation, fighters reached the stratosphere, flying at an altitude of 12,000 m. Characteristically the "circulation" between the echelons occurred no more slowly than in combat involving piston-driven aircraft, since climbing was significantly faster due to the increased engine power.

The broadening of the spatial limits of air combat and the difficulties of control sharply raised the question of providing the fighters with aid from the ground command posts. Equipped with more advanced radars, these command posts began to inform the group leaders of the enemy's approach. They led their fighters into the areas for taking up an advantageous tactical position prior to combat, they increased the forces in critical situations, and prohibited the engaging of the groups with an unequal numerical ratio. The combat crew of the control post became a full participant in combat. Characteristically, regardless of the sharply increased speed and rate of climb of the aircraft, none of the belligerents obtained noticeable advantages prior to the start of the air battles. The North Korean Air Force had Soviet-produced MIG-15 aircraft which were the equal of the American Sabrejet fighter in its basic flight and technical performance and surpassed it in terms of the rate of climb and the power of the fire salvo.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, in the course of the Korean War, fighter aviation employed new tactical procedures which considered the strong and weak points of the equipment. Actual combat showed how essential it was to organize combat with the poorer thrust-to-weight ratio but the better maneuverability of the jet planes and vice versa. However, regardless of the fact that new elements were incorporated in the fighter combat formations and in the organization of control and cooperation, the Korean War, in the estimate of foreign specialists, did not alter either the tactical principles or the very nature of air combat. It remained close, group and maneuverable.<sup>2</sup>

Old weapons were the chief restraining factor in the development of air tactics. The high-speed jet fighters were armed with machine guns and cannons which had "roamed over" from the piston-driven planes. The range of hitting the air enemy had virtually not increased. In one of the basic principles of air combat--the close combining of maneuver and fire--only the first element had gained a new content. With little fire power, it was possible to destroy the enemy, that is, to achieve the ultimate goal of combat only by closing in to a short range from the rear. For this reason combat remained close. Compensating for the weak destructive capabilities by the number of planes involved in the attack determined, as before, the group nature of combat.

Prior to the start of the Korean War abroad there was not a uniform opinion on the question of employing attack tactical air forces for hitting ground targets. It was felt that the high speed of the jet-fighter bombers impeded the detection and hitting of small-sized objects. The too high fuel consumption at a low altitude did not make it possible to allocate a great deal of time for searching and repeat passes over the target. The sights did not guarantee accuracy in the first attack. For this reason the piston-driven Mustangs and obsolete carrier-based fighters were initially the close support for American troops.

Subsequently, the jets began employing tactics making it possible to use the advantages of the new equipment. The fighter-bombers began to be guided to ground targets by radio from forward command posts. The call-in pilot took up a waiting area at an altitude of over 5,000 m (at these altitudes the hourly fuel consumption in comparison with ground-level flight declined by 2-fold) and then received target designations by radio. The best conditions for locating a target were provided by reduced speed in a descent in activating the air brakes. The attack was made straight in so that the plane did not remain long in the intense antiaircraft fire zone. After the attack, the advantage in speed was fully utilized with the executing of an ascending maneuver, then the putting on of speed and the fighter bomber quickly left the zone dangerous to it.<sup>3</sup>

Regardless of the improved methods of attack and guidance of the planes to ground targets, the effectiveness of air support for ground troops increased but slightly. The jet fighter-bombers had old weapons and in addition the weight of the bombload in comparison with the piston-driven planes also increased insignificantly. The use of unguided missiles did not lead to a noticeable rise in hit accuracy. For this reason, the forces required to hit one typical object as before remained large. After the fighter bombers were given the functions of attack planes there also was no tangible benefit.

At the same time, a trend which could be noticed in the last years of World War II was becoming more apparent, that is, the gradual replacing of the light and medium bombers with fighter bombers, that is, multipurpose aircraft adapted for hitting both air and ground targets. The work of ensuring a further rise in aircraft speed to the detriment of other performance assumed an even broader scope since it was felt that the combining of attack capabilities with high speed was the basic factor determining air supremacy.

During the Vietnamese War (1964-1973), the American tactical aviation consisted of the multipurpose Phantom F-4 fighter, the F-105 fighter-bomber (these were considered in the second generation jets) as well as the obsolete piston-driven Skyraider A-1 attack plane.

Built in accord with the concept "speed--strike power," the Phantom tactical fighter possessed supersonic speed (a maximum M number = 2.2) and was equipped with guided air-to-air missiles, an onboard radar and an automated sight and navigation system. This provided the airplane with the possibility of intercepting high-speed bombers under instrument flying conditions and at night.

Prior to the Vietnamese War, the notion of air combat in the U.S. Armed Forces came down to the fact that it must be carried out using detecting radars and automated sight systems. The enemy was to be "picked up" and tracked by the onboard radar and then destroyed by a guided missile at a range exceeding visual contact with it. In the designing fighters, basic attention was paid to automating the aircraft controls. The pilot's capabilities here ceased to be considered. The idea of conducting a close, maneuvering battle was rejected.<sup>4</sup>

The first air battle between American and North Vietnamese fighters occurred on 2 April 1965. The Phantom aircraft were part of a cover group for the F-105

fighter bombers which were making raids on objectives in North Vietnam. This was one of the traditional combat missions constantly performed by fighters during the years of World War II. However, this ran contrary to practical needs as the American fighters operating in the escort groups were intercepted by planes of the opposite side. The only defensive means ensuring escape from the attack was a maneuver. Thus, the Phantom pilots were forced to conduct maneuvering combat but the combat capabilities of the planes and the weapons did not correspond to its requirements. A high wing load impeded a rapid turn and the conditions for conducting combat deteriorated with an increase in altitude. The North Vietnamese MIG-21 fighter was lighter and more maneuverable while the ability to make a supersonic "rush" in an attack or breaking away from the enemy gave it an advantage in all stages of air combat.<sup>5</sup>

The tactics of surprise, high-speed missile attacks by the MIG-21 was difficult to parry except by deeply echeloning the cover groups. On the route of the American planes to the objectives of the attacks, the "escort" was usually positioned behind and above the fighter bombers; the flank groups in approaching the target moved forward and formed a "screen." In the attack area, at a distance of 15-20 km from it, several patrolling zones were established in which two flights of vertically separated phantoms operated. The counter-maneuver of the flights in the area was organized considering the providing of better opportunities for search and immediate reforming for the active start of combat.

In comparison with the close escorting of bombers, operations using the "screen" method had a number of advantages: the fighters were provided with freedom to maneuver; they did not have to maintain a common formation with the attack group (they were not "tethered" to it); they were given the right independently to choose the place of the patrol areas but here it was necessary to consider the actions of the ground air defenses protecting the objective of the attack. At the same time, the "screens" could be created only with a great numerical superiority of American aviation and with mid-air fueling for the tactical planes to increase the length of the flight (in taking off from bases in Thailand, this reached 3-3.5 hours).

The American fighters rather often employed the method known since World War II of sealing off the North Vietnamese airfields. Two or three flights of Phantoms positioned themselves in patrol areas bordering an airfield during the period of raids by fighter-bombers on installations in North Vietnam. The pilots watched the movement on the ground and were ready to attack taxiing or taking-off planes. The other flight (or a flight from the blockade group) was designated for "hunting." The hunter Phantoms independently looked for MIGs returning to land and in detecting them tried to attack them by surprise. For camouflaging the flight they used terrain features which created a "blind zone" in the view of the North Vietnamese ground air defense radars.

In operations as "screens," in sealing off the airfields and in "hunting" the American fighters used data from electronic intelligence which was conducted continuously by specially equipped reconnaissance planes. The latter established the location, operating conditions and detection zones of the air defense radars.

A characteristic feature in the combat employment of American fighters in Vietnam was that their basic efforts were aimed at supporting air assault forces since the U.S. ground forces were not fighting on North Vietnamese territory. The multipurpose Phantom in the attack version could be loaded with six-eight 340-kg bombs and increase the effect of attack aviation in the bombings.

During the extended war, fighter bomber tactics was repeatedly changed. The first period of the war was characterized by their employing of "range" methods of operation. During this period, resistance from North Vietnamese air defenses was weak and only small subunits of antiaircraft artillery were involved in repelling the American air raids. Large groups of aircraft with under-wing bombs without a strong cover made massed attacks from medium altitudes (2,000-5,000 m) which were best for bombing. The attack was made in several passes and the planes remained a long time over the target. Small groups operating somewhat ahead of the approach of the basic forces to the target were employed to neutralize the antiaircraft fire.

The situation changed sharply when antiaircraft guided missile complexes appeared in the North Vietnamese air defense system; the range of medium and high altitudes was covered by these weapons. The attempts by the American fighter bombers to operate in the same key led to high losses. In addition, the North Vietnamese fighter subunits which had gained some experience in air combat also began to show greater activity. The decision to convert to the tactics of employing low altitudes under the given conditions was, in the opinion of foreign military specialists, obvious and sound. However, the effectiveness of the fighter bomber attacks here declined significantly.

At low altitudes it was impossible to have the massed employment of attack aviation, as it was impossible to put the planes in large groups and organize solid formations. The echeloned operations of small groups of planes in employing conventional weapons led to a situation where the results of the raids were much lower while losses did not decline. In a ground-level flight, the planes, in avoiding the range of the antiaircraft missiles, came under intense fire from conventional antiaircraft artillery. High speed as an effective measure of countering the antiaircraft artillery could be used only along the route to the target. At the final stage of the flight the pilot was forced to reduce speed and increase altitude for creating better conditions to search out and identify the target. At this moment the antiaircraft artillery fire became accurate and the number of downed planes increased.<sup>6</sup>

In approximately April 1966, the U.S. tactical aviation was again forced to convert to combat operations from medium altitudes and began to be employed on a massed basis (Fig. 1). The electronics countermeasures [ECM] equipment also changed tactics when this equipment began to be received in large amounts. Air defense was combated by a comprehensive method: by the setting of intense radio and radar jamming, the executing of antimissile maneuvers and firing against air defense weapons using the Shrike class antiradar guided missiles. The planes carrying these missiles often cooperated with the fighter bomber attack groups armed with conventional ammunition, giving them target designations by radio after detecting a radar and marking its position by the exploding of a Shrike missile. This procedure was termed "fire reconnaissance" (or reconnaissance with an attack) and the method was "detected--destroyed."<sup>7</sup>




Fig. 1. Typical diagram of a flight of Phantom groups for attacking a ground target (the group is designated by the silhouette of a plane): 1--Take-off from air base; 2--Assembly of planes and ordering of formation; 3--Climb to altitude of 7,000-9,000 m; 4--Mid-air refueling; 5--Opening up of groups in hold area; 6--Breaking away of screen fighters from group formation; 7--Patrol area of jammers; 8--Attack on ground target by attack group; 9--Leaving target at low altitude; 10--Mid-air refueling (when necessary); 11--Break-up of group and landing.

With the strengthening of the North Vietnamese air defense system, the employment of the support groups at medium altitudes became more complex. The situation forced the American bombers to directly break through the air defense system and abandon attacks from different directions. In this situation, the groups neutralizing the air defenses were given the mission of providing a flight "corridor" for the attack planes to the targets. The attack by the bombers required precise timing with the neutralization groups. If the lead in starting the "neutralization" was great, then the air defense combat crews could shift fire to the attack groups which were in a vulnerable situation. Since the planes approached the targets at a speed of 880 km per hour and the attack itself was brief, timing was down to the second and corrected in the air. The pilots had to have a detailed knowledge of the situation and a quick response to a change in it.

The American Command did not abandon employing aviation at low altitudes in the zone of strong air defenses. Individual nighttime raids involving attacks on North Vietnamese airfields began to be made by the U.S. F-111A fighter bombers which had begun arriving in Southeast Asia.

While the basic mission of the fighter bombers was to attack ground objectives located in depth, the ground attack planes, in accord with their purpose, were to support ground troops on the battlefield. Without the active involvement of ground attack planes, not a single punitive operation was conducted against the detachments of patriots in South Vietnam. In 1 year alone of combat operations, American aviation made 53,480 aircraft sorties for carrying out this mission.<sup>8</sup>

The planes carrying out the functions of ground attack planes adhered to the old tactical principles worked out even in World War II. These included strict

coordination of operations with the ground troops, accuracy and promptness of the air attacks and the economic consumption of forces. However, the sharply increased dynamicness of ground combat, the rapid change in the situation and the mobility of the front line demanded the incorporating of new procedures in attack aviation tactics.

The coordinating of its actions with the ground troops was achieved by establishing direct ties and personal contacts between the representatives of the air force and the ground troops in the fire distribution zone. Tactical aviation on the inferior level of cooperation was represented by an air spotter who was in a battalion of ground forces. His duties included: making up the orders for assigning aviation resources, that is, the number of aircraft sorties for planned and emergency (call-in) support, consultation with the battalion commander on the questions of the combat employment of the ground attack planes, the guiding of the planes to ground targets and determining the results of the attack. Along with the communications officer of the ground forces, the air spotter was at the forward guidance (target designation) post which had direct communication with the army air support center, the division (brigade) staff and the airplanes in the air.

The accuracy of the attacks by the ground attack planes at low and maximum-low altitudes depended totally upon the training level of the flight personnel, as during the period of the Vietnamese War automated attack support systems still did not exist.

The prompt response to a call from the forward edge and the prompt appearance of the airplanes over the object of the attack were achieved by basing the ground attack planes at field airstrips (close to the front line) and by organizing a system for transmitting the requests (commands, information) over special communications channels. An important role was also played by the short times required to ready the planes to take off and their ability to remain for an extended time (at least 40 minutes) in the air holding area (Fig. 2).

The principle of the economic consumption of forces with the increased scope of support could almost not be maintained, since the commanders of the ground forces subunits and units preferred to have ground attack planes ready almost constantly to make an attack. According to announcements in the American press, the waste in using the assigned aviation resources often led to a situation where the ground subunits during the most difficult moments of combat remained "on starvation rations."<sup>9</sup>

In the wars in the Near East, the Phantom fighters were aided in conducting air combat by the lighter and more maneuverable Mirage-3C fighters. These participated in initiating combat and feints while the crews of the Phantom fighters chose an opportune moment for a surprise attack from below with the subsequent launching of air-to-air missiles (Fig. 3).

The control of the Israeli fighters during the October War of 1973 was carried out from ground command posts which obtained data on the air situation using detection and guidance radars. For immediate direction of air combat, forward guidance posts were moved up closer to the combat area and these were assigned zones of responsibility. These bodies played the basic role in coordinating the actions of the various tactical groups.




Fig. 2. Diagram for the handling of an emergency request for direct air support: 1--Liason officer (forward air controller); 2--Control and command aircraft; 3--Relay aircraft; 4--Direct air support center; 5--Ground attack planes in status of "ground alert"; 6--Ground attack planes in status of "air alert."




Fig. 3. Diagram for the committing of Phantom fighters to battle (variation): 1--Group for initiating combat (Mirage 3C aircraft); 2--Attack group (Phantom); 3--Fighters of opposite side.

The command post crews were manned by experienced officers who had a flying education and a good understanding of the tactical situation. The command posts also had plotting boards, guidance displays and a map with plotted lines for the detection and hitting of various air defenses. The position of the lines was constantly corrected on the basis of electronic intelligence data. In addition to the control of the fighters, the duties of the command post crews included: providing information on the air operations of the opposite side, committing the reserve to combat, determining the moment for disengaging, monitoring the fuel supply of the aircraft as well as ensuring their passage through the zone of their own air defense system. For clarifying the air situation, the command post crews widely employed radio intercept data. It was not recommended that the crews of their planes take unplanned decisions in the event of the loss of contact with the command post.

The forward guidance posts provided observation of the air situation in their own zone and, having detected enemy aircraft, guided the Mirages to them with the Mirages on patrol at a low altitude close to the front line. As soon as the air enemy crossed the fighter engagement line, immediately a command was given to turn on the jamming radio and then carry out the attack.

In the opinion of foreign military specialists, the above examined particular features are inherent to close highly maneuverable combat which involves fighters equipped with cannons and short-range missiles.<sup>10</sup>

In the armed conflict of 1982 in Lebanon, groups of F-15 and F-16 aircraft armed with the new Sparrow guided missiles fought in air battles according to a single plan. The chief feature of these fighters is considered to be not so much the increased service ceilings, the maximum speed and payload (as was the case in the multipurpose second generation aircraft of the Phantom type) as it was the high energetic maneuverability. This indicator is provided by the lower wingload and the greater thrust-to-weight ratio. While the service ceiling and the maximum speed of the new fighters have been increased by just 5 percent in comparison with the Phantom, maneuverability has been improved by 1.5-fold. Quantitatively this was expressed in the reduction of the size of the turning radius by such an amount and the increase in the turn rate. The acceleration time was also shortened, particularly in the most frequently employed transonic area of flight.

All changes of a technical sort significantly increased the fighters' capabilities to conduct both close maneuvering and long-range missile combat. This was also aided by the increased range of target detection employing improved on-board radars. The line for initiating combat or the transition to close-in was moved far beyond the limits of visual visibility. For this reason fighter control was turned over to airborne command posts, to the E-2C Hawkeye early radar warning aircraft which were on patrol in areas close to the combat zone.<sup>11</sup>

The Israeli fighter bombers adhered to the tactics of low-altitude attacks. The concealment capabilities against the background of the mountainous terrain were fully utilized. The formations were extended in depth and usually this was a line of pairs employing terrain following. The attack on a ground target was made from different directions and this shortened the time of the attack and scattered the fire of the ground air defenses where in combat the principle

was established of "blind and neutralized." Initially, intense jamming was set up of the detection and guidance radars and then, using the possibility granted of a covert approach to the targets, the attack on the air defenses was made by groups of Phantom or Kfir aircraft employing conventional and guided weapons.

The ground attack planes--subunits of Israeli Skyhawk aircraft--not only supported the ground troops but were also used for attacking airfields, air defenses as well as rear installations. A fighter screen was sent out before the attack wave approached the front line ahead of its combat area. In an attack on installations close to the forward edge of friendly troops, the forward air controllers provided the target designation. Characteristically, the Israeli ground attack planes suffered few losses in comparison with the planes of the other branches of aviation.<sup>12</sup>

On the basis of the experience of local wars, in working out fighter tactics for the 1980's, foreign specialists have aimed at air combat which combines equally both new and old elements. Fundamental changes involving the breaking of traditional principles have been moved off to the year 2000. This has been confirmed by the commissioning of the light F-16 fighter which has been specially designed for conducting highly maneuverable air combat.

In the employment of modern U.S. fire bombers, the tendency has survived of "assault operations" in the tactical defensive zone and this reflects the offensive nature of their military-political views. The use of these planes for close infantry support is viewed as an additional task carried out when necessary.

As for the employment of attack aviation, the principles elaborated in local wars for support of ground troops are, putting it figuratively, only the foundation of its tactics. The erecting of the "edifice" itself is going on rather slowly. Nighttime air support remains an unsolved problem. A unity of views has not been reached on conducting combat operations of "plane against tank." A system has not yet been created of controlling the diverse aircraft and airborne weapons belonging to the ground troops and aviation. Recently, the question has also arisen of the actual training of ground attack planes which are carrier based for supporting the units and formations of the Rapid Deployment Force which has been organized for realizing the hegemonic plans of Washington in various regions of the world.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> INTERAVIA, No 1, 1952, p 89.

<sup>2</sup> REVUE MILITAIRE GENERALE, No 2, 1968, p 174.

<sup>3</sup> G. Feuchter, "Istoriya vozдушной войны в ее прошлом, настоящем и будущем" [The History of Air War in Its Past, Present and Future], Voyenizdat, 1956, p 322.

<sup>4</sup> INTERAVIA, No 12, 1974, p 119.

<sup>5</sup> ORDNANCE, No 10-11, 1968, p 302.

<sup>6</sup> AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 23 March 1967, p 90.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 6 February 1967, p 23.

<sup>8</sup> AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, No 8, 1972, p 54.

<sup>9</sup> INFANTRY, No 1-2, 1970, p 52.

<sup>10</sup> AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, No 23, 1973, p 18.

<sup>11</sup> FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 16 October 1982, p 1110.

<sup>12</sup> AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, No 7, 1982, p 17.

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CSO: 1801/149

## WORLD WAR II: SOVIET FAR EAST CAMPAIGN SURVEYED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 52-58

[Article by Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Maj Gen Tank Trps I. Krupchenko: "Military Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East in 1945"]

[Text] According to the standard curriculum for military history for the officer candidates in the military schools, the examination of the most important engagements of the Great Patriotic War and the entire World War II as a whole ends with this subject [the Soviet campaign in the Far East]. Two class hours (90-100 minutes) are assigned to the lecture. From our experience, this time should be allocated in the following manner (in minutes): 3 for an introduction; 10-12 for an analysis of the military-political situation existing in the Far East by the summer of 1945; 25-28 for the planning and preparation of the operations by the Soviet Armed Forces; 40-42 for the general course of combat operations and the employment of the branches of troops in the operation; 10-12 for the military-political results of the war and the characteristic traits of military art. Certainly this allocation of time is approximate. Moreover, 2-3 minutes must be left for answering the questions of officer candidates at the end of the exercise.

The aim of the introduction is to establish contact with the audience and lay out the content of the lecture. The instructor should focus basic attention on determining the place of the campaign by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East in the Great Patriotic War. Here it is important to emphasize that in the summer of 1945, our troops were conducting combat operations against the ally of Nazi Germany which imperialist Japan had been over the entire Great Patriotic War. It provided the Nazis with intelligence data on the military situation of the USSR and made its naval bases available to German submarines operating in the Pacific. The Japanese Navy blockaded the Soviet coast and disrupted our navigation. Moreover, Japan kept a large troop grouping along the Soviet frontiers and thereby forced the Soviet Command during the entire war to keep significant forces in the Far East.

The introduction must end with the precise formulating of the lecturer's goal, a listing of the study questions which will be examined and a description of the literature on the given subject. It is important to point out to the officer candidates those books or magazine articles where descriptions are found of the actions of that branch of troops (armed service) to which the school belongs.<sup>1</sup>

The description of the first question, an analysis of the situation in the Far East in the summer of 1945, should start by describing the military-political situation in the Far East after the end of the war in Europe. As a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany, militaristic Japan was deprived of its basic ally in aggression. Its political, economic and military situation had sharply deteriorated. Military operations were coming close to the Japanese homeland and in the occupied territories the national liberation movement had sharply strengthened. Defeat in the war was inevitable.

However, the ruling circles of imperialist Japan did not want to admit they were conquered. They rejected the proposal of the United States, England and China of unconditional surrender. In still possessing large armed forces and maintaining control over extensive areas of Asia, the Japanese government decided to continue the war. By August 1945, the Japanese armed forces numbered 7.2 million men, over 6,000 airplanes and 109 combat ships.<sup>2</sup> The American and English troops in the Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as in Southeast Asia at the beginning of 1945 numbered 2.4 million men, up to 19,300 aircraft and 711 combat ships.<sup>3</sup> The Japanese were planning on extending the war for a protracted time by defensive actions, to cause great losses to the allied troops and ultimately secure advantageous conditions for concluding a peace. In their plans for an extended war, they put great hopes on the possibility of differences between the USSR, the United States and England.

It was quite apparent that the continuation of the war by Japan threatened the frontier and interests of the Soviet Union in the Far East and created an extremely tense situation here. Moreover, at the Crimean [Yalta] Conference of the Allied heads of state in February 1945, an agreement was reached that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan 2-3 months after the ending of combat operations in Europe.

It is important to point out that, in entering the war, the Soviet Union pursued just and noble goals: to accelerate the defeat of Japanese imperialism and bring closer the end of World War II; to free our nation once and for all from the threat of an invasion by the Japanese aggressors; to help the peoples of the Asian countries in their struggle for national freedom and independence; to carry out our obligations to the Allies.

In an analysis of the grouping of Japanese forces and in a description of their defenses, the attention of the officer candidates must be drawn to the large size of the theater of war and its complex physical geographic conditions. The combat of the Soviet troops developed on the territory of the northeast provinces of China, North Korea and the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. In the designated areas, considering the troops of Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Command has over 1 million men, 1,215 tanks, 6,640 guns and mortars and 1,907 combat aircraft.<sup>4</sup> The basic force of this grouping was the Kwantung Army deployed in Manchuria and Korea. It consisted of 24 infantry divisions, 9 mixed brigades, 2 tank brigades and a brigade of condemned prisoners, an air army and a naval flotilla.<sup>5</sup>

Having captured the northeastern provinces of China and Korea, the Japanese turned them into an initial staging area for an offensive against our country. Here they built 17 fortified areas which covered the most important routes

leading into the central regions of Manchuria. The enemy troop grouping was created in accord with the plan of the Japanese Command worked out in the spring of 1945. Its essence was the intention of the Japanese to bleed the advancing Soviet Army white and halt its advance in the border area, relying on the fortified areas and the advantageous natural frontiers. The main forces were to be concentrated in Central Manchuria ready to maneuver and make counter-strikes in the event of a breakthrough by the Soviet troops deep into the territory. Here the Japanese Command expected the main thrust in the coastal sector. For this reason, the strongest grouping was created on the right wing of the Kwantung Army consisting of the 1st and portions of the 17th Fronts. An advance from Mongolian territory was considered the least probable due to the difficulties of crossing the waterless steppes and the mountainous terrain. This sector was covered by a weak troop grouping. The passes across the Greater Khingan were not occupied ahead of time and the 3d Front which formed the reserve of the Kwantung Army was 100-150 km from the range and 600-650 km from the Mongolian frontier.

In assessing the Japanese troop grouping in Manchuria, it must be concluded that its weakest element was the left wing of the Kwantung Army which was opposite Mongolia. This circumstance had a substantial impact on the choice of the sector of the main thrust by the Soviet Command.

The giving of the first study question should be ended with a brief description of the theater of war and by showing the influence of its natural conditions on the combat employment of the Armed Services and branches of troops.

A review of the questions of planning and preparation of operations in the Far East should start by defining the composition of our forces involved in the war against Japan. Here the Soviet Supreme High Command had fielded three fronts: the Transbaykal and the First and Second Far Eastern. Moreover, the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Naval Flotilla were also to be involved in the operations. As a total our troops had over 1.7 million men, 29,835 guns and mortars, 5,250 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts [SAU] and 5,171 combat aircraft.<sup>6</sup>

For coordinating the operations of the fronts and the fleet, by a decision of Hq SHC the Chief Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East was established headed by Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy. The strategic goal of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was to rout the basic groupings of Japanese troops in Manchuria, North Korea, Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, to liberate the population of the designated territories from the occupiers and ultimately accelerate the surrender of Japan. For achieving these conditions, Hq SHC adopted a decision to prepare and conduct three offensive operations: the Manchurian, Southern Sakhalin and Kuril Amphibious. In the course of giving the lecture, basic attention must be given to examining the first of these, since its results had a crucial impact on the outcome of the Soviet-Japanese war.

The plan of the Manchurian Strategic Operation consisted in the simultaneous making of a number of concentric attacks from the Transbaykal, the Amur area and the Maritime Province in the aim of splitting up, encircling and subsequently destroying the main forces of the Kwantung Army piecemeal, and capturing the

most important military-political centers of Manchuria. The basic thrusts were to be made toward one another by the Transbaykal Front (commander, Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy) from Mongolian territory and by the First Far Eastern Front (commander, Mar SU K. A. Meretskov) from the Soviet Maritime Province. The Second Far Eastern Front under the command of Gen M. A. Purkayev had the mission of advancing on Harbin, to tie down the opposing enemy forces and thereby ensure the successful carrying out of the missions by the troops of the Transbaykal and First Far Eastern Fronts.

The troops of the 16th Army and the Kamchatka defensive area in cooperation with the navy were to clear the Japanese out of the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The basic tasks of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Adm I. S. Yumashev were to cover our ports and sea lines of communications as well as assist the ground forces in capturing the ports and naval bases of North Korea, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

The lecture should stress that one of the most important prerequisites for the successful carrying out of the Manchurian Strategic Operation was the creation of a powerful Soviet troop grouping and ensuring superiority in forces over the enemy. For these purposes the largest strategic regrouping of troops was carried out. During May-July 1945, over a distance of 9,000-12,000 km the following were shifted from Europe: 2 front and 4 army headquarters, 12 headquarters of rifle corps, the headquarters of artillery, tank and 2 mechanized corps, 36 rifle, artillery and antiaircraft artillery divisions, 53 brigades of the various branches of the Ground Forces and 2 fortified areas, 5 air divisions and a large number of other units and formations.<sup>7</sup>

In creating the troop grouping in the Far East, consideration was given to the specific experience acquired by them on the Soviet-German Front. For example, the armies and divisions which had experience in breaking through heavily fortified positions were incorporated in the First Far Eastern Front which was confronted with a solid line of Japanese fortified areas, while the troops which had fought in mountain-steppe conditions were sent to the Transbaykal Front, since it included the Greater Khingan Mountain Range. The troops which had previously been in the Far East in a short period of time were retrained for the newly received military equipment while the staffs and command of the formations and field forces were strengthened by officers and generals having combat experience.

Party political work was aimed at further raising combat readiness, military discipline and at teaching the troops to fight under the difficult conditions of the new theater of war. Great attention was also given to explaining the aggressive role of Japanese imperialism to the personnel.

The general course of combat operations in the Far East is best viewed by stages:

The first or the defeat of the Japanese cover forces in the border areas (9-14 August);

The second or the development of the offensive by the Soviet troops in Manchuria, the capturing of the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands and the surrender of the Kwantung Army (15 August-2 September).

The Soviet troops went over to the offensive during the night of 9 August simultaneously on all three fronts. For achieving surprise and considering that the enemy did not have a prepared defense in the zone of the troops of the assault grouping from the Transbaykal Front, the offensive commenced without artillery and air softening up.

The reinforced forward detachments were the first to cross the frontier at night. The main forces rushed forward at dawn. The enemy in the border area was unable to put up serious resistance. During the day, the rifle formations of the front advanced 50 km on the right wing and in the center while the formations of the mobile troops had covered 120-150 km. On the left wing, where the enemy resisted stubbornly, the troops of the front captured the Chalainor-Manchurian Fortified Area and crossed the Argun River, advancing 40 km during the day.

Soviet aviation from the very outset of the operation won air supremacy and held it until the war's end. The main air forces attacked the centers of communications, Japanese troop accumulations and airfields. As a result, on many roads traffic was paralyzed and communication disrupted between the basic enemy troop groupings in Manchuria and North China.

The most rapid advance was made by the formations of the 6th Guards Tank Army under the command of Gen A. G. Kravchenko. The surprise of the advance and the unpreparedness of the enemy to resist in this sector allowed the troops of the army from the very start of the operation to advance in dispersed march formations. During the first 24 hours, the army covered 150 km. In the middle of the following day, having covered another 100 km, its forward units had reached the Greater Khingan. By the end of 13 August, the main forces of the guardsmen, having crossed the mountains, came out on the Manchurian plain, deep in the rear of the Kwantung Army, and carried out a rapid advance on the cities of Shenyang (Mukden) and Chanchun. During the first 6 days of the offensive, the tank army advanced 500 km.

By this time, the cavalry-mechanized group [KMG] of Soviet-Mongolian troops under the command of Gen I. A. Pliyev had captured the town of Dolonnor and initiated battles for the towns of Zhangbei and Kalgan. The forward units of the 17th Army under Gen A. I. Danilov over the first 6 days of the operation advanced 250-300 km and crossed the southern spurs of the Greater Khingan Range.

The mobile detachments of the 39th Army under the command of Gen I. I. Lyudnikov, in destroying isolated enemy groups, advanced 300-350 km and occupied the town of Wangyemiao.

The fiercest resistance from the Japanese was encountered by the troops of the 36th Army under Gen A. A. Luchinskiy. In employing maneuver and surprise actions, its formations crossed the Argun River and captured the strongpoints of Manchuria, Chalainor and Hailar.

Thus, as a result of decisive actions, the troops of the Transbaykal Front quickly crushed the Japanese cover units and in 6 days advanced 250-400 km on the basic axes deep into Manchuria. The lines of communications of the Japanese troops in North and Northeast Manchuria with the main forces of the

Kwantung Army were cut. The Japanese troops which continued to resist in the Solun, Hailar and Tsitsikar sectors were cut off from their superior staffs and supply depots.

The offensive by the troops of the First Far Eastern Front also commenced during the night of 9 August without artillery softening up with the actions of the forward detachments of the armies. In using darkness and the torrential rains, the boundaries and open spaces between the fortified areas and their centers of resistance, the forward detachments sealed off or destroyed the enemy strongpoints clearing the way for the main forces. By dawn they had advanced 3-10 km into the enemy defenses. At 0830 hours, the main forces of the front went over to the offensive. In all sectors the enemy put up stubborn resistance.

In crossing the fortified areas, our troops employed, as on the Soviet-German Front, assault groups which cooperated closely with the breaching groups. In acting decisively and boldly, the Soviet troops by the end of the day had advanced up to 20 km on the basic sectors and had broken through the zone of border fortifications. The assault groupings from the all-arms armies began to develop the offensive deep into Manchuria.

By the end of 12 August, the front's assault grouping had reached the outer line of fortifications in the Mudanjiang Defensive Area, where the enemy had concentrated large forces. The enemy sharply increased resistance, it undertook counterattacks and widely employed mixed minefields as well as suicide detachments. On 14 August, the troops of the front initiated battles directly for the city of Mudanjiang, outflanking it to the south and north. By this time the troops from the left wing of the front had entered North Korea and in cooperation with the Pacific Fleet had captured the Japanese Navy bases of Yuki and Rasin.

Over the 6 days of the offensive, the troops of the First Far Eastern Front had broken through the permanent Japanese defenses, they had crossed the most inaccessible sections of the East Manchurian Mountains, they had advanced 120-150 km and defeated not only the cover units but also the basic forces of the First Japanese Front.

The troops of the Second Far Eastern Front on 9 August commenced combat operations in two sectors, the 15th Army under the command of Gen S. K. Mamonov on the main Sungari sector and the V Separate Rifle Corps on the Raohei. Formations of the 15th Army in cooperation with ships from the Red Banner Amur Naval Flotilla on 9 and 10 August crossed the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, they took by force bridgeheads and created conditions for developing the offensive deep into Manchuria.

On the morning of 11 August, the 2d Red Banner Army and the LVI Rifle Corps of the 16th Army deployed on Sakhalin Island went over to the offensive.

In the course of the 6-day battles, the troops of the Second Far Eastern Front crushed the Japanese cover groups and the garrisons of the fortified areas and, advancing 50-200 km in the sector of the main thrust, approached the city of Jiamusi standing on the path into Central Manchuria.

Thus, in the first stage of combat operations, the troops of all the fronts achieved significant successes. They routed the Japanese cover troops, they crossed inaccessible areas of Manchuria and, advancing rapidly, created important prerequisites for making decisive strikes and encircling the main forces of the Kwantung Army.

The rapid advance by the Soviet troops during the first days of the operation put the Japanese Command in a difficult situation. The Japanese government was forced to accept the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration and on 14 August, the emperor announced the surrender of Japan. However, no order followed for the armed forces to cease fire. The enemy troops not only did not cease resisting but even tried to make a number of counterattacks. In guessing the enemy's plans, the Soviet Command ordered the troops of all the fronts to continue the offensive.

Due to the sharp worsening of the road conditions caused by rain and the difficulties of delivering fuel and lubricants, pursuit of the enemy was carried out only by the reinforced forward detachments with the distance between them and the main forces reaching 100-120 km. The supplying of fuel to these detachments was carried out chiefly by air. For the 6th Guards Tank Army alone, the pilots of the air transport divisions during the operation delivered more than 2,000 tons of fuel. As before the actions of the 6th Guards Tank Army were the most rapid. By the end of 17 August, its forward units had reached the line of Tungliao and Kaitung. A day later, the units of the KMG of Soviet-Mongolian troops took the town of Chengde where contact was established with units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The routes of the possible retreat of the Kwantung Army into North China had been cut.

The offensive was also successfully developed by Soviet troops in the other sectors. In pursuing the remnants of the retreating Japanese units, the main forces of the First Far Eastern Front pushed toward the city of Girin, toward the troops of the Transbaykal Front. The left-flank formations of the 25th Army, in cooperation with a landing force of the Pacific Fleet, captured the navy base at Seisin, thereby cutting the enemy off from the coast of the Sea of Japan.

As a result of the decisive offensive by the Soviet troops, by the end of 17 August, the main forces of the Kwantung Army were confronted with the threat of complete encirclement. The staff of the Kwantung Army by radio proposed to the Soviet Command that combat operations be ceased. And although this time the Japanese Command gave the corresponding order to its troops, in a number of the front's sectors, they continued to resist.

The mass surrender of Japanese soldiers and officers started on 19 August. Airborne forces were landed to accelerate the disarming and imprisonment of enemy troops as well as for preventing the destruction of industrial enterprises, the ruining and removal of valuable materials in a number of cities of Manchuria, North Korea and on Sakhalin Island. During the period from 20 through 25 August, mobile detachments entered the major cities of Manchuria and North Korea and together with the landing forces they disarmed the Japanese troops. Almost simultaneously with the Kwantung Army the enemy forces on the Kuril

Islands also surrendered. Japanese resistance on Sakhalin was crushed by 25 August.

Having suffered a crushing defeat in Manchuria and having recognized the impossibility of continuing the war in other areas, the Japanese government on 2 September 1945 signed the act of unconditional surrender.

In examining combat operations in the Far East during the summer of 1945, it is important to point out the high combat skill, courage and heroism which the Soviet soldiers showed in the battles against the Japanese militarists. As an illustration to this, one could give the following examples. In the battles for the Dungning and Mishan Fortified Areas, three Soviet soldiers--Pvt G. Ye. Popov, Jr Sgt A. Ya. Firsov and Pfc V. S. Kolesnik--repeated the feat of Aleksandr Matrosov [blocking the embrasure of a pillbox with their bodies]. In the storming of the Fujin Fortified Area, Sr Sgt I. M. Yakubin at the price of his own life saved his commander. For these feats all of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Courage and heroism in the battles for the Port of Seisin were shown by the commander of the reconnaissance detachment, Hero of the Soviet Union, Sr Lt V. N. Leonov, who was awarded a second Gold Star. As a total during the operation, 308,000 men received combat orders and medals, including 87 receiving the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

It is extremely important that in describing the courage, heroism and high combat skill of the Soviet soldiers, examples be given from one's own branch of arms, that is, the specialty of the school be considered.

In the concluding part of the lecture, it is essential to formulate the basic military-political results of the Soviet-Japanese war and point out the characteristic features of Soviet military art. First of all, it is essential to point out that as a result of the defeat of militaristic Japan, the last center of World War II was eliminated, peace was restored throughout the world and the threat of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union was eliminated. Our motherland received back the southern part of Sakhalin along with the transferral of the Kuril Islands. This ensured the security of the frontier in the Far East.

The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces led to the liberation of the territory of Manchuria and North Korea from the Japanese occupiers and created necessary conditions for the victorious conclusion of the national liberation struggle of the Chinese people. As a result of the defeat of militaristic Japan, a powerful upsurge started in the national liberation movement of the South and Southeast Asian peoples who rose to struggle against colonial suppression and for their own national independence.

The combat operations of the Soviet troops in the Far East enriched Soviet military art with the experience of preparing and carrying out major offensive operations under the difficult natural and climatic conditions of the Far Eastern Theater of War. The success of the Manchurian Offensive Operation to a significant degree was determined by the well-organized cooperation of all the Armed Services and branches of troops. The operation was characterized by a decisiveness of planning and by an enormous scope of the combat operations. These were carried out along a front of more than 5,000 km and to a depth of up to 800 km. The offensive of the Soviet troops, particularly the mobile ones,

was carried out at a high pace, reaching 80-100 km a day on the Transbaykal Front.

The Soviet troops widely employed various forms of maneuver and for achieving surprise used nighttime and bad meteorological and natural conditions. One of the particular features of the operation was the offensive by the Soviet troops along a broad front in separate, often very widely placed sectors. The armored troops on all the fronts, as a rule, advanced in the first echelon. The experience of the Manchurian Operation confirmed the possibility of the combat employment of all branches of troops under the special conditions of the Far Eastern Theater of War in their ordinary table of organization.

In the conclusion, as throughout the lecture, basic attention must be given to an analysis of military art (methods of operations) of one's branch of arms. For example, for the tank troops very instructive was the experience of achieving a high rate of advance; the rifle troops and artillery were enriched by the experience of breaking through fortified areas; aviation gained rich experience in carrying out such missions as conducting air reconnaissance in depth, preventing the approach of reserves and the delivery of fuel; the engineer troops successfully solved the problem of water supply and laying column tracks, the signal troops gained experience in the broad use of radio and so forth.

In this context, in preparing for the lecture, each instructor should carefully choose examples of instructive actions by the subunits of his branch of troops, prepare the necessary illustrative materials and think out the procedure for using teaching aids. At the end of the lecture it is advisable to recommend to the officer candidates that, in addition to the textbook, they use the works of artistic and memoir literature devoted to the combat operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East in 1945.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> For a list of literature on this subject, see the Bibliography below.-- Editors.

<sup>2</sup> "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 11, Voyenizdat, 1980, pp 22, 174, 175.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p 22.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p 182.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p 197.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p 193.

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3. "Final. Istoriko-memuarnyy ocherk o razgrome imperialisticheskoy Yaponii v 1945 g." [The Finale. Historical Memoir Essay on the Defeat of Imperialist Japan in 1945], Voyenizdat, 1969.
4. Vnotchenko, L., "Pobeda na Dal'nem Vostoke. Voyenno-istoricheskiy ocherk o boyevykh deystviyah sovetskikh voysk v avguste-sentyabre 1945 g." [The Victory in the Far East. A Military History Essay on the Combat Operations of Soviet Troops in August-September 1945], Voyenizdat, 1977.
5. "Krasnoznamennyy Dal'nevostochnyy. Istoriya Krasnoznamennogo voyennogo koruga" [The Red Banner Far Eastern. The History of the Red Banner Military District], Voyenizdat, 1971.
6. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1962, pp 15-30; No 5, 1963, pp 36-48; No 1, 1963, pp 77-81; No 8, 1975, pp 17-27, 38-46; No 4, 1978, pp 97-101; No 9, 1975, pp 30-34; No 8, 1970, pp 18-29.

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CSO: 1801/149

## WORLD WAR II: AMMUNITION, WEAPONS SUPPLY SYSTEM OUTLINED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 59-61

[Article by Col Gen Art (Ret) I. Volkotrubenko: "On the Planned Supply of Weapons and Ammunition for the Troops"]

[Text] The procedure adopted on the eve of the Great Patriotic War for supplying the troops with weapons and ammunition derived from the provisions of Soviet military doctrine that if the enemy forces a war on us, the Red Army will wage it offensively and will shift combat operations to enemy territory (Draft Field Manual of 1939, p 9). Proceeding from this the following system was adopted in the Red Army for supplying the troops with weapons and ammunition.

With the start of combat operations, the troops in the border military districts (fronts) during the first offensive operations would be supplied from the reserves created before the start of the war at the district artillery dumps. At the same time delivery of ammunition would be started from the central dumps of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) to the army head artillery dumps (GAS) which had been mobilized and manned at the district dumps and deployed at the army supply stations. Subsequently, the troops would be supplied with ammunition through the head artillery dumps. Here from the GAS the ammunition was delivered to the divisional exchange points (DOP) and from here to the regimental combat supply points (PPB) and then to the battalion combat supply points (BPB). A front element in the ammunition supply system was absent. In addition, it should also be pointed out that in the GAU there was no single supply body for weapons and ammunition. This task was carried out by several production administrations of the GAU.

Shortcomings in the organizational structure of the GAU were felt sharply in the work of artillery supply literally from the first days of the war. The operation of the GAU was greatly impeded by the fact that the accounting and reporting procedures for the artillery supply service for wartime (the report priority log) had not been worked out. The GAU did not always precisely know the actual supply of weapons and ammunition for the troops. The fronts sometimes provided overstated and sometimes completely unsound requests. The GAU was actually unable to verify the correctness of the troop requests.

All of this created unbelievable difficulties in the activities of the artillery supply service, particularly on the level of the GAU--front--army. In order to obtain even approximate information from the army artillery supply chiefs on the available ammunition in the troops and ascertain their requirements, the author of these lines, then the chief of artillery supply on the Southwestern Front, had to sit for nights at the communications center and during the day have the same work continued by operations officers from headquarters.

The existing situation forced the incorporation of substantial changes in the work of the GAU. In July 1941, the Artillery Weapons Supply Directorate and the Ammunitions Supply Directorate were organized. Soon thereafter a change was made in the procedure for supplying weapons and ammunition for the troops. Thus, in the front rear services, front artillery weapons and ammunition dumps were organized. Instead of the GAS, field army artillery dumps were organized in the armies. Thus, all elements from the front down to the battalion came to have their own ammunition and weapons supply bodies.

Upon the instructions of the GAU chief, Col Gen Art N. D. Yakovlev, the Fourth Section (chief, Col F. A. Nefedov) from the Organizational and Planning Directorate began to work out a report priority log. In December 1941, upon an order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Artillery Chief of the Red Army, Col Gen Art N. N. Voronov, a report priority log was put into effect for troop ammunition, and somewhat later, in April 1942, for weapons, too.

According to the report priority log, all elements of artillery supply from the regiment to the army, inclusively, reported as of 2000 hours of each day up the line of command (and the fronts to the GAU on the following day) on the movement of ammunition (availability, expenditure and receipt). For weapons there was a 5-day and later a 10-day report on availability, losses and the course of repair on artillery systems.

From the first months of 1942, the GAU shifted to sound planned supply of ammunition for the troops on the basis of systematized accounting and reporting. This provided an opportunity to know the true state of its availability in the fronts.

Ammunition delivery to the troops was planned monthly by the GAU. The basis for drawing up the plan was the instructions of the General Staff and the requests from the fronts and other users (Navy, NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] and the military districts). The monthly ammunition resources were determined proceeding from availability at the GAU bases as well as from the deliveries of the round elements from the plants (shell bodies, casings, powder, fuzes and primer cups) and their monthly assembly at the GAU depots. The Second Second Section (chief, Maj Gen Intend Serv M. S. Grigor'yev) of the GAU Organizational and Planning Directorate, as a rule, completed the elaboration of the plan for supplying the fronts with ammunition by the 25th of the current month. The most difficult was to determine the available ammunition in the fronts on the 1st of the month being planned.

During the first months of 1942, the GAU actually was unable to deliver ammunition to the fronts according to the directive of the General Staff, as it did

not possess the necessary resources. For this reason, the plan usually gave two graphs, that is, according to the General Staff directive and the GAU proposal. Ammunition was then allocated usually proceeding from the available reserve. For this reason, the requests of the fronts, usually for calibers of 76-mm and higher, often were not completely satisfied. Ammunition for small arms was not limited.

The plan drawn up by the Organizational and Planning Directorate for ammunition supply for the troops for the following month was corrected by the GAU chief and usually on the 25th it was presented to A. I. Mikoyan who was responsible for supply. During the report without fail the permanent representative of the General Staff, Col N. I. Potapov, was present. After examining and correcting the plan by A. I. Mikoyan (if there were discrepancies in the demand columns for the General Staff and the GAU, as a rule, he left the GAU figure), the document was submitted for approval to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin who usually signed it on the same day.

The GAU chief on the 25th or 26th informed the commanders of the fronts of the amount of ammunition to be allocated for the month. On the basis of this plan the Organizational and Planning Directorate issued instructions to the Ammunition Supply Directorate to dispatch the ammunition to the fronts. Planning, in turn, for the delivery of ammunition to the troops, the Ammunition Supply Directorate issued requests to the VOSO [Military Transport] and informed the artillery supply chiefs of the fronts of the transport numbers, the dates and stations of departure and the composition of each transport. Dispatch of the freight commenced on the 3d-5th and ended on the 20th-22d of each month. At the GAU systematic control was instituted over the movement of the ammunition-loaded transports.

Thus, from mid-1942 until the war's end, there was a well-organized and planned supply of the fronts with ammunition and this ensured continuous supply in all operations of the Great Patriotic War.

The supply of the fronts with weapons to cover losses was carried out as necessary, that is, it had an episodic nature. Weapons were provided to the new formations of Hq SHC (rifle and artillery divisions and brigades), as a rule, under directives of the General Staff and was carried out at the time these formations became ready. The same procedure was followed in supplying artillery weapons to the Navy and NKVD troops. The weapons were sent to the fronts (the Navy and NKVD) in a majority of instances directly from the plants by military representatives upon command from the GAU. Here the Weapons Supply Directorate exercised constant supervision over the routing of the transports.

The experience of the work done by the GAU during the years of the Great Patriotic War clearly showed that the planned supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops can be established only with the regular receipt from the inferior artillery supply services of information on the availability and consumption of these types of supplies. The report priority log for weapons and ammunition, as a basic document for the GAU planning bodies, proved fully effective. Its introduction greatly facilitated the work of supplying the troops with weapons and ammunition. This experience to a certain degree can be used by the artillery supply services under present-day conditions as well.

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## HISTORY OF RUSSIAN MILITARY POSTAL SYSTEM TRACED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 61-63

[Article by N. Balayev, senior science associate at the Central Communications Museum imeni A. S. Popov: "From the History of the Field Post Office"]

[Text] The field post office is a special service providing courier and mail communication in the troops by delivering (forwarding) combat and official documents and other correspondence to the formations, units and institutions as well as maintaining communication within the army and navy and with the nation's population. This was first introduced in Russia upon the instructions of Peter I as a temporary type of troop postal communication during the period of the Azov Campaigns (1695-1696). This operated between Moscow and Azov over two routes: the shortest (via Valuyki) and the round-about ("up the Don and to Tsaritsyn across the steppe and from Tsaritsyn to Saratov along the Volga," and then to Moscow). The Azov mail was dispatched regularly, once a week and took 10-12 days. This system existed a total of 7 months.<sup>1</sup>

Officially the introduction of a field post office in Russia (on the basis of the experience of operating the Azov line in 1695-1696) was in 1716. The Military Statute (1716) about this stated: "...For this sake there must be in the troops a field post office established which should have several post horses for dispatching couriers and to which post it would be possible to give letters and receive them."<sup>2</sup> At that time the positions of field post master and mailman were introduced. In 1719, at the same time with the general table of organization for the entire postal department, the first table of organization was introduced for the field postal facilities (field post offices). Each post office consisted of a postmaster, his assistant, clerk and six mailmen.

Preparations for the establishing of a field post office were carried out even in peacetime. Thus, in Russia, in anticipation of the war against Napoleonic France on 27 January 1812, issued a special regulation for the field post offices and this determined the procedure for sending both official and private correspondence through the field mail system. In accord with this regulation, the personnel for filling the positions in the field mail institutions were assigned by the Postal Department. At the head of the field post office stood a special field post director. Under him were all the officials and mailmen of the field postal system. Under the post director were the permanent and temporary offices established for communication with the postal border institutions.

The chief leadership over the field posts was provided by a duty general (in the army). He established the schedule of horses at the post stations, he set the days and hours for the dispatch of official correspondence, he granted the permission for accepting private correspondence by the field post and supervised the activities of the field post facilities and the expenditure of the allocated amounts.<sup>3</sup>

A field post office in the course of the Crimean War of 1853-1856 was established under the Army Headquarters. In the event that the army corps were a significant distance away from headquarters, temporary post sections were opened up under them.<sup>4</sup> On the eve of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, a "Regulation on the Field Troop Administration at Wartime" (16 October 1876) was established in the place of the previous legal regulations. According to the regulation, the field post included: a field post administration under an army staff, a field post office under the headquarters and field post sections set up under the corps and other army formations (at the discretion of the commander-in-chief). During the war some 7,454,000 private letters, 1,337,000 money orders and 281,000 packages<sup>5</sup> were sent to the army.

In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the field post apparatus included:  
a) two main field post offices (in Harbin and Mukden) assigned to forward correspondence to the field offices; b) the field post offices under the army staffs; c) the field post offices under the corps staffs for serving the units which were part of these formations.

The main field post offices in Harbin and Mukden had disposition lists which gave the assigning of the units to the offices as well as field post office lists indicating their location.

During the years of World War I of 1914-1918, for the remitting of correspondence, out of the permanent postal institutions in the operational army 10 (later 12) main post offices were organized and these usually were located at the rail junctions deep in the rear. In addition to the main post offices, 16 field post offices were organized under the army staffs, 14 control post offices, 75 field post offices under the corps staffs as well as 16 reserve ones for serving the individually operating detachments and newly formed corps.<sup>6</sup>

Each troop unit was to be assigned to the nearest post office and in the event of departure submit the corresponding statement to this office. The chiefs of the field offices by telegraph transmitted these data in a coded form (and also the location of the offices) to the chief of the post and telegraph section of their front. The latter summarized the received information and incorporated them in circulars which were sent out to all the main post offices.

At the start of the Civil War, the organization of field postal communications in the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] was based on the system used during the period of World War I. Leadership over the field post was provided by the People's Commissariat of Posts and Telegraph (Narkompostel'). From October 1919, leadership over all military and field postal communications was concentrated in the newly organized Signals Directorate of the Red Army (the organ of the field staff of the RFSR [Republic Revolutionary Military Council]) and the corresponding signals directorates and sections in the fronts, armies and so forth.

As of January 1920, a new procedure was introduced for forwarding correspondence and the method of receiving information on the assigning of military units was changed.

The changes in the field postal apparatus came down to merging the previously independent departments of the postal sorting points with the rights of a section into the TOE of the control posts. In addressing correspondence to the operational army, it was necessary to give: a) the accurate name of the individual troop unit in which the addressee was (regiment, artillery battalion, hospital and so forth); b) the name of the subunit (company, battery and so forth); c) the name, patronymic and last name of the addressee.

After the end of the Civil War, the experience of the field postal service was carefully studied. In 1922, the Military-Technical Signals Council adopted the following decision:

1. The field post was to be established only in wartime.
2. It was a special organization and a component part of the state mail system.
3. The field post was designed for providing postal communications for the units, facilities and institutions of the army and the servicemen serving in these with the institutions, organization and population in the internal regions of the nation.
4. The operation of the field post was carried out together with the permanent postal enterprises in accord with the instructions of the state communications directorate. Here the technical and clerical services should follow procedures which would ensure the maintaining of military secrecy.
5. The field post is not a means of operational communication between the staffs.<sup>7</sup>

Such a procedure for organizing the field post (in the event of wartime) existed up to the start of the Great Patriotic War and in its first period. However, it, as was later established, did not fully meet the needs of the troops. For this reason, in December 1941, the Military Field Post Directorate was organized under the Main Signals Directorate. The sections and departments for field communications of the NKS [People's Commissariat of Communications] in the fronts and armies were reorganized as military field post sections and departments according to the established TOE.

In August 1942, the postal distribution service was fundamentally reorganized. A postal distribution section was organized as part of the Main Signals Directorate of the Soviet Army. There were postal distribution departments in the signals directorates of the staffs of the fronts and military districts.<sup>8</sup>

For ensuring the necessary secrecy for the location and name of the troop units and subunits, by an order of the People's Commissar of Defense of 5 September 1942, a new addressing procedure was established in accord with which for formations having a TOE field post station (PPS), the address consisted of:

- a) The current number of the PPS assigned to this formation;
- b) The code number of the subunit (down to the company and individual platoon) which in organizational terms was part of the given formation;
- c) The name of the addressee.

For the units and facilities in the rear areas (as part of the troops of military districts) and not having a TOE PPS or agency, the address consisted of:  
a) the name of the population point; b) the code number of the unit (subunit);  
c) the name of the addressee.

The field postal communications operated in this form until the end of the Great Patriotic War.

The wartime experience was creatively generalized in the "Regulation on Military Postal Communications of the USSR Armed Forces" issued after the war.<sup>9</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> A. Vigilev, "The Azov Field Post," SOVETSKIY KOLLEKTSIONER, 1967, Vol 5, pp 39-40.
- <sup>2</sup> "Kniga Ustav voinskiy...," [Field Manual Book], St. Petersburg, 1717, p 117.
- <sup>3</sup> "Field Post in the Patriotic War of 1812," POCHTOVO-TELEGRAFNYY ZHURNAL, April, 1912, p 433.
- <sup>4</sup> TsGIA [Central State Historical Archives], folio 1289, inv. 1, file 972, sheet 533.
- <sup>5</sup> V. Trubacheyev, "The Field Post During the Last Turkish War," POCHTOVO-TELEGRAFNYY ZHURNAL, December, 1898, pp 1521-1533.
- <sup>6</sup> "Postal Communications in Wartime," POCHTOVO-TELEGRAFNYY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1916, pp 359-365.
- <sup>7</sup> Kalistratov, "The Forwarding of Correspondence to the Operational Army," (see: TEKHNIKA I SNABZHENIYE KRASNOY ARMII, No 31, 1923).
- <sup>8</sup> TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 71, inv. 297097, file 60, sheets 77-78.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid., inv. 196521, file 84, sheets 21-22.

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CSO: 1801/149

#### BOOK REVIEW: CHINESE VIEW OF WORLD WAR II CRITICIZED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 64-70

[Review by Yu. Shcheben'kov of the book "Dierci shijie dazhan shi" (History of World War II) [in Chinese] by Zhu Guisheng, Wang Zhende and Zhang Chunian, Peking, 1982, 734 pages]

[Text] The problems related to World War II of 1939-1945 continue to hold one of the central places in the works by historians throughout the world. The interest on the part of researchers in this dramatic period of world history is determined by the enormous changes which this war brought about in the destiny of all mankind. The problems related to the war and the victory over Nazism and Japanese militarism remain in the focus of the most acute clash between communist and bourgeois ideologies.

For this reason, the appearance both in our nation and abroad of any new work on the history of World War II is a major event on the front of the ideological struggle. Here the question of the initial premises of the authors and their views on the course and outcome of the war assumes particular significance.

In 1982, the Beijing Publishing House Renmin Chubanshe published a "History of World War II" [the reviewed work] prepared by a collective of Chinese historians. The number of copies published is 20,000.<sup>1</sup> It contains 734 pages of printed character text which converted into a language with an alphabet is at least 1,000 pages. The book consists of a foreword written by the director of the Institute for Universal History under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Prof Liu Simu and 15 chapters which, as is pointed out in the foreword, provides a "systematized exposition of the events of World War II."

The book is the first original work on the history of World War II written by Chinese scholars. It has been written chiefly on the basis of sources published at different times abroad, although it must be pointed out that the most recent historical research is represented far from completely. No data are given on the use of any archival materials. There are merely references to collections of diplomatic documents published in a number of nations. The Chinese sources are basically represented by the works of Mao Zedong, by several articles of a memoir nature and certain reference materials.

In beginning to prepare their work the authors, in their words, set for themselves the task of "elucidating the true essence of World War II on the basis of analyzing the most diverse judgments...separating all the correct from the erroneous in order to recreate the true appearance of the history of World War II...and to deepen an understanding of the sources of modern wars, their essence and patterns" (Foreword, p 2). Proceeding from the fact that works on the history of World War II which have been published outside of China do not, in the authors' opinion, properly treat the anti-Japanese war, they have intended to more fully show its "place and role in World War II" (Foreword, p 3). As a general methodological concept they have employed the principle of "showing events completely or briefly depending upon the degree of their importance, endeavoring to assign to each event the place which it merits" (Foreword, p 3).

The appearance of such a work in a nation which became the victim of aggression long before the start of World War II undoubtedly will be of interest to both specialists as well as a broader range of readers not only in China itself but also outside it. Our nation has long paid tribute and continues to pay tribute to the heroic struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders during the years of the anti-Japanese War and World War II. For this reason, the Soviet community and Soviet historians were ready to sincerely welcome a work by the historians of a nation which was a direct participant in the anti-Hitler coalition and made a major contribution to the defeat of the Japanese aggressors.

However, in becoming acquainted with the work by the Chinese historians, one must note with regret that along with the positive aspects, in particular, the unmasking of the predatory policy carried out by the imperialist aggressor states and the infamous policy of "appeasement" carried out by the Western "democracies" on the eve of the war, and the correct depiction of the struggle of the world's peoples against imperialist aggression during the prewar years and the heroism and steadfastness of the Soviet people on the front and in the rear during the period of the Great Patriotic War, this work is not devoid of a whole series of major shortcomings. The statement by the authors of their intention to "recreate the true appearance of World War II" in actuality frequently ends by the siding with the bourgeois falsifiers of the history of this war and in a number of instances leads to a distorted interpretation of its causes and to an actual denying of the crucial contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of the fascist-militaristic bloc. Proceeding from the fact that China's struggle against the Japanese aggressors "was the most extended and the damage and losses were enormous" (Foreword, p 1), the authors of the book endeavor to prove that supposedly the Chinese Front played the crucial role in World War II.

With close scrutiny of the book, it becomes clear that such deviations from historical facts in no way are accidental. As is pointed out in the Foreword, by publishing this book the Chinese historians, along with filling in the gap in the Chinese historiography of World War II, intended first of all "to help the masses of people...arm themselves with the knowledge necessary for a struggle against hegemonism" (Foreword, p 2). The author of the Foreword emphasizes that "this is particularly important to do today, when the Soviet Union has already set out on the path of the world dominant power, everywhere resorts to aggression and becomes a most dangerous source of new conflicts, while the specter of a new global war little by little again appears on the horizon" (Foreword, p 2).

Thus, according to the given concept of the Chinese historians, it follows that the source of military danger at present is not American imperialism and not the aggressive NATO bloc which without restraint foster the arms race but rather the Soviet Union which has acted consistently to eliminate the military danger and has put forward widely known proposals aimed at preventing the arms race, at fostering disarmament and strengthening good neighborliness and collaboration between states.

Also related to a certain "givenness" is the tendentiousness in the interpreting of World War II events and which becomes noticeable from the very first pages of the book. This is reflected primarily in a distorting of the prewar policy of our country. In attempting to affirm their version of the "aggressiveness" of the Soviet Union, the authors put it in the same rank with the imperialist states. In concealing the true goals of the liberation campaigns of the Soviet Army which provided aid to the fraternal peoples in their struggle for reannexation by the USSR, the Chinese historians interpret these events as "an invasion of Poland," the "occupation" of the Western oblasts of the Ukraine and Belorussia, the "dismembering" of the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Romania and the annexation of the Baltic states on the basis of ultimatums for reorganizing the governments and introducing Soviet troops on their territory (p 228).

In addition, the authors endeavor to place the blame on our nation for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, asserting that this war broke out supposedly over "Finland's refusal to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the Soviet Union and exchange the Karelian Isthmus" (p 228), and overlooking such facts as the hostile anti-Soviet course of the reactionary ruling circles in prewar Finland who turned the nation's territory into a staging area for an attack on the USSR, the concentration on the frontier of major forces which created a direct threat to Leningrad and the artillery shelling of Soviet garrisons.

One is also struck by the interpretation in the work of the sociopolitical nature of World War II which differs from what is generally accepted in Marxist historical literature. As is generally known, World War II started as a clash between the two imperialist groupings. The states in the Nazi bloc from the first to the last day waged an imperialist, unjust war. On the part of the Anglo-French coalition, the war in the initial stage was also unjust and imperialist. However, in the course of the war, its sociopolitical nature began to change for the bourgeois states which opposed the fascist-militaristic bloc. This derived primarily from the fact that the escalation of aggression created the real threat of enslaving the peoples in many European nations and a threat to their national independence.

The participation of the broad masses of people in the war became the determining factor for turning it from an imperialist one into a liberation, just war. The peoples of Poland and Yugoslavia from the very outset waged a just war for freedom and national independence. The peoples of Greece, Albania and Czechoslovakia and later Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and France rose to the liberation struggle.

But the main, decisive factor which determined the liberation nature of the war against the states of the Nazi coalition was the entry of the USSR into it after the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany.

The researchers of the history of World War II in the Soviet Union and abroad explain this question thus from fundamental, Marxist positions. The Chinese historians in their work proceed from somewhat different assumptions. They feel that "the initial, imperialist stage of World War II was short and lasted approximately 8-9 months (from 1 September 1939 through April-June 1940). During the period between 9 April 1940, when Germany attacked Denmark and Norway, through 18 June, when the Free France forces headed by Gen de Gaulle began operating, there was a change in the nature of the war, and it was turned from an imperialist war into an anti-fascist war" (p 148).

The book's authors advance such a turning point in the nature of the war for a certain purpose, trying to put a sort of "theoretical base" under the fanciful thesis of Soviet "aggressiveness" so that the measures of the Soviet Union to strengthen the security of its frontiers could be described as "aggressive ones," since in time they coincide with the stage (1939-1940) defined by the Chinese historians as a "imperialist" and "unjust" one.

The authors of the book cast this shadow on Soviet policy not only in terms of the prewar history. They emphasize that "the present situation and the situation on the eve of World War II have many aspects in common," trying to make the reader perceive the events of the 1980's in the pattern worked out by them.

As for the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the authors give the general strength of the grouping of Nazi troops thrown against our nation according to the Barbarossa Plan and point out the axes of the main thrusts and the results of the first days and months of the war. The book also mentions the measures of the Communist Party and the Soviet government to mobilize and deploy the Soviet Armed Forces, to reorganize the economy on a war footing, to evacuate the industrial enterprises to the eastern regions of the nation, to expand defense production, to reorganize the party and state system and so forth.

At the same time, in talking about the reasons for the defeat of the Nazi hordes at Moscow, the Chinese historians use certain worn out postulates from bourgeois historiography. For explaining the success of the outstanding operation by the Soviet troops leading to the defeat of the assault groupings aimed at Moscow, the authors of the work have again seized on the old saw of the terrible "general frost," that is, the reason for the failure of the Nazi offensive against Moscow is seen by them primarily in the unpreparedness of the German Army for wintertime operations as well as in the miscalculation by Hitler who "split his efforts, having sent a portion of the forces to the south and a portion to the northern wing of the Soviet-German Front" (pp 256-257).

The authors of the work recognize the crucial significance of the Battle of Stalingrad and the successes of the Soviet Army achieved in 1943. At the same time, the Chinese historians endeavor to introduce the idea of the significant "co-involvement" of the American and English Allies in the events of bringing about a fundamental change in World War II. Here the contribution of the Anglo-American Allies in bringing about the fundamental change is seen by the work's authors primarily in the delivery of weapons, equipment and raw materials to the Soviet Union.

At the same time, from the official data given both in Soviet and foreign sources,<sup>2</sup> it is known that the Allied deliveries in 1942, the most difficult year for the Soviet nation, were very insignificant and the approved delivery program was only 55 percent carried out. In the autumn of 1942, during the most difficult months for the Soviet Armed Forces in the crucial struggle for Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the deliveries of weapons and equipment were sharply cut back as a result of a unilateral act by the English and U.S. governments.

The interpretation by the work's authors of the events in the concluding stage of World War II also causes significant argument. As is known, with the final liberation of the areas of the Soviet Union temporarily under Nazi occupation, the Soviet Armed Forces were confronted with the important political mission of providing direct aid to the peoples of Eastern and Southeast Europe in freeing them from Nazi suppression. The great liberating mission of the Soviet Armed Forces which they began to directly carry out in mid-1944 was prepared for by the military and labor accomplishments of the Soviet people, by their loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism and by the organizational and ideological activities of the CPSU.<sup>3</sup> However, the reviewed work does not give space to an appropriate section which would bring out this noble mission of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Soviet military paid a high price for the freedom brought to the peoples of the foreign countries in releasing them from the Nazi and Japanese occupiers. More than a million Soviet soldiers and officers perished while the total losses of the Soviet troops considering wounded and missing in action were over 3 million persons. The Soviet troops also suffered great material losses.<sup>4</sup>

Almost one-third of the book is devoted to the events of the anti-Japanese war and military operations on the Chinese Front during World War II. This is explained not only by the fact that the book is designed basically for the Chinese reader and because the events which occurred in China during that period, quite naturally, were given a more detailed treatment, but also by the fact that the authors have endeavored in this manner to prove their thesis about the crucial role of the Chinese Front in World War II.

The main contribution of the Chinese Front to the forces fighting against the Nazi-militaristic bloc is seen by the authors in the fact that it supposedly tied down the basic mass of Japanese ground forces and this, in their opinion, had an enormous impact on the course of operations in the other theaters and on the course of World War II as a whole. "The role of the Chinese Front is determined primarily by the fact," the work emphasizes, "that if there was not the 8-year heroic Japanese war of the Chinese people, the Japanese invaders could have invaded Australia and India with impunity and also pushed to the north, against the socialist Soviet Union. Only due to the long anti-Japanese war of the Chinese people was it possible to thwart the military-strategic plans of the Japanese fascists who intended initially to strike at the center and then on the flanks" (p 718).

The Asian theater of war, regardless of the enormous expanses, from the very moment of the outbreak, played a subordinate role in relation to the European theater, where enormous groupings of belligerent coalitions were concentrated

and the basic tasks were carried out of defeating Nazi Germany which was the main enemy and achieving victory over the aggressive bloc as a whole.

The Chinese Front within the Asiatic theater, in turn, also held far from the dominant position in comparison, for example, with the Pacific Theater, where the basic Japanese efforts were concentrated. The armed struggle in China basically had a local nature. It is a fact that over the entire war the Chinese troops did not carry out a single strategic operation.<sup>5</sup> Starting from 7 July 1937 right up to the beginning of World War II, China actually tied down a certain portion of the Japanese ground forces and fought the Japanese aggressors virtually alone. The only country which at that time provided significant material and financial aid to China was the Soviet Union and this the authors of the book could not help but mention. But the number of Japanese troops involved in combat operations in China in no way was the "basic mass of Japanese ground forces." This can be seen from the fact that the Japanese militarists, in endeavoring to carry out their aggressive plans in 1938 at Lake Khasan and in 1939 on the Khalkhin-Gol River, used major forces in these areas without any harm to the situation of their troops on the Chinese Front.

If one turns to China's contribution to preventing Japanese aggression against the Soviet Union, then the facts are certainly not in favor of the book's authors.

In July 1941, our representatives in Yanan, having learned of Japan's preparations for war against the USSR, turned to the leadership of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] with a request to prevent the concentration of Japanese troops along the Soviet frontier on the Beiping-Kalgan and Baotou sectors and thereby helped the Soviet Union in a critical situation. But the CCP leaders did not respond to this request. At that time Mao Zedong stated: "In the event of a war of the Japanese against the USSR, we will conduct only minor operations, without undertaking actions with large forces in order to preserve our own. In the course of the war we will act depending upon the situation...."<sup>6</sup>

After the attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the national liberation forces of China, in particular the 8th Army, not only did not increase but, on the contrary, noticeably reduced their efforts in the rear and on the lines of communications of the Japanese troops.

In the summer and autumn of 1942, the situation on the Soviet-German Front was exceptionally difficult for our country. The Nazi hordes were pushing toward the Volga. At this time, the Japanese General Staff was working out a new version of a plan to attack the USSR and the implementing of this was made dependent upon the expected victories of Nazi Germany. And although complete quiet at that moment reigned on the Chinese Front, all requests from the Soviet side to the CCP leadership to prevent by any means the Japanese from preparing for war against the USSR remained disregarded. It became clear that in the event of an attack by Japan on the USSR no hope could be put on aid from the armed forces led by the CCP.

The "counterstrikes of local importance" conducted from 1944 by the troops of the 8th and New 4th Armies and described by the work's authors (p 663) could not have a decisive impact on the course of engagements on the other theaters

of World War II. These were basically actions against the puppet troops of the Chinese Quisling Wang Jingwei and did not divert the Japanese forces from other fronts.

As a result of the offensive operations by the Japanese troops in China by the summer of 1945, the Chinese people and their armed forces were in a very difficult situation and the way out of this was provided only by the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan. As is known, a week before the entry of the USSR into the war, the Japanese surrounded in the area of Pingquan units of the 8th Army under the command of Zhao Wenjin and these comprised a significant portion of the troops of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Liberated Region. Only the rapid advance by the Soviet 17th Army prevented the destruction of the surrounding troops.<sup>7</sup>

The desire of the authors of the reviewed work to play down the importance of the world historical victory of the Soviet Union in World War II is particularly apparent in understating the contribution of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces to the defeat of militaristic Japan. The book's authors intentionally underestimate the size and battleworthiness of the Kwantung Army, in pointing out that of the former "flower of the Imperial Army," which it was considered at one time, "only a remembrance remained" by the moment of the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan (pp 706-707). The book's authors do not consider the fact that from the spring of 1945, the Kwantung army began to be intensely strengthened and readied for combat operations against the Soviet troops as is pointed out even by Japanese historians.

In promising to follow the principle of "depicting events depending upon the degree of their importance," the book's authors nevertheless have devoted just several pages to the description of the Kwantung Army by the Soviet troops without describing any details.

The Manchurian Strategic Operation by the Soviet troops, during which the Kwantung Grouping was defeated, deprived the Japanese militarists of the last means and opportunities for continuing the war. The main result of this brilliant operation which has become part of the treasurehouse of the history of world military art consisted not only in the fact that it forced the aggressor to lay down his arms and extinguished the site of war in the East where millions of lives had been lost, including the Chinese. Its importance was also that this operation by a lightning-like attack paralyzed the Kwantung Army and prevented it from entering an extended armed struggle which would have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Japanese as well as Soviet soldiers and officers. This operation was the finale of World War II.

Unfortunately, the Chinese historians have not succeeded in providing an objective assessment of the Manchurian Operation by the Soviet troops. Moreover, in endeavoring to prove the "decisive" role of the Chinese Front in defeating militaristic Japan, they have compared the number of losses suffered by the Japanese armed forces in the various theaters of war. They have pointed out that over 8 years on the Chinese Front, according to understated Japanese data, over 1.3 million Japanese soldiers and officers were killed and wounded, approximately 890,000 Japanese were killed and wounded in the battles against the Western Allies in the Pacific Theater, and a little more than 80,000 in the 3 weeks of

battles in Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and the Kurils (p 718), forgetting the end result of the actions of the Soviet troops, the surrender of Japan and the end of World War II.

It must be pointed out that far from all the Chinese historians concerned with studying the problems of World War II adhere to such views of the events in its final stage in the Far Eastern Theater. For example, the article "Victory in the Anti-Japanese War" published in the newspaper RENMIN RIBAO at the end of July 1983, in contrast to the reviewed work, states that as a result of the entry of the USSR into the war, Japan was deprived of the last opportunity to resist and, being in a hopeless situation, was forced into surrender.<sup>8</sup> The article's author emphasized that the atomic bombing of the Japanese cities by American aviation could in no way force Japan to cease resistance. Moreover, the article points out, the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of North-east China significantly brought closer the end of the anti-Japanese war of the Chinese people and which could now enter its final stage, the stage of a general counteroffensive against the Japanese invaders. Who could argue against such an objective assessment of events in the designated period?

The book has also not properly treated the question of the establishing of a powerful revolutionary base in Manchuria. This could arise only as a result of the defeat of the Kwantung Army. The Soviet Command turned over to the Chinese people's armies an enormous amount of captured Japanese weapons. Due to this the technical equipping and combat capability of the armed forces led by the CCP were significantly increased. Manchuria which was liberated by the Soviet troops became a secure military strategic staging area for the Chinese revolutionary forces and a new political center of the Chinese revolution. Relying on this the Chinese communists led the people into a decisive struggle against the rotten Gomintang regime.<sup>9</sup>

The "History of World War II" published in China is not merely the first literary steps of an individual scholar. This is a collective work by Chinese historians, fundamental research. However, this first attempt by Chinese scholars, unfortunately, cannot be considered successful, for many ideas set forward in their book do not correspond to the objective facts of history. It can merely be hoped that in subsequent works on the history of World War II the Chinese scholars will be able to avoid the tendentiousness in the treatment of historical events. This will only improve the scientific value of their research.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> An announcement has been published on preparing a new run of the book.

<sup>2</sup> See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War of 1939-1945], Vol 12, Voenizdat, 1982, p 186; "Istoriya sotsialisticheskoy ekonomiki SSSR" [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], Vol 5, Moscow, Nauka, 1978, p 543; M. Howard, "Bol'shaya strategiya" [Grand Strategy], translated from the English, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980, pp 40-48.

<sup>3</sup> "Osvoboditel'naya missiya Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil vo vtoroy mirovoy voynы" [The Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II], 2d Edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, p 78.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p 455.

<sup>5</sup> "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 12, p 427.

<sup>6</sup> P. P. Vladimirov, "Osobyy rayon Kitaya 1942-1945" [The Special Region of China 1942-1945], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1973, pp 57-58.

<sup>7</sup> "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 11, 1980, p 225.

<sup>8</sup> RENMIN RIBAO, 25 July 1983.

<sup>9</sup> O. Borisov, "Sovetskiy soyuz i man'chzhurskaya revolyutsionnaya baza" [The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base], Moscow, Mysl', 1977, p 13.

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CSO: 1801/149

## BOOK ON DEFENSE OF TULA IN WORLD WAR II REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 70-71

[Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Maj Gen (Res) V. Makhalov of the book "Rabochaya Tula srazhayetsya" (Worker Tula Fights), by A. N. Malygin, 2d Supplemented Edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1983]

[Text] In the literature devoted to the heroic events of the Great Patriotic War, a special place is held by the recollections and memoirs of its immediate participants. Among such works is the book by A. N. Malygin "Rabochaya Tula srazhayetsya" which has been put out in a second edition by Politizdat and supplemented with new materials.

A. N. Malygin who, during the war years, was the first secretary of the Central Raykom of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] in Tula, relates the heroic defense of the city by the armorers and the feats of the Soviet military and workers from the Tula plants who fought on the southern approaches to Moscow.

At the beginning of the book, the author, using the example of the activities of the Tula communists and the work of the collectives at the city and oblast enterprises, shows what enormous efforts were undertaken by the Communist Party during the prewar years in strengthening the nation's economic and defense might and in preparing the Soviet people to repel Nazi aggression.

Thus, over the years of the first five-year plans, many large industrial installations were put up on Tula land. The defense plants were fundamentally reconstructed, new models of weapons and combat equipment were developed and the output of military product was increased. Extensive work was done in the area of military instruction for inductees and reserve personnel and indoctrinating the youth in the revolutionary and combat traditions of the Soviet people.

The system of party leadership was improved. In accord with the decisions of the 18th VKP(b) Congress defense industry sections were set up in the party obkom and gorkom and military sections in the raykoms. At the major military plants there was the institution of party organizers from the VKP(b) Central Committee. All of this ensured the successful activities of the city and oblast party organization during the wartime in organizing the defense of Tula and in mobilizing the workers to repel the enemy.

From the very first days of the war, the entire life of the rayon and city was changed over to a wartime footing: reserves were mobilized for the Red Army, fighter subunits and detachments of the people's militia were formed and training was organized for the public in the system of Vsevobuch [Universal Military Training] and the MPVO [local air defense]. Work was widely initiated to teach jobs to juveniles and women who would replace the men leaving for the front. Workers were sent to build defensive structures and barricades in Tula itself and on the approaches to it. Here tens of thousands of city and oblast inhabitants were employed. In Tsentral'nyy [Central] Rayon, from 23 October 1941, each day around 5,000 persons were employed in building defensive structures. Over a short period of time, two fortified belts were constructed with deep antitank trenches and secure obstacles and barricades.

On 23 October 1941, the city defense committee adopted a decision to create the Tula Worker Regiment on the basis of the fighter battalions and the people's militia detachments. By the end of October this regiment numbered 1,500 persons.

The first attempt by the Nazis to take Tula without a halt after capturing Orel was thwarted in the battles around Mtsensk. But the enemy did not give up on its plans. A. N. Malygin has told in detail about the extremely dangerous situation which existed by 30 October near Tula. The enemy had concentrated major forces on the southern approaches to the city while the formations of our 50th Army which, according to the orders from Headquarters, was to block the further advance of the Nazis toward Tula, were fighting in other sections of the front or were on the way to the designated area. The only real force which could be used for defending the city was the 732d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, the 156th NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] Regiment and the just organized Worker Regiment. In addition, they could count on the support of certain units which held positions to the northeast of Tula.

As is described in the book, by the morning of 30 October the enemy threw its infantry and tanks into the offensive.

The first to engage in battle were the men of the 732d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment. They destroyed the enemy infantry, they fired at reserve staging areas, they covered the positions of the 156th NKVD Regiment and the Worker Regiment against air attack and then engaged the tanks. Just a gun platoon from the 6th Battery under the command of Lt G. M. Volnyanskiy destroyed several enemy tanks. Volnyanskiy, taking over for the antiaircraft gunners unable to fight, himself carried the rounds and aimed the gun. When he himself fell in battle, command was assumed by the political instructor M. I. Sizov.

Fighting heroically in repelling repeated enemy attacks on 30 October were the men of the Worker Regiment headed by the commander, the communist, Capt A. P. Gorshkov and the military commissar, the Old Bolshevik and participant in the Civil War, G. A. Ageyev (he was killed on the same day). The workers, the Chekists [NKVD employees] and antiaircraft artillery troops drove off four Nazi attacks, having destroyed several-score enemy tanks and having killed more than a battalion of infantry. The plans of the Nazis to break into Tula without a halt were thwarted.

The author shows the difficulty of the situation on the Tula sector and later, in November 1941, when the enemy, having pierced the defenses of our troops, was rushing toward Kashira in outflanking Tula to the southeast. The city could communicate with Moscow only through a narrow 6-km corridor. But the men of the 50th Army with the active support and aid of the entire Tula population defended the city and then as part of the troops of the Western Front went over to a decisive counteroffensive.

The value of the book is that it completely describes the work of the party raykom under the conditions of the enemy-beseiged city at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. From the example of the work of the Tula communists, A. N. Malygin shows how the Communist Party, having led the fighting people and having reorganized its ranks, turned our country into a strong combat camp. The organizer and soul of resisting the enemy were precisely the Tula party organization headed at that time by the candidate member of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the First Secretary of the Obkom and Gorkom, V. G. Zhavoronkov who was also the chairman of the city defense committee.

The high morale of the city's defenders, their steadfastness and belief in victory were supported and ensured by the ably organized ideological and indoctrinal work. The book devotes a great deal of attention to the organizing of mass political work under the difficult conditions of the enemy-beseiged city. Also interesting and instructive are the author's statements about the style and methods of work of the party body. Centralization, brief effective meetings, brief decisions formulated in the form of specific instructions--all of this characterized the organizational role of the party obkom, gorkom and raykom in turning Tula into an unattainable fortress for the enemy.

By its entire content the book shows that a most important means for ensuring a party influence in all areas during the days of the heroic defense of Tula was the personal example of the communists. Some 60 percent of the men in the Worker Regiment were communists and Komsomol members. The communists were in the first ranks of those who built the defensive structures and mined the roads and cleared the aftereffects of the enemy air and artillery raids and those who with strings of grenades and Molotov cocktails in their hands fought a duel with the enemy tanks. The immortal feat of the defenders of the glorious city of Russian armorers was properly recognized by awarding Tula the high title of hero city.

The book of A. N. Malygin has primarily indoctrinal importance. It helps to indoctrinate in our youth the ideal which embodies nobility, ideological conviction, courage and industry and helps to instill a respect for our glorious history, a pride for the heroic past of our country and a readiness to defend our motherland.

As a whole the book by A. N. Malygin "Rabochaya Tula srazhayetsya" is a good gift for readers for the approaching 40th anniversary of the great victory of the Soviet people over Nazism.

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CSO: 1801/149

BOOK ON DEVELOPMENT OF ROCKET UNIT IN WORLD WAR II REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) p 72

[Review by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Col (Ret) A. Shurygin of the book "Ogon' vedut gvardeyskiye minomety. Boyevoy put' 7-y gvardeyskoy minometnoy Kovenskoy Krasnoznamennoy, ordenov Suvorova II stepeni i Kutuzova II stepeni divizii" (The Rocket Launchers Are Firing. The Campaign Record of the 7th Kovnya Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Second Degree and Order of Kutuzov Second Degree Rocket Launcher Division) by K. D. Karsanov, Voyenizdat, 1982, 152 pages with illustrations]

[Text] Voyenizdat has put out a book on the campaign record of the 7th Guards Mortar [Rocket Launcher] Division written by its commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Maj Gen Art K. D. Karsanov.

The Communist Party and its Central Committee during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War did everything necessary to provide the Soviet Army with the most modern types of combat equipment. In July 1941, the first volley of the M-13 rocket battery thundered near Orsha and just a year later, the first units of heavy rocket artillery appeared on the front.

The value of the work by K. D. Karsanov is that it discloses to the reader little-known pages from the history of the Great Patriotic War. It, for the first time, completely deals with the history of the combat operations of the heavy rocket artillery formations.

The 7th Rocket Launcher Division received its baptism in fire on 7 August 1943 on the right wing of the Western Front. The division fired thousands of rockets against the enemy and these destroyed a large number of enemy dugouts and pill-boxes and destroyed many enemy guns and mortars. On 13 August 1943, the 7th Rocket Launcher Division with volley firing supported the advance of the 33d Army on Spas-Demensk. On this day the city was liberated.

The book shows well the activities of the political bodies and primary party organizations in the political support for the division's combat operations. The formation had more than 40 primary party organizations. During the period of the battles on the Smolensk sector in August-September 1943, some 447 persons were accepted as members and candidate members of the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)].

The author tells in detail about the further combat record of the division. In crushing the enemy's defensive works, it laid a path for our infantry and tanks. On 25 September 1943, Smolensk and Roslavl were liberated. On 12-14 October 1943, in the battles near Lenino, the formation provided fraternal aid to units of the 1st Polish Division imeni Tadeusz Kosciusko.

The year 1944 was the year of driving the Nazi invaders out of Soviet land. During this year the 7th Rocket Launcher Division received the honorary name of Kovnya. Subsequently, the formation was awarded the Order of Suvorov Second Degree.

During the winter and spring of 1945, intense battles were being fought in East Prussia. The Nazi troops were putting up fierce resistance. The 7th Guards Rocket Launcher Division participated in the preparations for storming a number of cities. In February 1945, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet awarded the Order of the Red Banner for successful combat operations in East Prussia and on the occasion of its second anniversary. Upon the conclusion of combat operations, the division was awarded the Order of Kutuzov Second Degree.

The book describes the numerous combat feats of the soldiers, commanders, political workers, engineers, technical and medical workers in the division. Over 3,000 men of the division received orders and medals for courage and bravery.

As a whole, the book by K. D. Karsanov is a useful aid in the military-patriotic indoctrination of our youth.

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CSO: 1801/149

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN 1936-1937 CHRONICLED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 73-76

[Article by section head of the TsGASA (Central State Archives of the Soviet Army) Z. Pavlova and Senior Science Associate of the TsGASA G. Smirnova: "Chronicle of the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces"]

[Text]

1936 (July-December)

2 July--By an order of the USSR NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] within the NKO administrative directorate the Archives Section of the NKO was established (on the basis of a decree of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] and SNK [Council of People's Commissars] of 5 February 1936). This same order established the personnel and statute of the section and according to this it is a body of the USSR NKO entrusted with the storage and correct utilization of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] archival materials.

In accord with the plan for the construction and strengthening of the Pacific Fleet, the move has started for the destroyers "Voykov" (commander, Capt 3d Rank M. G. Sukhorukov) and "Stalin" (commander, Capt Lt V. N. Obukhov) over the Northern Seaway from Kronshtadt to Vladivostok (completed on 17 October).

4 July--By an order of the USSR NKO, the Regulation Governing the Firefighting Bodies in the RKKA was promulgated.

12 July--The USSR NKO established annual army competitions for the RKKA ground and antiaircraft artillery in the aim of helping to increase the weapons training of the personnel and more effectively utilize the equipment in a combat situation.

11 August--By a decree of the USSR TsIK and SNK, induction age for young persons for active military service was reduced from 21 to 19 years of age. The transition to the new induction age is to be carried out in the period from 1936 through 1939.

8-11 September--Demonstration maneuvers were held in the Belorussian Military District [BVO] with the task of checking the results of the summer troop combat training period. Participating in them were large formations of the mechanized

troops and aviation, rifle and cavalry formations, artillery and parachute units. The chief leader of the exercises was the commander of the BVO, Army Cmdr 1st Rank I. P. Uborevich. Attending the maneuvers were the People's Commissar of Defense, Mar SU K. Ye. Voroshilov, his deputies, members of the Belorussian government as well as foreign military delegations invited to the exercises (English, French and Czechoslovak).

10-15 September--Tactical exercises were conducted in the Transbaykal Military District. The exercises were attended by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Cmsr 1st Rank Ya. B. Gamarnik.

12-14 September--Tactical exercises were conducted in the Kiev Military District [KVO] under the leadership of the KVO commander, Army Cmdr 1st Rank I. E. Yakir. These were attended by the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, Mar SU K. Ye. Voroshilov, Mars SU A. I. Yegorov and S. M. Budenyy, Army Cmdrs 2d Rank A. I. Sedyakin, Ya. I. Alksnis and I. A. Khalepskiy.

20-22 September--Tactical exercises were conducted in the Moscow Military District [MVO] (leader of the exercises, MVO commander, Army Cmdr 1st Rank I. P. Belov) in the course of which the 84th Rifle Division was successfully shifted from Tula to the area of Gorkiy (on air transports) as well as units and rear services of the Moscow Proletarskiy Rifle Division over a distance of 280 km (by ground transport).

29 September--Tactical exercises commenced in the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the leadership of fleet commander, Flt Flagman 2d Rank L. M. Galler (these continued until 4 October). They were attended by the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, Mar SU K. Ye. Voroshilov.

29 September-3 October--Tactical exercises were conducted in the Pacific Fleet under the leadership of the fleet commander, Flt Flagman 1st Rank M. V. Viktorov. These were attended by the USSR Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Cmsr 1st Rank Ya. B. Gamarnik and the commander of the OKDVA [Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army], Mar SU V. K. Blyukher.

27 October--By an order of the NKO, the Decree of the USSR SNK of 19 October 1936 has been promulgated on the uniforms for regular command personnel and instructors as well as for students of the RKKA General Staff Academy.

31 October--By an order of the USSR NKO, the 93d Rifle Division has been given the name "East Siberian."

5 November--By a decree of the USSR TsIK, the 18th Turkmen Mountain Cavalry Division has been awarded the Order of the Red Banner on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the RKKA Turkmen national units as well as for combat feats in the fight against the enemies of the workers of the Soviet motherland and for successes in military and political training.

10 November--By an order of the USSR NKO, the corps high-power artillery regiments were renamed the corps heavy artillery regiments with the assigning of new numbers to them.

2 December--By an order of the USSR NKO, under the RKKA General Staff Academy, a military history faculty was established in the aim of training highly skilled instructors for the history of wars and military art for the higher RKKA institutions of learning. In line with this the military history department of the RKKA Academy imeni M. V. Frunze was abolished.

30 December--By an order of the USSR NKO, the provisional RKKA Field Manual (PU-36) and the Provisional Navy Manual were put into effect.

1937 (January-July)

5 January--By an order of the USSR NKO, the Regulation Governing the Field Headquarters of a Cavalry Army was promulgated.

10 January--By an order of the USSR NKO, the Regulation for Training Snipers in the RKKA Rifle Units was put into effect. A sample of the chest insignia "Sniper" was approved.

16 January--The VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee approved the Regulation Governing the Work of the Komsomol Organizations in the Red Army.

20 January--By an order of the USSR NKO, the Navy Signals School of the RKKA was renamed the Navy Signals School while the Navy Shore Defense School of the RKKA imeni LKSMU was renamed the Navy Artillery School imeni LKSMU.

23 January--An order of the USSR NKO was issued for organizing military musical schools in Moscow and Leningrad.

26 January--By a decree of the USSR TSIK, the position of USSR Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for the Air Forces was established and he is also to be the chief of the RKKA Air Forces. The Army Cmdr 2d Rank Ya. I. Alksnis was appointed to this position. At the same time, the position of USSR Deputy People's Commissar for the Navy was introduced and he is also the chief of the RKKA Navy. Flt Flagman 1st Rank V. M. Orlov was appointed to this post;

By an order of the USSR NKO, the Regulation on the Chief of the RKKA Air Forces and the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for the Air Forces and His Directorate was announced;

By an order of the USSR NKO, the Regulation Governing the Commander of the District (Fleet) Air Forces and His Directorate was announced.

11 February--By an order of the USSR NKO, the Regulation Governing the Emergency Rescue Service of the RKKA Navy was put into effect.

13 February--By an order of the USSR NKO, the troop units of the Cossack divisions are to be given the following names: Don to the units of the 4th Don Cossack Division imeni Voroshilov; Kuban to the units of the 6th Kuban-Tersk Cossack Chongar Division imeni Budenyy; Tersk to the units of the 10th Tersk Stavropol Cossack Territorial Division; Kuban to the units of the 12th Kuban Cossack Territorial Division; Don to the units of the 13th Don Cossack Territorial Division.

27 February--By a directive of the RKKA Political Directorate, 6-month courses are to be organized for the training of political instructors from the junior commanders in regular and re-enlisted service and from reservists.

1 March--By an order of the USSR NKO, the rear support units of the RKKA are to be reorganized into RKKA construction units.

16 March--By an order of the USSR NKO, the ground forces military schools are to be renamed military schools.

26 March--By an order of the USSR NKO, the 1937 Provisional RKKA Navy Manual (BUMS-37) was put into effect.

28 March--By an order of the USSR NKO, the Regulation Governing the Chief of the RKKA Navy and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Naval Forces and His Directorate was approved.

23 April--By an order of the USSR NKO, the RKKA Artillery Field Manual, Part II, was put into effect;

By an order of the USSR NKO, the Regulation Governing the RKKA Construction Units was put into effect.

27 April--By a decree of the VKP(b) Central Committee, in the aim of coordinating all measures relating to national defense questions, the USSR Defense Committee was organized under the USSR SNK;

The USSR TsIK approved the decree for abolishing the Labor and Defense Council.

9 May--By an order of the USSR NKO, the Regulation Governing the Billeting Operations Bodies of the RKKA was put into effect.

10 May--The USSR TsIK and SNK approved the decree on introducing the institution of military commissars in the Red Army and Navy;

Military councils were re-established in the districts, fleets, armies and flotillas;

By a decree of the USSR TsIK and SNK, the Regulation Governing the Military Council of a District (Fleet, Army) of the RKKA was approved; according to this it is to consist of a commander and two members of the military council and be the superior directing military body in a district (fleet, army);

By an order of the USSR NKO, the Statute of the RKKA Mechanized Troops, Part III, was put into effect.

11 May--By an order of the USSR NKO, the Northern Military Flotilla was renamed the Northern Fleet.

1 June--By an order of the USSR NKO, political sections were organized in all rifle, cavalry and air corps.

27 June--By an order of the USSR NKO, positions of military commissars of sections were to be introduced on the staffs of the districts, armies and fleets.

1 July--Positions of military commissars and individually the positions of chiefs of political sections were introduced on the TOE of all the RKKA formations;

By an order of the USSR NKO, two positions for members of the military councils are to be incorporated in the TOE of the RKKA Directorates of Air Forces and Navy;

Positions of military commissars and separately chiefs of political sections are to be introduced on the TOE of all the RKKA military academies.

9 July--The position of district deputy air force commander for combat training is to be introduced in the Leningrad, Belorussian, Kiev and Transbaykal Military Districts;

Upon the order of the USSR NKO, the Moscow Railroad School from the Special Corps of Railroad Troops was renamed a higher school.

16 July--An order of the USSR NKO was issued on forming the Air Forces correspondence command faculty under the RKKA Air Forces Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy.

19 July--By an order of the USSR NKO, the RKKA Military Chemical Academy imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov has been renamed the RKKA Military Academy for Chemical Defense imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov.

22 July--By an order of the USSR NKO, a military faculty has been established under the Engineer and Technical Communications Academy in the aim of training radio communications engineers for the RKKA;

Adopted was the Decree of the USSR SNK "On Introducing Representatives of the NKO as Members of the Council under the People's Commissar of the Defense Industry."

25 July--By an order of the USSR NKO, Naval Aviation was taken away from the chief of the RKKA Naval Forces and turned over to the chief of the RKKA Air Forces.

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CSO: 1801/149

BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON FIRST NAVY COMMANDER V. M. AL'TFATER GIVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 80-82

[Article by A. Zakharov: "The First Commander of the Republic's Navy V. M. Al'tfater (On the 100th Anniversary of His Birthday)"]

[Text] Many thousands of military specialists who came over to the Soviet side after Great October took an active part in creating the Red Army and Navy. Among them one could put Vasiliy Mikhaylovich Al'tfater (1883--20 April 1919), a career officer in the Russian Navy who had rich practical experience in naval service. He "due solely to his personal qualities, to his abilities, intelligence and talents began to move up even under the Old Regime and at the age of 33...had reached the rank of rear admiral."<sup>1</sup>

Vasiliy Mikhaylovich was born in Warsaw in a noble family. In 1902, he brilliantly completed the naval corps. He participated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 as the junior navigation officer on the cruiser "Askol'd." In 1908, V. M. Al'tfater completed the Navy Academy, after which he held responsible positions, serving in the Baltic Fleet and the Naval General Staff. During World War I he was the navy representative and later the chief of the Navy Directorate under the commander-in-chief of the Northern Front. He took a direct part in working out the plans for coastal defenses.

During the Provisional Government, V. M. Al'tfater was the assistant chief of the Naval General Staff. He continued to hold this position after the victory of the October Armed Insurrection. His very first report to the chief of the Soviet Naval Staff concerned the general state of affairs and the preparations for reforms in the Navy. In describing, in particular, the situation in the Baltic, he wrote: "As for the political situation, it is as follows: the fleet is fully on the side of Petrograd, actual political power is in the hands of Tsentrobalt [Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet] and the Finland Oblast Committee working in full contact with Petrograd."<sup>2</sup>

With the start of the peace talks with Germany (December 1917), V. M. Al'tfater, upon the proposal of the Naval College, was sent to Brest as one of the military experts on the Soviet delegation. His knowledge, tenacity, tact and good will which he showed so clearly during the talks helped him win the complete confidence of the Soviet government. After 2 weeks of the delegation's work,

Vasiliy Mikhaylovich wrote to the Soviet military leadership: "Up to now I have served only because I felt it necessary to be useful to Russia where I could be and however I could. But I did not know you and did not believe you. Even now there is much that I do not understand in your policy. But I have been persuaded of one thing. I am convinced that you love Russia more than many of ours. I must now tell you that I am on your side."<sup>3</sup>

In holding the position of assistant chief of the Naval General Staff from February 1918, V. M. Al'tfater participated in working out the draft for organizing the Higher Military Council and worked on a special commission on the questions of police organization.

In April, upon a proposal of the Chairman of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee], Yakov Mikhaylovich Sverdlov, V. M. Al'tfater became a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Naval Affairs.<sup>4</sup> The new member of the Board had many concerns: the difficult situation of the Black Sea Fleet, the preparation for operations on the Caspian Sea, the acute fuel shortage, the elaborating of a plan of measures to prevent the capture of the Baltic Fleet by the enemy, the dispatching of seaplanes to the fleet, the laying of minefields and so forth. His great capacity for work and conscientiousness were truly unusual and amazing to everyone working with him. There was not a single instance when he left something undone, no matter how difficult it was. The rapidly changing situation at that time required an immediate solution to the most diverse questions involved with the war.

Two notes from V. I. Lenin to V. M. Al'tfater have survived from 28 and 29 August 1918.

"To Comrade Al'tfater:

"What is the situation on the dispatch of submarines to the Volga and the Caspian Sea?

"Is it true that only old subs can be sent?

"How many are there?

"When was the order given for their dispatch?

"What has been done generally?

Lenin"<sup>5</sup>

(Written 28 August 1918)

In the reply to the request of V. I. Lenin, Al'tfater stated that they were still searching for small submarines to be moved.

On 29 August 1918, V. I. Lenin demanded an immediate and accurate report by the following day on the preparations to send the subs as this question could not be deferred for a single minute. Undoubtedly all the instructions of the revolution's leader were carried out unswervingly.

In October 1918, V. M. Al'tfater became a member of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council [RVSR]. Over the signature of V. I. Lenin, he was given a mandate. Its text reads:

"Comrade Vasiliy Mikhaylovich Al'tfater, on the basis of a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 12 October 1918 is appointed a member of the RVSR. Due to the extremely important and responsible tasks entrusted to Comrade Al'tfater, all the authorities and organizations of the RSFSR are to provide him, Comrade Al'tfater, immediately with any assistance in carrying out the assignment entrusted to him bearing responsibility to the Revolutionary Tribunal for doing such."<sup>7</sup>

At the same time V. M. Al'tfater was given the post of the first commander of all the republic's naval forces (komorski) as established by the decree of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] of 15 October 1918.<sup>8</sup> The carrying out of the assigned duties required the straining of all forces and complete dedication. In the difficult situation, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich in a short period of time was able to organize the available naval forces along new lines and unite the better portion of the officers which had come over to Soviet power. In assessing the activities of V. M. Al'tfater, the then Commissar of the Naval General Staff Ye. A. Berens pointed out that "if the Soviet republic has kept its naval fleet here this is chiefly due to...Vasily Mikhaylovich."<sup>9</sup>

V. M. Al'tfater was not merely an excellent line officer. He also wrote the theoretical work "On Coastal Fortresses" published in 1919 in the journal MORSKOY SBORNIK. In this work, Al'tfater analyzed the main shortcomings and errors made in building maritime fortresses and examined the questions "which undoubtedly are essential for the rational establishing of coastal defenses in the future."<sup>10</sup>

V. M. Al'tfater carried out great work to keep the Soviet naval forces in a battleworthy state in creating many naval flotillas, in strengthening the Baltic Fleet and in employing it in defending Petrograd during the Civil War. Thus, upon his proposal, the RVSR, recognizing that all restrictions of the Brest Peace had actually been lifted, on 12 November 1918 issued orders to bring the core of the Baltic Fleet to a state of combat readiness and on 15 November adopted a decision on the basis of the fleet to create an operational detachment of the Baltic Fleet (the battleship "Petropavlovsk," the iron-clad "Andrey Pervozvannyy," the cruiser "Oleg," four destroyers and six submarines).<sup>11</sup>

The intense virtually around-the-clock work undermined the health of Vasiliy Mikhaylovich and during the night of 20 April 1919 he died from a heart attack.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> IZVESTIYA, 24 April 1919.

<sup>2</sup> "Baltiyskiye moryaki v bor'be za vlast' Sovetov (noyabr' 1917--dekabr' 1918)" [The Baltic Sailors in the Struggle for Soviet Power (November 1917-December 1918)], Leningrad, Nauka, 1968, p 36.

<sup>3</sup> IZVESTIYA, 24 April 1919.

<sup>4</sup> R. N. Mordvinov, "Kursom 'Avrory'" [By the Course of "Avrora"], Voyenizdat, 1962, p 42.

<sup>5</sup> V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 50, p 171.

<sup>6</sup> "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biograficheskaya khronika (1918-1919)" [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biographic Chronicle (1918-1919)], Vol 6, Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, p 106.

<sup>7</sup> SOVETSKIY FLOT, No 253, 25 October 1957.

<sup>8</sup> "Direktivy Glavnogo Komandovaniya Krasnoy Armii (1917-1920). Sbornik dokumentov" [Directives of the Red Army High Command (1917-1920). Collection of Documents], Voyenizdat, 1969, p 801.

<sup>9</sup> IZVESTIYA, 23 April 1919.

<sup>10</sup> "On Coastal Fortresses," MORSKOY SBORNIK, Vol CDX, No 7-8, 1919, p 98.

<sup>11</sup> "Grazhdanskaya voyna v SSSR" [The Civil War in the USSR], Vol 1, Voyenizdat, 1980, p 203.

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CSO: 1801/149

## BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON NAVAL OFFICER M. V. VIKTOROV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 82-84

[Article by Candidate of Naval Sciences, Capt 1st Rank V. Shevchenko:  
"Flt Flagman 1st Rank M. V. Viktorov (On the 90th Anniversary of His Birthday")]

[Text] Linked with the name of Mikhail Vladimirovich Viktorov (24 December 1893 [5 January 1894]--August 1938), one of the prominent Soviet military leaders, is a whole series of important events in the history of the birth, subsequent development and organizational strengthening of the Baltic and Pacific Fleets as well as the development of the Soviet Navy as a whole. He was born in Yaroslavl. Upon reaching the age of 10, he was appointed a student in the Yaroslavl Cadet Corps. In 1910, he completed it, however he decided to dedicate his subsequent life to the Navy. During the same year, he was admitted to the naval cadet classes of the Navy Corps. Here he received the rank of warrant officer ["michman"] and was appointed assistant watch chief on the cruiser "Rossiya" (Baltic Fleet).

With the start of World War I, M. V. Viktorov participated in the combat cruises of the Baltic Fleet ships and in the laying of minefields. In 1915, he completed the Officer Mine Class and in 1917 Navigator Class.<sup>1</sup> Being the senior navigator on the battleship "Grazhdanin" (the former "Tsesarevich") he participated in October 1917 in repelling the attempts by the German Fleet to break into the Gulf of Finland, including in the battle at Kuyvasto (17 October).

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, M. V. Viktorov came over to the side of Soviet power. On the cruiser "Oleg" (in the position of senior navigator, first mate and temporary commander) he participated in the Ice Campaign of the Baltic Fleet (5-10 April 1918), the amphibious landing at Narva (1918) and in suppressing the counterrevolutionary coup at the forts of Krasnaya Gorka and Seraya Loshad (13-16 June 1919).<sup>2</sup>

In 1919, M. V. Viktorov was appointed the commander of the destroyer "Vsadnik" and on it participated in the fight against the English interventionists and the White Guard troops of Yudenich advancing on Petrograd. A year later he was in command of the battleship "Andrey Pervozvannyy" and then the battleship "Gangut."

In the spring of 1921, M. V. Viktorov participated in suppressing the Kronstadt anti-Soviet revolt and then became the senior naval chief of Kronshtadt. In May of the same year, he was appointed the chief of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea and this was an act of great confidence by the Bolshevik party and the Soviet government. From the very outset in the new position he endeavored to impose an organization on service, he steadily and firmly strengthened proper order and showed concern for increasing the battleworthiness of the fleet. In a short time ship repairs were organized there, the fleet crews and training detachment were restored, training programs were worked out and the training of junior specialists established. Very quickly, with the support of the command and political personnel, M. V. Viktorov was able to create a fighting nucleus of the fleet from the best manned and technically operational ships.

In the autumn of 1922, the first maneuvers were conducted in the fleet and these involved the battleship "Marat," destroyers, submarines and training vessels. Several days later, a composite detachment numbering 18 pennants for the first time since the Civil War went out on a practice voyage which was successfully completed.<sup>3</sup>

From June 1924, M. V. Viktorov for a short period of time was appointed the chief of the Black Sea Naval Forces. During the same year he was sent to advanced training at the Navy Academy.<sup>4</sup> Upon completing it, Mikhail Vladimirovich headed the Hydrographic Directorate and in April 1926, he was again appointed the chief of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces.

Having assumed the position, V. M. Viktorov introduced compulsory command exercises for all command personnel. He required a thorough knowledge of the probable enemy and excellent tactical training from the commanders of the groups and ships and their executive officers. Each trip to sea was accompanied by exercises with their subsequent analysis. In 1927, such exercises were held involving the leader of the Leningrad Bolsheviks S. M. Kirov and the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs K. Ye. Voroshilov. These demonstrated the good condition of the ships and the high combat skills of the personnel.

V. M. Viktorov carried out the tasks of rebuilding and strengthening the fleet and training the personnel together with the political bodies, relying on the party organization. Well organized party political work helped to strengthen discipline and achieve political maturity in the Baltic Fleet sailors. As a result, the Baltic Fleet became the leading one in the system of the USSR Armed Forces.

In March 1932, Mikhail Vladimirovich Viktorov who had dedicated all his energies to navy service at an open party meeting of the Baltic Fleet Staff was admitted to the party<sup>5</sup> and soon thereafter was appointed the chief of the Far Eastern Naval Forces. With his inherent firmness and tenacity he directed the organizing of the first formation and the construction of combat ships, airfields and coastal defense installations. M. V. Viktorov devoted a good deal of attention to studying and examining the Far Eastern coast in the aim of establishing conditions for constructing the new fleet's naval bases. Under him they began building the naval bases in Nakhodka, Sovetskaya Gavan and elsewhere. From

February 1933 through February 1934, the number of ships in the Far Eastern Naval Forces increased significantly.

In 1935, the Far Eastern Naval Forces were renamed the Pacific Fleet and M. V. Viktorov was appointed as its commander. At that time the fleet emerged in first place among the other Soviet fleets for the basic indicators of military and political training. On 20 November 1935, M. V. Viktorov was among the first to be awarded the high military rank of fleet flagman 1st rank for Navy command personnel.<sup>6</sup> Ten days later after this event, he headed a delegation which traveled to Moscow to report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and to the Soviet government on the first results of fleet construction and on the military and political training of its personnel.

For the great work carried out to create the Pacific Fleet, many of the commanders and Red Navymen were given high governmental decorations. The fleet commander was awarded the Order of Lenin "for outstanding achievements in organizing the submarine and surface naval forces of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] and for successes in the military and political training of the Red Navy-men."<sup>7</sup>

The newly created fleet gained strength year by year. In the autumn of 1936, in the largest exercise of the troops of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army and the Pacific Fleet, the Pacific Fleet sailors demonstrated a high level of combat readiness. They successfully carried out all the tasks confronting them and passed the exam for combat maturity. The actions of the fleet formations and units were highly praised by the USSR Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Cmsr 1st Rank Ya. B. Gamarnik and the commander of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army, Mar SU V. K. Blyukher, who attended the exercise.

In subsequent years, M. V. Viktorov devoted a great deal of energy to strengthening the combat might of the Pacific Fleet. In particular, he introduced constant combat patrolling of the ships. The surface vessels and submarines began operating year-round. Such concepts as the degree of combat readiness of the fleet formations were established under him.<sup>8</sup>

In August 1937, Flt Flagman 1st Rank M. V. Viktorov was appointed the chief of the RKKA Navy Directorate. In this post, his activities were directed at further increasing the combat capability of the Soviet Navy and strengthening Soviet defenses.

Flt Flagman 1st Rank M. V. Viktorov was elected a candidate member and member of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee]. For great services to the Soviet state as well as for courage and valor shown during the years of the Civil War, he received the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner and Red Star.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, p 136.

<sup>2</sup> "Istoriya voyenno-morskogo iskusstva" [The History of Naval Art], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1963, pp 38, 77.

- <sup>3</sup> "Dvazhdy Krasnoznamenny Balticкий flot" [Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet], Voyenizdat, 1978, pp 168-169.
- <sup>4</sup> "Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya" [Soviet Historical Encyclopedia], Vol 3, Moscow, 1963, p 469.
- <sup>5</sup> V. A. Andreyev, "Morya i gody" [Seas and Years], Voyenizdat, 1982, p 126.
- <sup>6</sup> "Boyevoy put' Sovetskogo Voyenno-Morskogo Flota" [The Campaign Record of the Soviet Navy], Voyenizdat, 1974, p 143.
- <sup>7</sup> "Krasnoznamenny Tikhookeanskiy flot" [The Red Banner Pacific Fleet], Voyenizdat, 1973, pp 123-124.
- <sup>8</sup> V. A. Andreyev, op. cit., p 262.

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## BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON ARMY CORPS COMMANDER S. S. VOSTRETSOV GIVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 24 Nov 83) pp 85-87

[Article by Col (Ret) Ye. Timofeyev: "Corps Commander S. S. Vostretsov (On the 100th Anniversary of His Birthday)"]

[Text] At the beginning of 1923, the command of the 5th Red Banner Army adopted a decision to eliminate the last major counterrevolutionary nest of the Kolchak Gen Pepelyayev on the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk. The carrying out of this mission was entrusted to the assistant commander of the 36th Transbaykal Division, Stepan Sergeyevich Vostretsov who was appointed commander of the expeditionary detachment.<sup>1</sup>

The choice was not accidental. Army Cmdr I. P. Uborevich knew him well as a participant in the storming of Spassk, as a master of organizing surprise attacks for the enemy. He was highly regarded for his resourcefulness, unrestrained bravery and firm commander will in controlling combat and in achieving victory.

In May 1919, S. S. Vostretsov had been given a brief but very objective and flattering recommendation: "A soldier of the revolution. An energetic leader in combat."<sup>2</sup> His combat achievements in defeating the interventionists and the White Guards during the years of the Civil War were recognized by three Orders of the Red Banner.<sup>3</sup>

In April 1923, S. S. Vostretsov traveled to Vladivostok to organize and prepare the expeditionary detachment. In a short period of time 800 of the best soldiers and commanders were selected from the 2d Nerchinsk Regiment of the XVII Maritime Corps, including more than 80 persons who were members of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)]. Two old cargo and passenger steamers, the "Stavropol" and "Indigirka" were assigned to delivery the detachment to the Okhotsk coast. The boats had to be quickly repaired.

On 23 April, by Order No 0105 signed by I. P. Uborevich, the detachment was given the following mission: 1. In the briefest time to eliminate the Pepelyayev White Guard band in the Okhotsk-Ayan area and recover the gold and furs seized by it. 2. ...To first occupy Okhotsk and after this with the first opportunity Ayan. 3. To restore Soviet power in the areas cleared of the White

bands, being guided by the provisions on extraordinary measures to secure revolutionary order...."<sup>4</sup>

During the night of 26 April, S. S. Vostretsov held a secret meeting at which he informed the commanders of the mission received and urged them in the crossing of the sea to be an example of restraint and discipline and to prevent the faint-hearted from panicing in a storm.

At the end of 26 April, the "Indigirka" and "Stavropol" cast off and headed out of Zolotoy Rog Bay. In the La Perouse Strait which was under the control of the Japanese, S. S. Vostretsov ordered that precautionary measures be taken with lights extinguished and the radio operating only for receiving. The soaking rain and fog helped to pass the strait unnoticed.

Some of the soldiers began to feel seasick from the heavy swell. In entering the Sea of Okhotsk ice appeared. A blizzard, fog and enormous ice floes blocked the way. During the night of 9 May the hull of the "Indigirka" sprung its first leak. Vostretsov, learning about the emergency, went down into the hold and rolling up his sleeves, began to help the sailors.

"Now that is a commander!" they said in praise. "We have never seen a superior use a sledge hammer that way!"

How could they know that Stepan Vostretsov had been a blacksmith before his induction into the army.

In mid-May, both steamboats were caught fast in the ice. The commander of the detachment of ships, the navyman N. N. Azar'yev, told S. S. Vostretsov who was standing next to him on the bridge:

"Well, comrade commander, we have entered the Sea of Okhotsk too early. We cannot get through the ice!"

"We must get through," replied Stepan Sergeyevich.

At a meeting with the captains of the steamships, he defended his position of going forward and only forward, although the sailors tried to show the impossibility of further advance and the unjustified risk. But S. S. Vostretsov did not abandon his demands. It was decided to move closer to shore, observing precautionary measures.

Slowly, frequently halting in dense fog and among large ice fields, the steamships continued on their way to the goal and finally came out in clear water. The ice campaign which lasted almost a month was over.

For ensuring a surprise attack on the White Guards, S. S. Vostretsov decided to conduct it at night and the detachment would be landed 15 km away from Okhotsk in the mouth of the Marikanka River. On 4 June 1923, the landing on the coast was still continuing while the assault group had already received the order to advance on Okhotsk. Along the way scouts captured a White Guard messenger who provided valuable information on the enemy forces.

Two or three hours before dawn, S. S. Vostretsov led the detachment to the city. The Red Armymen noiselessly occupied the streets, then suddenly shouts rang out. It was the guard opening fire. The battalion commander S. P. Kuznetsov fell, cut down by enemy bullets. Having assessed the situation, Vostretsov led the men into the attack and they broke into the barracks. The White Guards surrendered. Their Gen Rakitin during this time was hunting in the taiga. They found him there but were not able to capture him. The general shot himself.

In the meanwhile, in Okhotsk an order was received by radio to immediately send the "Stavropol" to Vladivostok. This complicated the situation. On 11 June the "Stavropol" headed to Vladivostok and the "Indigirka" to Ayan.

Again to ensure the surprise of the raid, S. S. Vostretsov took a decision to land the detachment 100 km to the north of Ayan. Some 476 soldiers and commanders moved quickly over the roadless terrain, across hillocks, mountain rivers and swamps.

Gen Pepelyayev was expecting the landing of the Reds at Ayan itself and was confident that he could easily push it into the sea with his own detachments. Vostretsov upset the general's plans. Late in the evening of 17 June, the detachment suddenly entered the settlement. Without a single shot being fired, the Red Armymen disarmed the patrol. A captured officer pointed to the house where Pepelyayev's staff was located. Vostretsov ordered that this building be surrounded and along with the lieutenant colonel captured in Ayan went up to the general.<sup>5</sup> The stunned White Guards did not even resist and Pepelyayev signed the order for the surrender of the garrison.

On 24 June, the "Indigirka" with the expeditionary detachment and 367 prisoners on board headed to Vladivostok. The combat mission had been brilliantly carried out. The White Guard bands had been eliminated and Soviet power restored in Okhotsk and Ayan. The motherland highly praised the actions of S. S. Vostretsov, having awarded him his fourth Order of the Red Banner.<sup>6</sup>

Soon thereafter Stepan Sergeyevich Vostretsov was appointed the commander of the 84th Rifle Division which was located in Tula. Here he came to feel that he lacked theoretical training and submitted a request to be sent to the Military Academy Courses for the Superior RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Command Personnel. After completing them, S. S. Vostretsov became the commander of the 27th Omsk Rifle Division where he had begun his service in the Red Army as an assistant company commander. In 1928, there followed a new assignment as divisional chief and military commissar of the glorious 51st Perekop Division.

In the autumn of 1929, S. S. Vostretsov again showed his skill at surprise attack. During the period of the conflict on the East China Railroad he was assigned to head the Transbaykal Troop Group. On 17 November, the group made a surprise attack against the basic enemy forces, forcing them to surrender.<sup>7</sup> This was the last combat operation of S. S. Vostretsov for which he received an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon, the highest decoration of those times.

In May 1931, S. S. Vostretsov was sent to the Northern Caucasus Military District to hold the position of commander and commissar of the IX Rifle Corps.

S. S. Vostretsov did a great deal, sparing no effort. This intense work undermined his health which had still not recovered after an extended illness. He died on 3 May 1932. On his grave in Rostov-na-Donu stands a monument with the inscription: "To Stepan Sergeyevich Vostretsov--A Hero Fighter for the Workers Cause and Valiant Commander of the Worker-Peasant Red Army."

More than a half century has passed since the life of the legendary Civil War hero was cut short but his memory lives on and will always live on in the hearts of the Soviet people. Streets have been named after him in Vladivostok, Magadan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Ufa, Birsk and Vitebsk, kolkhozes in Bashkiria and the Far East as well as many school and pioneer detachments. Three vessels are named "S. S. Vostretsov." Monuments have been put up to him in the hero's homeland, in the rayon center of Burayev in the Bashkir ASSR, at the Kolkhoz imeni Vostretsov in the village of Novo-Bekmetovo and on the Okhotsk coast in Ayan.

The life of Stepan Sergeyevich Vostretsov, an active participant in the Civil War, at present serves as an example for those who are guarding our motherland, the victories of October, peace and socialism.

#### FOOTNOTES

1 S. S. Vostretsov was born on 17 (29) December 1883 in the village of Kazantsevo, now Vostretsovo in Burayevskiy Rayon of the Bashkir ASSR. For revolutionary activities among the soldiers in 1909, he was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment but during the years of World War I was made a warrant officer ["praporshchik"] for bravery. From 1905 through 1918, he was a Menshevik. During the Civil War he volunteered for the Red Army and commanded the 242d Rifle Regiment of the 27th Rifle Division. In January 1920, he was admitted to the Communist Party. After being wounded in 1921, he was appointed to the position of chief of the administration of the VChK [Secret Police] troops for guarding the Siberian frontier and then commanded a brigade of the 35th Rifle Division, and in 1922, a group of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic and participated in the liberation of the Maritime Province.

2 TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 1324, inv. 1, file 112, sheet 107.

3 For the decorations of S. S. Vostretsov, see: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1966, p 13.

4 TsGA VMF [Central State Navy Archives], folio r-2193, inv. 2, file 11, sheet 9.

5 OGONEK, No 9, 1928, p 14.

6 Order of the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary Military Council] of 18 October 1923.

<sup>7</sup> For more detail see: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1974, pp 125-126.

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## CURRENT EVENTS, FACTS, FINDINGS

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[Brief historical reports]

[Text] On Russian Field Marshals--by Maj Gen (Ret) A. Zubarev and Sr Lt (Res) V. Yegorshin from Kuybyshev

In individual sources in literature incomplete or not completely accurate information is provided on who was awarded the title of field marshal in Russia and when. The brief paper provided on this question has been prepared on the basis of checked data.

Field marshal was the highest general's rank (military rank) in prerevolutionary Russia and some other states (Great Britain, Prussia, Germany, Austria, Austro-Hungary and others) corresponding to the rank of marshal. It was first introduced in the 16th Century in Austria. It was established in Russia in 1699 (abolished in 1917) and was awarded to the commander-in-chief of an army for the successful conduct of a war to prominent military and state figures.

In Russia the title of field marshal was given to 65 persons. Among them were 62 field marshal generals, 2 field marshal lieutenant generals (the rank was awarded to 2 foreigners in the service of Peter I, G. B. Ogilby in 1702 and G. Goltz in 1707) and 1 navy field marshal general (I. G. Chernyshev in 1796).

Below we give the names of persons having the rank of field marshal general in the Russian Army (with the exception of the above-named) and the year of the awarding of the rank is given.

Russian military leaders, figures and chiefs: B. P. Sheremetev (1701 or 1702), A. D. Menshikov (1709), A. I. Repnin (1724 or 1725), M. M. Golitsyn (1725), Ya. V. Bryus (1726), B. Kh. Minikh (1732), P. P. Lassi (1736), P. S. Saltykov (1759), P. I. Shuvalov (1761), A. M. Golitsyn (1769), P. A. Rumyantsev (1770), Z. G. Chernyshev (1773), G. A. Potemkin (1784), A. V. Suvorov (1794), N. V. Repnin (1796), M. F. Kamenskiy (1797), A. A. Prozorovskiy (1807), I. V. Gudovich (1807), M. I. Kutuzov (1812), M. B. Barklay de Tolli (1814), P. Kh. Vitgenshteyn (1826), F. V. Osten-Saken (1826), I. I. Dibich (1829), I. F. Paskevich (1829), P. M. Volkonskiy (1843), M. S. Vorontsov (1856), A. I. Baryatinskiy (1859), F. F. Berg (1865), I. V. Gurko (1894) and D. A. Milyutin (1898).

State leaders and other persons in civilian service: F. A. Golovin (1700), N. Yu. Trubetskoy (1756), A. I. Shuvalov (1761), A. P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin (1762), K. G. Razumovskiy (1764), N. I. Saltykov (1796).

Members of the imperial family, courtiers as well as other figures receiving the rank for long service: V. V. Dolgorukov (1728), I. Yu. Trubetskoy (1728), A. G. Razumovskiy (1756), S. F. Apraksin (1756), A. B. Buturlin (1756), I. P. Saltykov (1796), V. P. Musin-Pushkin (1797), and the Romanov grand dukes Nikolay Nikolayevich (1878) and Mikhail Nikolayevich (1878).

Foreigners in Russian service at different times: K. Kroy (1700), Ya. Sapega (1726), L. Hessen-Homburg (1742), P. Holstein-Beck (1762), G. Schleswig-Holstein (1762), I. Elmpt (1797) and F. Broglie (1797).

In addition, the rank of Russian field marshal general was also given to foreigners who never served in the Russian Army: the German princes K. Holstein-Beck (1761) and L. Hessen-Darmstadt (1774), the Englishman A. Wellington (1818), the Austrians Grand Duke Johann (1837), I. Radetzky (1849) and Grand Duke Albrecht (1872), the state and military leaders of Prussia including Crown Prince Friedrich-Wilhelm (1872) and H. Moltke the Elder (1872), the King of Montenegro Nikola Negos (1910) and the King of Romania Carol I (1912).

For the first time in Russia the title of field marshal general was presented to F. A. Golovin (1700), a statesman and diplomat. Two Russian field marshal generals became generalissimos: A. D. Menshikov (1727) and A. V. Suvorov (1799).

Literature: "Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], 3d Edition, Vol 6, Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1971, p 615; "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voyenizdat, 1976, p 509; "Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Historical Encyclopedia], Vol 15, Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1974, p 13; D. Bantysh-Kamenskiy, "Biografii rossiyskikh generalissimus i general-fel'dmarshalov" [Biographies of Russian Generalissimos and Field Marshal Generals], St. Petersburg, 1840-1841; A. Bartenev, "Biographies of Generalissimos and Field Marshal Generals of the Russian Imperial Army, VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY SBORNIK, No 1, 1911, pp 1-5; "Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'" [Encyclopedic Dictionary], Brokgauz-Yefron, Vol VIII, Book 15, St. Petersburg, Topografiya Akts. Obshch. Brokgauz-Yefron, 1911, p 317; "Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Military Encyclopedia], Vol VII, St. Petersburg, 4th Edition of I. D. Sytin, 1912, p 232; Vol XII, p 394.

The Development of the Partisan Movement in Brest Oblast--by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col (Ret) B. Chertok from Moscow

Regardless of a number of difficulties related to the development of the partisan movement in the western oblasts of Belorussia, here literally from the first days of the war the Soviet patriots actively fought the Nazi invaders. Even in the summer of 1941, on the territory of Brest Oblast, the men of the Soviet Army who were surrounded created partisan groups and detachments in the forests while in the cities and large population points the communists, Komsomol members and nonparty activists organized underground anti-Nazi groups and

organizations. Literally on the third day of the war, for example, the partisan detachment under the command of S. K. Dorodnykh was established in Zhabinkovskiy Rayon.

In the second half of August 1941, in the Razhany Forest there was a meeting of representatives from 16 underground groups and partisan detachments in Brest Oblast. Upon the proposal of the chairman of the Krasnyanskiy Rural Soviet in Prozhanskiy Rayon, M. Ye. Krishtafovich, here specific measures were worked out to develop the partisan struggle. The meeting adopted a decision to subordinate all partisan groups operating in the area of the Ruzhany Forest to single leadership headed by Sr Lt A. Zhurba (PA IIP pri TsK KP(b)B [Party Archives of the Party History Institute under the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], folio 3500, inv. 4, file 306, sheets 275, 276).

The combat activities of the partisans in Brest Oblast acquired an everbroader scope each passing day. Substantial attacks were made by the partisans against the enemy lines of communications and garrisons and their reconnaissance activities were strengthened.

In September 1941, the central committee of the KP(b)B [Belorussian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] sent to Brest Oblast its representatives: the chairman of the Ruzhany Settlement Soviet I. P. Urbanovich and the deputy of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet I. I. Zhishko. They established close contact with the communists and Komsomol members remaining in the enemy rear, and focused them on developing the partisan movement and underground struggle against the occupiers. In Ruzhany and certain other rayons in the oblast, the representatives of the KP(b)B Central Committee set up underground anti-Nazi committees and groups.

Certain anti-Nazi organizations by the end of the year numbered 30-50 members. Their membership included persons of the most different ages, party and non-party persons, peasants, intellectuals and servicemen who were unable to escape from encirclement. Along with political work, the anti-Nazi organizations conducted combat operations and provided aid to the partisans in the form of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

In May 1942, upon the initiative of I. P. Urbanovich, I. I. Zhishko, M. Ye. Krishtafovich and Ye. M. Afanas'yev, the Brest Oblast "Committee for Struggling Against the Nazi Occupiers" was organized. I. P. Urbanovich became its secretary, M. Ye. Krishtafovich was the second secretary, Ye. M. Afanas'yev was the head of the special section, A. Zhurba was the inspector of the partisan groups and detachments and I. I. Zhishko was an inspector (PA IIP pri TsK KP(b)B, folio 3660, inv. 1, file 22, sheet 45).

The Anti-Nazi Committee brought together and directed the activities of the basic partisan detachments in the oblast. The existing detachments were strengthened and seven new ones were organized with a membership of 1,500 persons. For example, the detachment under the command of F. Gorlanov fought actively. Upon instructions of the Anti-Nazi Committee, the detachment defeated the police details in the villages of Rudniki, Mogilevtsy and Voytov Most. At the end of May, the partisans from the detachment ambushed members of a punitive expedition. Seven motor vehicles were burned up and 53 Nazis killed.

In the summer of 1942, the committee established contact with the commander of the Pinsk partisan detachment, V. Z. Korzh and later with the Minsk underground party obkom which was headed by the member of the KP(b)B Central Committee V. I. Kozlov. The representative of the Anti-Nazi Committee I. I. Zhishko met with the secretary of the KP(b)B Central Committee I. P. Ganenko who was with the Minsk partisans and received recommendations from him on the further work of the committee.

The Brest Oblast Anti-Nazi Committee, in essence, was the leading staff of the partisan forces in many rayons of the oblast. Its members took a direct part in working out and implementing all the most significant combat operations of the partisan detachments.

Regardless of the fierce repression by the enemy, the Brest partisans continued active subversive and reconnaissance work and organized attacks on the Nazi garrisons. For example, the partisan detachments imeni Dmitrov, Shchors and Voroshilov on 2 August 1942 routed the police garrison in the town of Kosovo. Here the partisans killed 80 Nazis and took 11 prisoner. The Brest Anti-Nazi Committee was given significant aid in strengthening the partisan movement by the reconnaissance group from the Soviet Army which was sent to Brest Oblast in October 1942. The reconnaissance group was under the command of Capt I. F. Topkin and after his wounding, Sr Lt V. V. Aliseychik. Using the radio of the reconnaissance group, the Committee maintained contact with the unoccupied territory and regularly transmitted to Moscow the obtained intelligence data as well as reports on the actions of the underground and partisans.

At the end of February 1943, the Brest Anti-Nazi Committee together with the leadership of the army reconnaissance group organized the large partisan detachment imeni S. M. Kirov from the diverse partisan groups. The detachment was under the command of Maj K. B. Nishchenkov and the commissar was A. F. Pochebutov.

In the aims of further developing the partisan movement in the western oblasts, the KP(b)B Central Committee in October 1942 adopted a decision to create leading and party bodies here. In particular, the Brest underground obkom of the KP(b)B was established. S. I. Sikorskiy and I. I. Bobrov were appointed obkom secretaries. The obkom received instructions to create partisan detachments in each rayon of the oblast and to develop the partisan movement more widely.

Personnel from the Brest underground party obkom were flown to the Minsk partisan formation. From here the obkom with the combat detachment of 50 men assigned to it made a march virtually across all Belorussia. Having reached its destination at the beginning of April 1943, it immediately began to develop organizational and political work among the population. At that time the situation demanded primarily the centralized leadership over the partisan movement. For this reason, under the underground obkom a staff was set up to direct the partisan detachments in the oblast. Its work was headed by the secretary of the underground obkom S. I. Sikorskiy.

By June 1943, the Brest underground party obkom and the staff of the partisan movement, with the aid of the Committee for Struggle Against German Occupiers had succeeded in establishing contact with all the partisan detachments on the

territory of the oblast and in organizing in many towns and population points underground Komsomol and anti-Nazi organizations. As a result, the influx of Soviet patriots from the local population into the partisan detachments was increased and new partisan detachments began to be organized. On 1 August 1943, the oblast already had operating 2 partisan brigades and 11 detachments with a total membership of 3,603 persons.

The intense work by the underground party obkom which assumed direct leadership over the partisan movement in the oblast was quickly felt in the increased partisan forces and the further intensification of their combat activities.

#### Aid from the Orel Workers to the Front Line--by Candidate of Historical Sciences T. Ashikhmina from Orel

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the workers of Orel Oblast provided great material aid to the Soviet Army. They organized the mass collection of funds for building military equipment, they delivered food products and clothing to the defense fund and they actively subscribed to the state loans (see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1977, pp 127-128). This aid was carried out under very difficult conditions, since the city and a significant portion of the oblast for almost 2 years was occupied by Nazi troops.

The aid of the Orel people to the front was not limited to just collecting money and food products. Equally important was the nation-wide concern shown during the war years for the families of frontline soldiers. Starting in 1943, Orel Oblast began to regularly provide monthly and 10-day aid to the families of frontline soldiers. Their work was directed by commissions consisting of representatives from the soviet and party bodies as well as the military commissariats. During the monthly and 10-day periods, the commissions organized the mass preparation of fuel, feed for livestock, they established additional stocks of food and industrial goods and carefully studied the material situation and domestic conditions under which the families of the frontline soldiers lived. The results of the months and 10-day periods were discussed at sessions of the party raykom and gorkom bureaus.

By the beginning of 1944, the assistance fund for the families of frontline soldiers in Orel Oblast had 761 tons of grain, 727 tons of potatoes and over 620,000 rubles (Party Archives of the Orel CPSU Obkom [OPA], folio 52, inv. 7, file 525, sheet 24 verso). In just the first half of 1943, the sections for state welfare and housing placement for servicemen families gave out to the families of frontline soldiers state monetary aid totaling 356,000 rubles and provided help from funds collected during a 10-day period for aiding serviceman families totaling 837,830 rubles; they issued 25,180 poods of various products, 6,784 m<sup>3</sup> of fuel, and a great deal of clothing and footwear (ORLOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 July 1943).

Warmly supported among the Orel workers was the appeal of the Tambov workers to establish a large "Health Fund for the Defenders of the Motherland." The kolkhoz members from the agricultural artel "Pobeda proletariata" in Krasnozorenskiy Rayon were the first to appeal to all the kolkhoz workers in the oblast to establish the "Health Fund for the Defenders of the Motherland." This was

during the period of the fierce battles on the Kursk Salient. By the end of the year, the "Health Fund for the Defenders of the Motherland" in just the 21 rayons liberated from the occupiers prior to 1 August 1943 had collected 170,877 liters of milk, almost 150,000 eggs, more than 2,000 tons of potatoes and vegetables, 15 tons of meat and suet, 2 tons of coarse tobacco and many other products (OPA, folio 52, inv. 7, file 325, sheet 24).

Concern for wounded soldiers was one of the forms of aiding the front. In 1943, 27 hospitals were located in Orel Oblast. The Committee for Aid in Caring for Sick and Wounded Soldiers and Commanders of the Red Army established in the oblast took responsibility for all the hospitals and assigned enterprises, institutions, kolkhozes and sovkhozes to them for providing permanent sponsorship work. For example, during the period of the Kursk Battle, the oblast established 18 permanent points for around-the-clock rest for wounded soldiers and commanders of the Soviet Army.

The questions of organizing sponsorship work in the hospitals were a matter of special discussion at the enterprise party meetings. The hospitals were constantly helped by the local party and Komsomol organizations. The party obkom repeatedly inspected the condition of the hospitals. The results of the check were discussed at bureau sessions and specific measures were adopted at them to improve aid to the wounded. The party committees were concerned with the prompt repair on hospital buildings and for creating reserves of food and fuel in them.

The kolkhoz peasantry assumed the concern for additional food for wounded. In 1943, the oblast's population collected and turned over to the hospitals almost 16,000 parcels, more than 105,000 eggs, around 2,500 slaughtered poultry, around 3 tons of meat and suet, almost 2 tons of vegetables and fruits, around 9 tons of flour and wheat, 200 kg of honey and sugar (OPA, folio 52, inv. 8, file 473, sheets 2, 3).

The oblast workers not only helped the army materially, but also supported the soldiers morally. A collective from the oblast drama theater from just September 1942 through June 1943 gave 56 sponsorship concerts and performances for the Red Army soldiers and commanders. Many creative collectives regularly performed in the units and hospitals.

The diverse aid of the Orel workers to the front, to the wounded and to the families of frontline fighters helped to carry out an important political task of strengthening the ties of the rear and the front as well as to increase the combat capability of the Soviet Army units and formations. Even during the years of the Civil War, V. I. Lenin had emphasized that "when the Red Army men saw that the rear services were concerned for them then the Red Army was inspired by that spirit which gave it victory" (V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 361).

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CSO: 1801/149

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LIST OF MILITARY-RELATED NEW BOOKS GIVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press  
24 Nov 83) back cover

[Book advertisements]

[Text] Dol'nikov, G. U., "Letit stal'naya eskadril'ya" [The Steel Squadron Flies], Voyenizdat, 1983, 221 pages with illustrations (military memoirs), price 1 ruble 20 kopecks.

Grigoriy Ustinovich Dol'nikov has linked his life with aviation. He is presently a Hero of the Soviet Union, an Honored Military Pilot of the USSR and Colonel-General Aviation. His book tells about the courageous men and the combat deeds of the fighter pilots in the 100th Guards Air Regiment.

"Komandiru o voyenno-ugolovnom zakonodatel'stve" [For the Commander on Military Penal Legislation] (under the general editorship of A. G. Gornyy), Voyenizdat, 1983, 176 pages, price 35 kopecks.

The book gives the basic provisions on criminal liability for servicemen for the commission of military crimes according to the current military criminal legislation. It explains the concept of a military crime, it gives the types of punishments employed for servicemen and gives a legal description of the specific types of military crimes. In addition, it examines the basic areas of work to prevent military crimes.

Trunski, S., "Ne tak davno" [Not So Long Ago], memoirs, translated from the Bulgarian, Voyenizdat, 1982, 526 pages, price 2 rubles 10 kopecks.

The author of the book--Hero of Bulgaria, member of the BCP Central Committee and deputy minister of defense of the Bulgarian People's Army--Slavko Trunski in an artistic form tells about the partisan movement in Bulgaria during the years of World War II.

A former legendary partisan commander, he creates vivid images of the partisans and the best sons of the Bulgarian people who showed mass heroism in the struggle against the monarchical-fascist enslavers.

Mencik, J., Sulig, R., "Rasplata za oshibku" [Payment for a Mistake], novels, translated from the Czech, Voyenizdat, 1982, 368 pages, price 2 rubles 20 kopecks.

The two novels which have been made into a book are devoted to the unstinting struggle of the Czechoslovak state security bodies against the subversive activities of the imperialist states.

The authors show the involvement of Western intelligence agents in the actions of the Czechoslovak counterrevolution during the period of 1968-1969 and disclose the dirty methods of the secret warfare which is being waged against Czechoslovakia and the other socialist commonwealth countries.

Betancourt, L. A., "Zdes' pesok chishche" [Here the Sand is Cleaner], a novel, translated from the Spanish, Voyenizdat, 1982, 378 pages, price 2 rubles 70 kopecks.

The adventure novel by the Cuban writer has been written on the basis of real events. In it the author urges high revolutionary vigilance, he unmasks the criminal activities of imperialist intelligence agents against the socialist countries and engrossingly tells about the struggle of the Cuban state security bodies against the perfidious intrigues of American intelligence and the emigre rabble in its service.

Red'ko, B. F., "Ognem i slovom" [By Fire and Word] (frontline veterans relate), Voyenizdat, 1983, 141 pages, price 35 kopecks.

The author was a participant in the Great Patriotic War who rose from a soldier to an agitator in a rifle regiment and fought on the Volkhov, Stalingrad, Southern, Fourth Ukrainian, First Baltic and Third Belorussian Fronts. The book tells about those who by their ardent word and personal example led the men to a feat for the sake of the Soviet motherland.

Anan'yev, A. A., "Versty lyubvi" [Versts of Love], a novel, Voyenizdat, 1982, 351 pages, price 1 ruble 60 kopecks.

The book describes how in January 1944, the command of the First Belorussian Front worked out and carried out a combat operation to encircle and destroy the Nazi grouping in the area of Mozyr, Kalinkovichi. The book touches on the moral and social problems of our times.

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